Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS113052, Jerry Fields, Judge.
Christine Helwick and Donald A. Newman; Hanson Bridgett LLP and Allison M. Woodall for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rothner, Segall, Greenstone & Leheny, Glenn Rothner and Bernhard Rohrbacher for Defendant and Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
Appellant The Board of Trustees of the California State University challenges the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitrator’s award and supplemental remedial ruling in favor of respondent California Faculty Association (CFA). Appellant contends that the arbitrator exceeded her jurisdiction in issuing the supplemental remedial ruling, and thus that the trial court erred in confirming it. We affirm.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
CFA is a union of California State University (CSU) faculty employees. Article 20 of the operative collective bargaining agreement, as effective until June 2005, described faculty responsibilities as including teaching, and also specified “instructional responsibilities... beyond duties in the classroom.” Regarding instructional responsibilities, CSU and CFA have recognized a distinction between “direct” instructional responsibilities, including classroom teaching, and “indirect” instructional responsibilities, including at least some forms of student advisement and other activities. Historically, CSU has measured the allocation of these responsibilities to individual faculty members in terms of “Weighted Teaching Units” (WTUs).
Article 29 of the collective bargaining agreement also established a Faculty Early Retirement Program (FERP). Under the FERP, faculty members who had reached the age of 55 years were permitted to retire but continue to work up to 50 percent of their regular “time base,” as established in the year prior to retirement.
In 2004 and 2005, CFA filed several grievances related to the FERP, two of which are pertinent here. The first grievance, dated March 11, 2004, was filed on behalf of all CFA members (systemwide grievance). The grievance asserted that CSU Assistant Vice Chancellor Sam Strafaci or his office had issued a policy statement “inform[ing] campuses that they may ignore indirect instructional credits in the assignment of work to FERP employees.” The grievance referred to an e-mail distributed by a CSU administrator stating: “There is nothing in the [collective bargaining agreement] about how much of a FERP[] assignment is direct instruction (teaching) and how much is assigned and related duties. [Assistant Vice Chancellor] Strafaci’s opinion is that you can assign it to be all teaching.”
The second grievance, dated April 26, 2005, was filed on behalf of Jon Meisenhelder, a FERP participant in the Sociology Department at California State University San Bernardino (Meisenhelder grievance). The grievance stated: “FERP workload assigned in 2005-6 is not proportional to normal responsibilities, duties, and course load in Sociology during academic year immediately prior to retirement.”
The grievances were submitted to an arbitrator, who ordered the grievance proceedings consolidated. During the evidentiary hearing in January 2007, the arbitrator received evidence about the collective bargaining agreement and the implementation of the FERP program. In addition, the arbitrator received evidence establishing the following facts about the Meisenhelder grievance: The normal teaching load within Meisenhelder’s department was seven four-unit courses per year, although the normal load elsewhere on campus was nine such courses a year. In retiring, Meisenhelder elected to work at one-third of his regular time base, as determined by the year prior to retirement. The first year in which he participated in the FERP, he received a teaching assignment consistent with his 33.3 percent FERP time base. However, the following year, he was assigned three four-unit courses, which constituted 42 percent of a full-time assignment of seven four-unit courses.
Also consolidated was a third grievance which is not pertinent here.
The arbitrator issued her decision and award on April 20, 2007. Regarding the systemwide grievance, the arbitrator ordered CSU to issue a directive “stating that the collective bargaining agreement requires FERP faculty members to be assigned proportionate workloads, consisting of direct and indirect instructional duties, in the same manner as regular tenured faculty are assigned.” In addition, the arbitrator established a “make-whole” remedy that provided for monetary compensation and reduced workloads. Regarding the Meisenhelder grievance, the arbitrator awarded Meisenhelder monetary compensation for an excessive workload. The award further stated: “The parties [have] stipulated that the Arbitrator is to retain jurisdiction for purposes of resolving any dispute over implementation of the remedy ordered in this Award, but not to consider the merits of this Decision and Award, which is final.”
