Opinion
Civil Action No. 17-2810 (UNA)
02-12-2018
Oliver Boling, Petitioner, v. Mark S. Inch, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner is a District of Columbia prisoner incarcerated at the Estill Federal Correctional Institution in South Carolina. Appearing pro se, he has submitted an action for a writ of mandamus and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The application will be granted and this case will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring dismissal of a prisoner's case upon a determination that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
The extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus is available to compel an "officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Petitioner bears a heavy burden of showing that his right to a writ of mandamus is "clear and indisputable." In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "It is well settled that a writ of mandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts," Cox v. Sec'y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases), and it "will usually be denied when the petitioner could have invoked an adequate, ordinary remedy," In re GTE Service Corp., 762 F.2d 1024, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Petitioner claims that for 26 years, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons has withheld institutional and statutory good-time credit allegedly due him under D.C. law. Pet. at 1. Because the claim concerns the calculation of petitioner's sentence, it is the exclusive province of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding "that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus"). Moreover, "it is well-settled" in this circuit "that a [person] seeking relief from his conviction or sentence may not bring [actions for injunctive and declaratory relief]" but must proceed instead in habeas, Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations omitted), in the federal district court capable of exercising jurisdiction over "the respondent custodian," Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004). See Day v. Trump, 860 F.3d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal for want of jurisdiction where the District of Columbia was not "the district of residence of [petitioner's] immediate custodian for purposes of . . . habeas relief"); LoBue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082-84 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (determining that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action because the remedy of habeas corpus was available in the location of the plaintiffs' custodian).
For the foregoing reasons, this mandamus action will be dismissed. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/_________
United States District Judge Date: February 12, 2018