Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-3001, Section "T" (1)
June 11, 2001
Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the United States of America on behalf of its agency, the U.S. Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and the SBA's employee, Linda D. Anderson ("Anderson"). The parties waived oral argument, and the matter was submitted on the briefs only. The Court, having considered the memoranda filed, the evidence submitted, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. Background
On July 31, 1997, James Bonvillain, Sr., and James Bonvillian, Jr., ("Bonvillains") purchased the F/V Captain Lloyd, a vessel that the Bonvillains had hoped to use to start a fishing business. This vessel was subject to an outstanding Preferred Ship Mortgage held by the United States Small Business Administration in the amount of $118,000. The SBA, through its agent Linda Anderson, agreed to release its lien to the Bonvillains for $30,000. To satisfy the lien and obtain capital to start their business, the Bonvillains negotiated with Hibernia Bank ("Hibernia") through its vice president, Jerry Ledet ("Ledet"), to apply for an SBA guaranteed loan in the amount of $150,000. James Bonvillain, Sr. also applied for a separate home equity loan for an additional $40,000. These loans, coupled with Bonvillain, Sr.'s infusion of $10,000 cash, were to give the Bonvillain's $200,000 to release the lien and refurbish the boat.
By letter dated November 21, 1997, the SBA notified James Bonvillain, Jr. that it would guarantee 75% of the requested $150,000 loan subject to six conditions: (1) He would provide a current financial statement from a CPA; (2) His financial condition would not adversely change prior to loan disbursement; (3) He would need to provide a Tax I.D. number; (4) He would need to provide a copy of a Form DD214 reflecting an Honorable Discharge from military service; (5) He would provide evidence that not less than $50,000 had been injected into the business as equity capital; and (6) He would provide a marine survey indicating that the value of F/V Captain Lloyd is at least $184,000.
The Bonvillains then met with Hibernia Bank representative Ledet to discuss and finalize the loan agreement. At this meeting, the Bonvillains informed Ledet that items one, two, three, and six were easily obtainable. Item four was only a matter of Bonvillain, Jr.'s formally applying for the discharge. To satisfy item number five, the $50,000 cash influx into the business, Bonvillain, Sr. and Ledet agreed that Hibernia would extend him a separate loan for $40,000 that would be combined with $10,000 of his own savings. Pursuant to this understanding, Bonvillain, Jr. resigned from the military, where he had served twelve years and had attained the rank of Staff Sergeant. At the time of his resignation, Bonvillain, Jr. claims he earned approximately $48,000 per year in salary and benefits.
On January 23, 1998, Hibernia notified Bonvillain, Sr. that it had refused the application for the mortgage of $40,000. Without the $40,000 mortgage, Bonvillain, Jr. was not able to satisfy the $50,000 cash infusion requirement for the SBA guarantee of the $150,000 loan. In seeking alternatives to raise the $40,000, Plaintiffs received many extensions of the deadlines to pay the $30,000 required to secure the release of the SBA's lien on the Captain Lloyd and of the closing date for the $150,000 loan guarantee from the SBA. Extensions were granted until June 11, 1998. The Plaintiffs sought loans from two lending institutions, Dryades Savings Bank ("Dryades") and America's Mortgage Resource ("America's"), in attempts to raise the necessary funds.
On May 26, 1998, Anderson spoke with a representative from Hibernia, who informed her that Bonvillain, Jr. had not presented the required cash injection, and, as a result, the loan had lapsed on April 21, 1998. This date had been Hibernia's extended deadline for the initial disbursement of loan funds as per the Authorization and Loan Agreement. On June 2, 1998, the SBA received a letter from Dryades, dated June 1, 1998, indicating that Dryades had received an application from Bonvillain, Jr. for a loan in the amount of $30,000. In this letter, Dryades indicated that its review of Bonvillain's loan application would be completed on June 20, 1998; therefore, Dryades requested an extension of the SBA's deadline to June 20, 1998.
