Opinion
No. CV-19-04925-PHX-SMB
2020-02-19
Derek BOEHM, Plaintiff, v. AIRBUS HELICOPTERS INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants.
Katherine Elise Hollist, Kevin David Neal, Gallagher & Kennedy PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff. Eric C. Strain, Pro Hac Vice, Locke Lord LLP, New York, NY, Gregory James Marshall, Kristine Lucille Gallardo, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant Airbus Helicopters SAS.
Katherine Elise Hollist, Kevin David Neal, Gallagher & Kennedy PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
Eric C. Strain, Pro Hac Vice, Locke Lord LLP, New York, NY, Gregory James Marshall, Kristine Lucille Gallardo, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant Airbus Helicopters SAS.
ORDER
Susan M. Brnovich, United States District Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Airbus Helicopters, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 5, "Mot."). Defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff Derek Boehm responded, (Doc. 12, "Resp."), and Defendant replied, (Doc. 13, "Repl."). Having considered the pleadings and relevant law, the Court will dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(2) as explained below.
Plaintiff requested oral argument, but the Court considers the issues adequately presented in the parties’ briefs and elects to resolve the Motion without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Derek Boehm is the sole surviving passenger of an Airbus Helicopter crash near Superior, Arizona on December 15, 2015. (FAC ¶¶ 1-4; Doc. 5-2 at 8.) At the time of the crash, the helicopter was "registered to Air Methods Corporation doing business as Native Air Ambulance." (FAC ¶ 1.) Neither "Air Methods Corporation" nor "Native Air Ambulance" are defendants in this case.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is located at Doc. 1-3 at 24-29.
The Court assumes Plaintiff intended to name Native American Air Ambulance, not Native Air Ambulance. (See Resp. at 4 (referring to "Native American Air Ambulance").) For purposes of this Motion, the distinction makes no difference.
Defendant Airbus Helicopters, Inc. ("AHI"), one of two remaining defendants in this case, is a Delaware company with its principal place of business in Grand Prairie, Texas. (FAC ¶ 13; Doc. 5-1 at 2.) AHI sells and supports Airbus Helicopters, including the one at issue here, but does not design or manufacture them. (Doc. 5-1 at 2.) In May 2006, AHI sold the subject helicopter to a Texas-based company named Omniflight Helicopters, Inc. ("OmniFlight"), (id. at 3), which previously merged with Arizona-based company Native American Air Ambulance, (Resp. at 4). AHI was uninvolved in any subsequent sales of the helicopter. (Doc. 5-1 at 3.) In 2008, Omniflight resold the helicopter to Connecticut-based company CFS Air, LLC ("CFS"). (Mot. at 3; Resp. at 4.) Three years later, Air Methods Corporation ("AMC") having previously acquiring Omniflight and Native American Air Ambulance, (id. ), purchased the helicopter from CFS. (See Doc. 5-2 at 5.)
The other defendant in this case is foreign corporation Airbus Helicopters SAS ("AH"). Defendant's vice president of finance attests that "AHI is a separate and independent company from AH" and that "[e]ach has its own separate ownership, management, and employees." (Doc. 5-1 at 2.)
Shortly thereafter, AHI delivered the helicopter to Omniflight's Texas office. (Doc. 5-1 at 12.)
Plaintiff initially brought suit in Maricopa County Superior Court before Defendant removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.) In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against AHI and the other defendant: (1) strict products liability; (2) negligence, and (3) breach of warranty. (FAC ¶¶ 21-47.) As it relates to the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and at issue here, the FAC alleges:
19. Defendants had a reasonable expectation that they would be hailed [sic] into any court within these United States, including a court in the State of Arizona, by reason of injection of their products and services into the stream of commerce and the peculiarly mobile nature of aircraft which travel throughout the United States.
20. It does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to require Defendants to defend themselves in the State of Arizona. The context, ties and relations of the Defendants, and each of them, are sufficient to the exercise of personal jurisdiction within the state courts of Arizona.
(FAC ¶¶ 19-20.) Defendant disagrees with these allegations and moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a cognizable claim. (Mot. at 2.)
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant's Motion concerns two distinct issues: (1) whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant; and if so, (2) whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by Arizona's statute of limitations. (Id. ) However, because Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction over Defendant exists, the Court does not address Defendant's alternate 12(b)(6) arguments concerning the claims’ timeliness.
Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc. , 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff bears the burden of showing personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists, Ziegler v. Indian River Cty. , 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995), and "need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts" "in the absence of an evidentiary hearing," Sher v. Johnson , 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the complaint's uncontroverted allegations are accepted as true and "conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff's] favor." Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert , 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996).
Unlike Defendant, Plaintiff submits no affidavits or exhibits in support of his position.
"When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the forum state." Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp. , 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018). Arizona's long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a) ; thus, personal jurisdiction under Arizona law is identical to that of federal due process. See, e.g. , Uberti v. Leonardo , 181 Ariz. 565, 892 P. 2d 1354, 1358 (1995) (analyzing personal jurisdiction in Arizona under federal law).
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State's authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts." Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 283, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ). "Due process requires that a nonresident Defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state so that ‘maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Beneco Sys., LLC v. Pension Corp. of Am., Inc. , No. CV-09-2612-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 11515481, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2010) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotations omitted)). "Depending on the strength of those contacts, there are two forms that personal jurisdiction may take: general and specific." Picot v. Weston , 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiff concedes general jurisdiction is inappropriate here. (Resp. at 5 n.7) ("[Plaintiff] alleges this Court has specific, not general jurisdiction over [Defendant]."). The Court agrees, and turns to whether specific personal jurisdiction exists over Defendant.
"When a plaintiff relies on specific jurisdiction, he must establish that jurisdiction is proper for ‘each claim asserted against a defendant.’ " Picot , 780 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc. , 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) ). "[F]or a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state.’ " Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1781, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ). Without such a connection, "specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant's unconnected activities in the State." Bristol-Myers , 137 S.Ct. at 1781. "Only contacts occurring prior to the event causing the litigation ... may be considered by the Court." Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust, Inc. v. NMTC, Inc. , 169 F.Supp.3d 931, 934 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Ins. Co. , 907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990) ).
In analyzing specific jurisdiction, the Court uses the three-prong minimum contacts test "to determine whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum to warrant the court's exercise of jurisdiction[.]" Freestream , 905 F.3d at 603.
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.
Id. (citation omitted); Picot , 780 F.3d at 1211 (same). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying prongs one and two. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co. , 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) ; Sher , 911 F.2d at 1361. "If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable." Schwarzenegger , 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 476–78, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) ). Absent a showing of a "compelling case" that jurisdiction would be unreasonable, exercising personal jurisdiction is presumed reasonable. Burger King , 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174. If a plaintiff fails to meet the first prong, the Court need not address the remaining prongs. Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust , 169 F.Supp.3d at 936.
A. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant.
At the outset, the Court again highlights that both parties agree the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Instead, Plaintiff claims specific jurisdiction exists, but if not, that he be given an opportunity to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. (Resp. at 5-8.) Defendant argues the Court lacks personal jurisdiction because Plaintiff's causes of action do not arise out of or relate to any purposeful contacts it has with Arizona and that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Mot. at 2-9.) It also asserts jurisdictional discovery is futile. (Repl. at 5-6.) The Court begins its personal jurisdiction analysis with the minimum contacts test as its guide. See Freestream , 905 F.3d at 603.
1. Defendant Did Not Purposeful Avail Itself in Arizona.
Under this prong, Plaintiff must show that Defendant "either (1) ‘purposefully availed’ [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, or (2) ‘purposefully directed’ [its] activities toward the forum." Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy , 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Schwarzenegger , 374 F.3d at 802 ). This prong presents two distinct standards, with each to be applied in different circumstances. Schwarzenegger , 374 F.3d at 802. For instance, "it is well established that the Calder [purposeful direction] test applies only to intentional torts, not to ... breach of contract and negligence claims." Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc. , 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see generally J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U.S. 873, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011) (using purposeful availment test in product liability case). Because Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, the Court applies the purposeful availment standard. Holland , 485 F.3d at 460.
The purposeful availment requirement ensures that "a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of unilateral activity of another party or a third person." Burger King , 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "The requirement of ‘purposeful availment’ is based on the presumption that it is reasonable to require a defendant who conducts business and benefits from his activities in a state to be subject to the burden of litigating in that state as well." Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta , 873 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ). However, "[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act purposefully directed toward a forum state." Holland , 485 F.3d at 459 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court , 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) )."Even a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum state does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream of commerce into an act purposefully directed toward the forum state." Holland , 485 F.3d at 459. On the other hand, where "the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others." World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580. But mere prediction by a defendant that its goods will reach the forum is insufficient, and personal jurisdiction exists "only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum." Nicastro , 564 U.S. at 882, 131 S.Ct. 2780.
