Opinion
2003-03548.
Decided March 8, 2004.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant third-party plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCarty, J.), entered March 27, 2003, which granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) and granted the third-party defendant's separate motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.
Baxter Smith, P.C., Jericho, N.Y. (Victor Kotec and Robert C. Baxter of counsel), for defendant third-party plaintiff-appellant.
Taub Marder, New York, N.Y. (Elliot H. Taub and Kenneth Marder of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker Sauer, Mineola, N.Y. (Norman H. Dachs of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, SANDRA L. TOWNES, JJ.
DECISION ORDER.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
This action arises from an accident which occurred when the plaintiff Douglas Boles was working for the third-party defendant subcontractor, Personal Touch Home Improvements, Inc. (hereinafter Personal Touch), installing vinyl siding on a one-family house. The scaffold on which Boles was standing collapsed, causing him to fall to the ground and sustain injuries.
On a claim pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), "[p]roof of a collapse of a safety device constitutes a prima facie showing that the statute was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of the worker's injuries" ( Dos Santos v. State of New York, 300 A.D.2d 434; see also Panek v. County of Albany, 99 N.Y.2d 452, 458; Saeed v. NY/Enterprise City Home Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 303 A.D.2d 484). The defendant third-party plaintiff, Dormer Giant, Inc., d/b a Dormers Are Us (hereinafter Dormer) failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to its liability.
The Supreme Court properly granted the separate motion of Personal Touch for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. The evidence relied on by Personal Touch demonstrated that it was Boles's employer, since it had hired him for continuous, full-time work, paid him a salary each week based on an hourly rate, and had the power to control the means of completing the work ( see Matter of Ted Is Back Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 725; Sikes v. Chevron Cos., 173 A.D.2d 810; Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Lindenhurst Green White Corp., 101 A.D.2d 730) . In response to the prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment by Personal Touch, Dormer failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, since Boles did not sustain a "grave injury," the third-party action by Dormer against Personal Touch for contribution or indemnity is barred as a matter of law ( see Workers' Compensation Law § 11; Schuler v. Kings Plaza Shopping Ctr. Mar., 294 A.D.2d 556). That statutory bar, unlike the bar on personal injury actions by employees, is not affected by the failure of Personal Touch to secure the payment of workers' compensation for Boles ( see Workers' Compensation Law § 11).
SANTUCCI, J.P., FLORIO, SCHMIDT and TOWNES, JJ., concur.