That same day, Anderson received a telephone call from John Brocato, a representative of Dryades, who requested an extension to June 20, 1998. Anderson claims she informed him that based on Bonvillain, Jr.'s inability to comply with the terms of SBA's offer to release the lien for $30,000, and in light of other offers being higher than the Bonvillains', a further extension of the deadline would be unlikely. On June 2, 1998, Anderson received a telephone call from Bonvillain, Sr., who informed her that he had not received SBA's May 26, 1998 letter extending the deadline to June 5, 1998. Anderson subsequently faxed a copy of the letter to Bonvillain, Sr.
On June 4, 1998, in response to a request from the Bonvillains' counsel, Richard Barker, Anderson agreed to extend the deadline for the last time to June 11, 1998. Her letter also specified that the SBA needed to receive a certified check in the amount of $30,000 by June 11, 1998, for the Bonvillains to obtain a release of the lien. On June 10, 1998, the file was assigned to Joseph C. Charles, Jr., an SBA loan specialist. Charles had a single conversation with Bonvillain, Sr. on that date, in which Bonvillain, Sr. represented that they were still trying to raise the requisite funds for the cash injection.
The June 11, 1998 deadline came and went without the SBA receiving a certified check in the amount of $30,000. A faxed memo addressed to Anderson from America's dated June 11, 1998, indicated that the lender would need fifteen additional working days (until July 2, 1998) to process a loan to James Bonvillain. Charles denied the Bonvillains any further extensions beyond the final deadline of June 11, 1998.
As a result of the aforementioned events, the Bonvillains brought suit against the United States, Anderson, and Hibernia on November 12, 1998 in a action captioned James Bonvillain. Sr. and James Bonvillain, Jr. v. United States of America, et al, No. 98-3369, Div. "J" (1). That matter, "Bonvillain I." was assigned to the Honorable Carl J. Barbier. In Bonvillain I, the Plaintiffs alleged that "Anderson acted in concert, collusion, and conspiracy with others to restrain interstate trade and commerce by preventing and blocking plaintiffs efforts to close and obtain clear title to a fishing boat vessel which was to work in federal waters and was to sell its catch in interstate commerce." Bonvillain I at 6 (citing Complaint, paragraph XVI). In addition, the Bonvillains claimed that Anderson deprived them of their property without due process or just compensation. Id. at 6. The Bonvillains alleged that the United States was liable for Anderson's conduct under the theory of respondeat superior. In an attempt to recover monetary damages and receive injunctive relief, the Bonvillains sought recovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The Plaintiffs also alleged that Hibernia, through the negligence of its employee, Ledet, was a cause of the subsequent breach of contract by the SBA and the tortious conduct on the part of its agent, Anderson.
On August 25, 1999, Hibernia and Ledet filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. The Plaintiffs filed an opposition to this motion on November 10, 1999. A Final Judgment was entered on November 30, 1999, granting Hibernia's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, all claims against Hibernia were dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, in Bonvillain I, the United States and Anderson moved for two types of relief. First, the United States successfully moved to substitute itself for Anderson with respect to those allegedly tortious actions in which Anderson had acted in her official capacity. The Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 2679 (b)(1) required Anderson to be replaced by the United States as the Defendant to those claims stemming from Anderson's acting in her official capacity. Second, the United States and Anderson moved to dismiss all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs, including those claims arising from Anderson's acting in her individual capacity.
With respect to the claims against Anderson in her official capacity, the Bonvillain I court first held that all claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 were not actionable against a federal defendant. The Court explained that Section 1983 applies only to public officials acting under color of state law. Bonvillain I at 10 (citing Resident Council of Allen Pkwy Village v. HUD, 980 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, because the defendant, Linda Anderson, was not a state actor, those claims asserted against her pursuant to § 1983 were dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, the Bonvillain I court found that sovereign immunity bars actions for monetary damages arising under civil rights statutes or the Constitution when waiver has not been explicitly made. Bonvillain 1, at 11 (citing Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1972)). Accordingly, those additional claims against Anderson in her official capacity were dismissed with prejudice.
