Opinion
No. 4:01CV88-D-B.
April 23, 2001.
OPINION
Presently before the court is the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be denied.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiffs, who are registered voters in Cleveland, Mississippi, filed this voting rights action with this court on April 17, 2001, alleging, inter alia, that the existing redistricting plan used by the City of Cleveland to elect aldermen and executive committee members violates both Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the one-person, one-vote, principle of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Along with their complaint, the Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the city from, among other things, utilizing the existing redistricting plan to conduct municipal primary elections on Tuesday, May 1, 2001.
The City of Cleveland, Mississippi, is governed by a seven member city council that is elected once every four years from six single-member aldermen districts, with one at-large alderman being elected in citywide voting. The Plaintiffs argue that Cleveland's voting districts, which are based on 1990 census data, have become unconstitutionally malapportioned and impermissibly dilute black voting strength, according to the recently released 2000 census data.
B. Preliminary Injunction Standard
In order to grant a request for injunctive relief, the court must apply the standard set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). Pursuant to Canal Authority, the Plaintiffs in this matter have the burden of demonstrating four specific criteria:
• a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
• a substantial threat that the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied;
• that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs outweighs any damage that an injunction might cause the defendants; and
• that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest.Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1995). It is incumbent upon the movant to demonstrate all four factors, and the failure to demonstrate any one of the four is sufficient for the court to deny the issuance of an injunction. Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989). Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, not normally available unless the movant clearly carries his burden of proof as to each of the four prerequisites. Mississippi Power Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). And, even if the movant successfully establishes each of the four Canal prongs, the decision whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction remains discretionary with the court.Mississippi Power Light, 760 F.2d at 621.
C. Discussion
"Intervention by the federal courts in state elections has always been a serious business, not to be lightly engaged in." Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1988). Federal courts have been particularly wary of enjoining elections when the plaintiffs have delayed filing lawsuits and injunctive motions until the eleventh hour, and Chisom is but one in a long line of cases where federal courts in the Fifth Circuit have refused to enjoin state elections when the process is well underway. See, e.g., Watkins v. Mabus, 771 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.Miss. 1991); Tucker v. Burford, 603 F. Supp. 276, 277 (N.D.Miss. 1985).
This hesitance to enjoin state elections arises from the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1963), where the Court stated that when an impending election is imminent and the election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations typically justify allowing the election to take place, even when the voting districts are unconstitutionally drawn.Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585. For instance, in Tucker, the plaintiffs filed suit thirty-four days prior to the scheduled date for a county election, seeking an injunction enjoining the election. In denying the motion, the court cited Reynolds and noted that the ballots had been printed, the candidates had been qualified and money and time had been expended in campaigning prior to the lawsuit being filed. Tucker, 603 F. Supp. at 277.
Further, even where injunctive requests have been timely, as was not the case here, and in some instances even where liability has been established, courts have not enjoined imminent elections. In Chisom, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, and the election was enjoined. Chisom, 853 F.2d at 1187-88. But the Fifth Circuit, following Reynolds, reversed the preliminary injunction and allowed the election to proceed, holding that "the possibility that . . . other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against" enjoining the election. Id. at 1189. The Fifth Circuit further held that "[o]nly when the threatened harm would impair the court's ability to grant an effective remedy is there really a need for preliminary relief."Id.
In Watkins, the court held that the 1991 elections for the Mississippi legislature should go forward even though they were being held under a plan that was clearly unconstitutional. Watkins, 771 F. Supp. at 807. In doing so, the court cited Chisom, and further stated that "[w]here, as here, the possibility of corrective relief at a later date exists, even an established voting rights act violation does not . . . merit a preliminary injunction." Id. at 805.
Thus, even where the plaintiffs have demonstrated liability on the merits, or a strong likelihood of prevailing, courts typically refuse to enjoin elections at the last minute.
The one exception is where the election is going to be held under a plan that violates Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, because of the absence of preclearance. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652-53, 111 S.Ct. 2096, 2100, 114 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991). In that situation, the voting plan is legally unenforceable and injunctions are often appropriate. Here, however, the Plaintiffs do not assert that Cleveland's plan violates Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
C. Conclusion
In line with the above cited authority, the court finds that the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction should be denied. This lawsuit was filed with this court on Tuesday, April 17, 2001, a mere fourteen calendar days prior to the scheduled election date. In Tucker, where the plaintiffs filed suit thirty-four days prior to the election, the court denied the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the election because the election process was already underway. Tucker, 603 F. Supp. at 277. At this late date, the election process in Cleveland is certainly even further underway than was the case in Tucker.Further, in the course of this litigation, should the Plaintiffs establish that Cleveland's current voting districts are unconstitutional, adequate corrective relief can be timely fashioned.Chisom, 853 F.2d at 1189. There is no indication or assertion that allowing the election to take place as scheduled will impair the court's ability to grant an effective remedy at a later date. See id. As such, the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction shall be denied.
A separate judgment in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (docket entry 2) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.