Opinion
Case No. 1:07-cv-784.
September 28, 2007
ORDER
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution in Chillicothe, Ohio, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his rights. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a "litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(I). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
Congress has also authorized the dismissal of complaints which fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii-iii); 1915A(b)(1-2). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the persons engaging in the conduct complained of were acting under color of state law and that this conduct deprived plaintiff of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 517 (1984)). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief "if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action against Steve E. Martin, William H. Andersen, and Barry Levy. The complaint alleges:
Defendants without lawful or legal authority, did act in pro forma to allegedly charge, try, and convict the plaintiff of offenses as described in the Ohio Revised Code. This was done without any substantive law of Ohio being invoked. And without service of the complaint in this matter. As defendants acted without the benefit of any substantive law of Ohio, in case numbered (sic) plaintiff's due process was violated by prosecution's inability to prove and show burden of guilty. Lack of corroborating evidence further points to a conspiracy based on racial and religious prejudices.
(Complaint at 5). As relief, plaintiff seeks $1 million in compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant.
Plaintiff has no right to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since a ruling in his favor would necessarily cast doubt on his state court conviction and sentence. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2005); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1995). A § 1983 civil rights action seeking money damages on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence will not lie unless the plaintiff has already succeeded in having the conviction or sentence invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. When an inmate's successful § 1983 damages action would necessarily imply that his sentence or conviction was invalid, the complaint must be dismissed unless the inmate can demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determinations or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in order to proceed with the § 1983 action. Id.
In this case, plaintiff implies that his conviction and sentence are illegal because defendants violated his constitutional rights in procuring his conviction. A judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would necessarily imply that his state court conviction and resulting imprisonment are invalid. Since plaintiff has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated by a federal or state court or other appropriate tribunal, he may not proceed with a § 1983 action for money damages. Id.
When a prisoner's civil rights claim is barred by the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine, the appropriate course for a federal district court is to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), rather than to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as being frivolous, because the former course of action is not an adjudication on the merits and would allow the prisoner to reassert his claims if his conviction or sentence is latter invalidated. See Murphy v. Martin, 343 F. Supp.2d 603, 609 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Because the Court is dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 complaint under Heck, the dismissal will be without prejudice. Diehl v. Nelson, 198 F.3d 244, 1999 WL 1045076 (6th Cir. November 12, 1999) (citing to Fottler v. United States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The complaint is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of this Court's Order would not be taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).