In addition to dismissing the claims against Anderson in her official capacity, the Bonvillain I, court dismissed all claims against Anderson in her individual capacity. Bonvillain I at 12. In its opinion, the court articulated the general rule that a plaintiff must allege conduct by a defendant that rises to the level of a constitutional violation.Bonvillain I at 12. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). The court found that, even assuming Anderson discussed the potential availability of the F/V Captain Lloyd and "made arrangements in furtherance of her own personal gain" to obtain the fishing boat, given the number of continuances granted to the Bonvillains, no constitutional violation occurred within the meaning ofBivens. See Bonvillain I at 12-13. The court further stated that even if a constitutional violation did occur, the Plaintiffs failed to plead or reply to the Government's motion with sufficient specificity to overcome a defense of qualified immunity. Bonvillain I at 13. (citing Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995)). Consequently, on November 30, 1999, Judge Barbier granted the United States' and Linda D. Anderson's Motions to Substitute and to Dismiss, whereby he dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted against Anderson in both her individual and official capacity. However, as they were deemed to be premature because the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, all claims brought pursuant to the FTCA were dismissed without prejudice.
On January 14, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed an administrative claim with the SBA. The denial of their claim was sent via certified mail on April 27, 2000. The Plaintiffs filed the present action on October 10, 2000 ("Bonvillain II"). The present case, Bonvillain II, involves the same parties (with the exception of Hibernia) and almost all of the same claims that were dismissed by Judge Barbier in Bonvillain I. Consequently, the United States filed the instant Motion to Dismiss in which it contends that the Plaintiffs are attempting to resurrect civil rights and constitutionally based claims that were dismissed with prejudice and are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata and, possibly, the applicable statute of limitations. In addition, the United States maintains that the Plaintiffs' FTCA claims should be dismissed because they are without merit.
II. Law and Analysis:
A. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
With respect to the Plaintiffs' constitutional and civil rights claims against the Defendants, the United States avers that said claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1) states that a claim shall be dismissed if this Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In the present case, the United States argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the constitutional and civil rights claims asserted by the Plaintiffs because said claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or the applicable statute of limitations.
The rules of res judicata encompass two separate but linked preclusive doctrines: (1) true res judicata, or claim preclusion, and (2) collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978). The former is typically what is called "res judicata," and it treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action." Id. at 535. (citing Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 1974, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9, 17-18). Res judicata incorporates the doctrines of merger and bar, thereby extending the effect of a judgment to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not those issues were raised at trial. For example, when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the plaintiffs claim is extinguished and that judgment then acts as a "bar." Id. at 535. In contrast, collateral estoppel recognizes that suits addressed to particular claims may present issues relevant to suits on other claims. In order to minimize redundant litigation, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties. Id. at 535-36. (citing Harris v. Washington, 1971, 404 U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30 L.Ed.2d 212). In the present case, the Defendants argue that claim preclusion, or true res judicata, bars the Plaintiffs from bringing the claims asserted in this action.
The Fifth Circuit's test for determining whether a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, has been articulated as follows:
"`For a prior judgment to bar an action on the basis of res judicata, the parties must be identical in both suits, the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, there must have a final judgment on the merits and the same cause of action must be involved in both cases.'"Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (quoting Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Following these guidelines, this Court is of the opinion that to the extent that the instant action contains claims that were previously adjudicated by Judge Barbier in Bonvillain I, this action shall be dismissed with prejudice because said claims are barred by res judicata. In the present action, the Plaintiffs are asserting claims that are nearly identical to those claims asserted in Bonvillain I. Moreover, the present claims are based on the same facts as alleged in Bonvillain I. The parties are even the same, save that Hibernia is not a defendant to the present action.
The court's order dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims in Bonvillain I stated that "the Bonvillains' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 are not actionable against a federal defendant, since Section 1983 applies to public officials acting under color of state law." Bonvillain I at 10. (citing Resident Council of Allen Pkwy. Village v. HUD, 980 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. 1993)). The court additionally held that "sovereign immunity bars suit for any claims for monetary damages arising under civil rights statutes or the Constitution, when a waiver has not been explicitly made." Bonvillain I at 11. (citing Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1972)). As stated above, the Plaintiffs have asserted these same claims against Anderson in her official capacity in the present action; therefore, the Plaintiffs' present claims against Anderson in her official capacity shall be dismissed with prejudice because they are barred by res judicata.