Plaintiff first claims Defendant purposely availed itself in Arizona by "actively" targeting potential customers in Arizona and advertising its after-sale support team and third-party service centers to Arizona customers. (Resp. at 3-4, 7.) That is, he claims personal jurisdiction over Defendant is appropriate because it is engaging in "Arizona-based customer service, Arizona-based marketing and sales, and Arizona-based advice." (Id. at 7.) Although Plaintiff identifies no physical presence by Defendant in Arizona with any particularity as support of this proposition, he points to two "service area maps" listed on Defendant's website depicting the company's regional sales and after-sale service teams. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff points to no allegations in his amended complaint illustrating these connections nor does he describe them in further detail here.
Plaintiff states "[Defendant] had a service center in Arizona," without any further explanation of the service center's operations or presence in the State. (Resp. at 7.) The Court struggles to evaluate the extent of this "service center's" operations in Arizona without further explanation.
By itself, a map contained on a company's website depicting that it services Arizona does not establish personal jurisdiction. See Quantum Leasing, LLC v. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. , No. 2:15-CV-1005-HRH, 2016 WL 192145, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2016) (finding non-resident company's website and Operation and Maintenance Manual provided with helicopter purchase insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction). Even further, the Ninth Circuit has consistently found that "a mere web presence is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction." Holland , 485 F.3d at 459 ; see, e.g. , Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen , 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) ; Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. , 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997). These binding precedents require a similar finding here. Just because Defendant uses a website to passively target potential and existing customers across North America does not mean this Court automatically has specific jurisdiction over Defendant as it relates to any claim. Holland , 485 F.3d at 459. There must be something more substantial and direct linking Defendants’ contacts with Arizona to show Defendant purposefully availed itself in this forum. See Burger King , 471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Certainly, websites offer companies an opportunity to target numerous states with minimal effort. However, if such insipid targeting in our interconnected world were enough to show personal jurisdiction, the minimum contacts test would be hollow. To be sure, Plaintiff establishes nothing more than the vague notion that Defendant "targets" and "advertises" to Arizona consumers through the "service area maps" mentioned above. Such weak showings do not establish even a prima facie case that Defendant purposefully availed itself in Arizona.
Plaintiff's second argument is that Defendant purposefully availed itself in Arizona by placing the helicopter in the stream of commerce. (Resp. at 7.) More precisely, Plaintiff claims Defendant intended that the helicopter be operated in Arizona, even though the helicopter only arrived here after numerous subsequent sales. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff appears to argue that specific jurisdiction exists although Defendant resold the helicopter, originally purchased in France, to Texas-based Omniflight before it was resold to Connecticut-based CFS, where it was in turn sold to Colorado-based Air Methods. This causal chain of sales over ten years before the accident inadequately ties Defendant's relationship to the helicopter, let alone with this forum.
As Defendant persuasively explains:
Plaintiff argues that Omniflight would not have purchased the helicopter in Texas in 2006, and that Colorado-based Air Methods Corporation would not have, after buying the helicopter from Connecticut-based CFS Air, LLC in 2013, operated it in Arizona when it crashed in 2015, "but for" an identified, unspecified, undated alleged "promise" by [Defendant] to provide support and service for the helicopter in Arizona.
(Repl. at 3-4.) The Court finds that this situation appears to be exactly what the Supreme Court cautioned against in Burger King . See id. , 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (noting that "a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ... unilateral activity of another party or a third person."). After the initial sale over ten years before the incident, Defendant had no control over any subsequent sales and undoubtedly could not have "targeted" this forum without such control. See Nicastro , 564 U.S. at 882, 131 S.Ct. 2780. Rather, Defendant's "placement of [the helicopter] into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act purposefully directed toward a forum state." Holland , 485 F.3d at 459. In other words, Defendant's initial sale of the helicopter, when considering the numerous subsequent sales across the United States, does not show Defendant targeted this forum, especially considering the absence of any other meaningful contacts with Arizona as discussed above. Id.