With respect to claims arising against Anderson in her personal capacity, the Bonvillain I court held that for the Plaintiffs to "maintain an action against Anderson, a federal employee, in her individual capacity, they must allege that her conduct rises to the level of a constitutional violation." Bonvillain I at 12. In that case, the court found that "no constitutional violation occurred within the meaning of Bivens." Bonvillain at 12-13. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). Just as with the claims against Anderson in her official capacity, in this case the Plaintiffs have asserted the same claims against Anderson in her personal capacity as asserted in Bonvillain I. Furthermore, the present claims are based on the same factual allegations as stated in Bonvillain I. Those claims were adjudicated on the merits by Judge Barbier in Bonvillain I therefore, the Plaintiffs' present claims against Anderson in her individual capacity are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, those claims shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Moreover, this Court notes that even if the Plaintiffs' claims against Anderson pursuant to Bivens are not barred by res judicata, they would nevertheless be untimely. While 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides for federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases filed against federal officers who violate the constitutional rights of others under the Bivens rationale, courts must look to state law to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983);Laspopoulos v. F.B.I., et al., 884 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. La. 1995). Tort actions prescribe after one year in Louisiana under La. Civ. Code art. 3492. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claims against Anderson pursuant toBivens are prescribed because all of the alleged events that form the basis for those claims occurred in 1997 and 1998, greater than one year prior to the filing of the present lawsuit.
In the present action, the only new constitutional claim against the government that the Plaintiffs vaguely articulate is one that Anderson's actions "may have been motivated by race." Bonvillain II, Complaint paragraph XXVI. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that Marcus Voisin, a white male, did not have to obtain ownership interest in the F/V Captain Lloyd to be considered a competing bidder. Whereas, the Bonvillains, black males, contend that said ownership interest was a requirement in their case. They contend that this alleged difference in treatment was motivated by race. Whatever the merits of this claim might be, as Anderson's alleged conduct occurred greater than one year prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit, the Plaintiffs are attempting to adjudicate claims that have prescribed. Accordingly, said discrimination claim against the Defendant shall be dismissed with prejudice, as it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
The Plaintiffs additionally claim that Anderson intentionally denied them a Veterans' Preference of 85% financing for guaranteed loans available to Veterans. However, in reviewing the Veterans' Handbook the Plaintiffs refer to (Bonvillain II, exhibit 14), the Court finds that Veterans may receive a guarantee of "up to" 85% on a loan. The fact that the Bonvillains were given 75% rather than the maximum of 85% is not indicative of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' purported claim with regard to Anderson's failure give them 85% financing for their guaranteed loan is without merit.
In conclusion, because Judge Barbier has already adjudicated the aforementioned claims against Anderson on the merits and because any other possible constitutional and/or civil rights claims against Anderson are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, this Court finds that all civil rights and constitutionally based claims asserted in the present suit against Linda D. Anderson are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claims against Anderson, in both her official and individual capacity, shall be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowery v. Texas AM University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997); Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the original complaint must be taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1980). A district court may not dismiss a complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);Blackburn v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit defines this strict standard as, "whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247 (citing 5 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601 (1969)).
Because all civil rights and constitutionally based claims against both the United States and Anderson are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or the applicable statutes of limitations, the only claims capable of surviving are those brought against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680. However, in the instant Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' FTCA cause of action fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to the FTCA. Accordingly, the Defendants seek the dismissal of said FTCA claims with prejudice.
The United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit except to the extent that it has waived its sovereign immunity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983);United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-814 (1976); Advanced Materials, Inc. v. U.S., 955 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. La. 1997). Congress waived the federal government's immunity under limited circumstances by the passage of the FTCA. The FTCA allows parties to bring suit against the federal government only for "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b). Because the waiver of sovereign immunity is so limited, it must be strictly construed by the courts. Owen v. United States, 935 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1991); Levrie v. Department of Army, 810 F.2d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1987).
In the present case, the Plaintiffs assert what is essentially a claim for intentional acts. The Plaintiffs allege that Anderson intentionally used her position with the SBA to circumvent their business plans by soliciting other potential buyers in an attempt to undermine their business venture. They allege that Anderson discussed the potential availability of the F/V Captain Lloyd with her friends and business associates, in furtherance of her own personal gain. In addition, the Plaintiffs believe that Anderson "acted in concert, collusion and conspiracy with others to restrain interstate trade and commerce by preventing and blocking plaintiffs' efforts to close and obtain clear title to a fishing [boat] which was to work in federal waters and was to sell its catch in interstate commerce." Bonvillain II, Complaint paragraph XXI.