The Court also finds persuasive Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Am. Eurocopter Corp. , NO. CV. 09-00136 DAE-LEK, 2009 WL 2849130, at *6 (D. Haw. Aug. 26, 2009). There, the court found specific jurisdiction lacking because, inter alia , "[Defendant] was not a party to any subsequent transaction by third-parties that caused the helicopter to be operated ... in Hawaii." Id. As a result, the court found that "Plaintiff fails to provide evidence to satisfy the requirement that [Defendant] purposefully avail[ed] itself of this forum via the subject helicopter." Id. The same outcome is required here too. Defendant's connection to the subject helicopter after its initial sale to Omniflight is quite attenuated, if any connection to the latest owner exists whatsoever. This attenuated link is not cause for this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Nicastro , 564 U.S. at 882, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (noting how defendant must target a forum and simply predicting its good will reach a forum is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over it relating to a cause of action concerning that good).
For the reasons above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case that Defendant purposefully availed itself in Arizona. Schwarzenegger , 374 F.3d at 802. Without any meaningful contacts beyond "service area maps" on a website, an unidentified support team, or a more direct targeting of this forum, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Defendant. Even further, Defendant did not manufacture the helicopter, had no physical presence in Arizona, is not a registered business in Arizona, and only introduced the helicopter into the stream of commerce about ten years before the crash. Such a detached connection to this forum requires dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. B. Jurisdictional Discovery Would Be Futile.
"Because [P]laintiff has failed to meet the requirements of prong one," the Court "need not consider whether the other two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test have been met." Quantum Leasing , 2016 WL 192145, at *5 ; see Ariz. Sch. Risk Retention Trust , 169 F.Supp.3d at 936 (same). Additionally, as previously stated, the Court does not address Defendant's alternative 12(b)(6) arguments because the Court finds it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
In the alternative, Plaintiff requests the Court "afford him the opportunity to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery" if the Court finds that he has failed to establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. (Resp. at 8.) Plaintiff believes limited jurisdictional discovery would permit him to explore (1) whether Defendant advertised to Arizona residents or companies; (2) whether any agreement between Omniflight and Defendant contemplated Defendant's helicopter would be used in Arizona ; and (3) whether Defendant serviced the helicopter in Arizona. (Resp. at 8.) Defendant argues jurisdictional discovery would be futile and Plaintiff's assertion that personal jurisdiction exists is entirely speculative. (Repl. at 5-6.) The Court agrees with Defendant.
Defendant's sales agreement is already attached as one of Defendant's exhibits. (See Doc. 5-1 at 5-10.) It does not say whether the helicopter must, or even would, be used in Arizona. (See generally id. )
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A trial court has broad discretion as to whether to permit limited jurisdictional discovery. Data Disc , 557 F.2d at 1285 n.1 (citing Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co. , 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977) ). While "[d]iscovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary," Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc. , 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations and internal quotations omitted), "[w]here a plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by the defendant[ ], the Court need not permit even limited discovery," Pebble Beach , 453 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Terracom v. Valley Nat'l Bank , 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995) ). A court also need not permit "[a plaintiff's] request for discovery ... based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts." Boschetto v. Hansing , 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, the Court is satisfied that Defendant has specifically rebutted Plaintiff's unsupported personal jurisdiction allegations and will not permit jurisdictional discovery. Pebble Beach , 453 F.3d at 1160. Unlike Defendant, Plaintiff provides no controverting allegations that personal jurisdiction exists beyond two maps on Defendant's website and an attenuated chain of inferences supposedly indicating that Defendant directed the helicopter to be used in Arizona. Even further, Plaintiff points to no portion of his first amended complaint supporting even an alleged prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Such speculative showings and hunches do not warrant jurisdictional discovery. Boschetto , 539 F.3d at 1020. Plaintiff also makes no showing concerning whether any of the areas he wishes to explore would be fruitful in revealing jurisdictional facts or how they might allow him to demonstrate a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Defendant later on. Without such things, Plaintiff's request appears to be a fishing expedition for jurisdictional facts and will be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with this forum or that it purposefully availed itself through those contacts in this forum. Moreover, the Court finds jurisdictional discovery would be unnecessary because Plaintiff fails to allege which specific facts would lead the Court to a finding that specific jurisdiction over Defendant exists. To allow such discovery at this stage would result in wasted resources for all parties, especially where neither party claims no forum has personal jurisdiction over Defendant as it relates to these causes of action. In addition, the Court will not analyze the Motion's remaining Rule 12(b)(6) arguments because it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Defendant Airbus Helicopters, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), (Doc. 5). Defendant's remaining Rule 12(b)(6) arguments are denied as moot;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DIRECTING the Clerk of Court to terminate Airbus Helicopters, Inc. as a Defendant. The sole remaining defendant is foreign corporation Airbus Helicopters, SAS.