As mentioned above, the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to negligent acts of government employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b). Sovereign immunity is not waived for intentional acts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675. In Advanced Materials, Inc. v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 58, 59 (E.D. La. 1997), the court stated that the question of whether the (FTCA) provides jurisdiction turns upon the substance of the claim, and in making this determination, "a court is not bound by the parties' characterizations of the complaint." Advanced Materials, Inc. v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 58, 59 (E.D. La. 1997) (citing City Nat. Bank v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 536, 546 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1990); Hassan v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. Development, 923 F. Supp. 890, 894-895 (W.D. La 1990)). In Advanced Materials, the Plaintiff sought to maintain a lawsuit as a tort action by simply labeling a contract dispute a tort suit. See id. In the present case, the Bonvillains describe conduct of Anderson, that, if taken as true, would certainly be characterized as an intentional acts. The fact that the Plaintiffs mention the word "negligence" in paragraphs XX and XXV of their Complaint does not determine that the complained of conduct is indeed negligence. In fact, the Plaintiffs describe Anderson's alleged conduct as "intentional, willful, wanton, arbitrary and capricious, and done with callous disregard for plaintiffs' rights." Bonvillain II, Complaint paragraph XX. This clearly alleges intentional misconduct on the part of Anderson; therefore, the aforementioned FTCA claims against the government for the intentional actions of Anderson fail to state a cause of action for which relief can be obtained under the FTCA.
In addition to the intentional act claims brought pursuant to the FTCA, the Plaintiffs also assert that the United States is liable to them via the principle of respondeat superior for an alleged breach of contract by Anderson. As stated above, the FTCA grants jurisdiction only for "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b). The FTCA simply does not encompass contract claims. Therefore, the Bonvillains' claim of breach of contract cannot fall under the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA. Accordingly, all claims brought by the Plaintiffs pursuant to the FTCA shall be dismissed with prejudice.
C. The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint:
On May 18, 2001, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages. In said complaint, the Plaintiffs assert virtually identical claims as brought in both Bonvillain I andBonvillain II. In response to the Plaintiffs' filing of their Amended Complaint, the United States filed a Motion for Reconsideration, requesting that this Court reconsider allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint.
After thorough review, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint adds no new viable claims or pertinent facts to this litigation. In its Motion for Reconsideration, the United States avers that all of the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint (other than those claims that fall under the FTCA) are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the applicable statutes of limitation because of Bonvillain I. This Court agrees. Furthermore, this Court finds that those claims brought in the Amended Complaint pursuant to the FTCA are the same as those brought in the Original Complaint in the present action; therefore, it follows that the FTCA claims contained in the Amended Complaint are without merit for the same reasons that the FTCA claims contained in the Original Complaint are without merit. Consequently, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state any valid claim for which relief can be granted. Accordingly, all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, this Court notes that because all claims asserted in the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice, the United States' Motion for Reconsideration requesting that this Court reconsider allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint is hereby deemed moot.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have failed to state any valid claims for which relief may be granted because all claims brought by the Plaintiffs in both their original complaint and their Amended Complaint are barred either by res judicata or the applicable statute of limitations, or they fail to state valid claims for relief pursuant to the FTCA.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims asserted in the Original Complaint by the Plaintiffs, James Bonvillain, Sr., and James Bonvillian, Jr., against the Defendants, the United States of America on behalf of its agency, the U.S. Small Business Administration, and the SBA's employee, Linda D. Anderson, be, and the same are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims asserted in the Amended Complaint by the Plaintiffs, James Bonvillain, Sr., and James Bonvillian, Jr., against the Defendants, the United States of America on behalf of its agency, the U.S. Small Business Administration, and the SBA's employee, Linda D. Anderson, be, and the same are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' Motion for Reconsideration (Doe. 17) be, and the same is hereby, deemed MOOT.