On June 29, 2007, CFA asked the arbitrator to clarify the remedies regarding the systemwide grievance. According to CFA, CSU had limited the “make-whole” remedy to FERP participants who been assigned “‘all teaching’” workloads, and had denied it to FERP participants who had not been so assigned, but had received a disproportionately heavy teaching load. CFA stated: “By way of example, if it is normal, in a particular department, for a tenured faculty member to teach 12 direct WTUs and get 3 indirect WTUs, CSU is only [including] FERP participants with 15 direct WTUs in their assignments. Missing, then, are all the FERP participants with workloads of 13 or 14 direct WTUs. In a specific instance, there is a faculty member at San Bernardino who, like [] Meisenhelder, taught in a department where the norm is for tenured faculty to teach 7 instead of 9 courses. The dean insisted that this particular FERP participant... on a 1/3 time base [take on an] assignment that is based on the norm of 9 courses taught per year. [¶] It is clear from your award that excessive workloads short of ‘all teaching’ workloads violate the contract.... [¶] In short, CFA wishes to clarify whether or not FERP participants with excessive workloads [] that were not ‘all teaching’ are eligible for the remedy.”
In response, CSU contended that CFA was asking the arbitrator to “apply the Meisenhelder remedy systemwide.” CSU stated: “Your remedy is clear as it pertains to Meisenhelder. It is an individual grievance with an individual remedy. It is just as clear that it did not pertain systemwide.... [] CFA is clearly requesting that you expand your remedy, not clarify it.”
After a hearing, the arbitrator issued her supplemental remedial ruling on October 15, 2007 (remedial ruling). The arbitrator acknowledged that she had retained jurisdiction only to resolve “‘any dispute over implementation of the remedy,’” but not to revisit “the merits of the dispute.” Following an analysis of the statement of the remedies in the award, the arbitrator concluded: “The remedy ordered in the [systemwide] grievance requires a make-whole remedy for every FERP participant who had a classroom teaching assignment that was not proportional to that individual’s pre-FERP teaching assignment.”
On January 23, 2008, appellant filed a petition to vacate the remedial ruling. CFA opposed this petition, and filed a petition to confirm. Following a hearing, the trial court granted CFA’s petition. Pointing to Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, footnote 9 (Advanced Micro Devices), the court concluded that the arbitrator's decision bore a rational relationship to the underlying contract, in view of the issues raised in the systemwide and Meisenhelder grievances. Judgment was entered June 26, 2008. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly confirmed the supplemental remedial ruling. We disagree.
A. Governing Law
To enforce the finality of arbitration, the statutes governing nonjudicial arbitration awards minimize judicial intervention. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Moncharsh).) Once a petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior court has only four courses of conduct: to confirm the award, to correct and confirm it, to vacate it, or to dismiss the petition. (United Brotherhood of Carpenters Etc., Local 642 v. DeMello (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 838, 840; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, § 566, pp. 1071-1072.) The trial court is empowered to correct or vacate the award, or dismiss the petition, upon the grounds set out in the pertinent statutes; “[o]therwise courts may not interfere with arbitration awards.” (Santa Clara-San Benito Etc. Elec. Contractors’ Assn. v. Local Union No. 332 (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 431, 437; see also Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 10-13.)
Appellant sought to vacate the supplemental remedial ruling on the ground that the arbitrator “exceeded [her] powers” in resolving the grievances (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)). We review the trial court’s ruling on this matter de novo, but apply a highly deferential standard of review to the award itself, insofar as our inquiry encompasses the arbitrator’s resolution of questions of law or fact. (Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 376, fn. 9; Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 338, 347-348.)
Absent exceptional circumstances, we will not examine an award for errors of fact or law. As our Supreme Court explained in Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 10, the finality of arbitration awards is rooted in the parties’ agreement to bypass the judicial system. Accordingly, “it is the general rule that, ‘The merits of the controversy between the parties are not subject to judicial review.’ [Citations.] More specifically, courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning. [Citations.] Further, a court may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s award. [Citations.]... [¶] Thus,... with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.” (Id. at p. 11.) Such an exception may arise when the arbitrator imposes a remedy not authorized by the arbitration agreement (Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 375).
Here, the parties stipulated that the arbitrator retained jurisdiction to resolve “any dispute over implementation of the remedy ordered in this [a]ward,” but not to consider “the merits of [the award], which is final.” Generally, arbitrators must issue awards that “include a determination of all the questions submitted.” (Code Civ. Proc., §1283.4.) However, to discharge this obligation, they may use “a multiple incremental or successive award process as a means, in an appropriate case, of finally deciding all submitted issues.” (Hightower v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1434, italics deleted; accord, Roehl v. Ritchie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) Thus, arbitrators may issue an award that constitutes a final determination on the matters before them, insofar as the issues can be resolved, while reserving jurisdiction to decide questions requiring resolution at a later time. (Hightower v. Superior Court, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434; Roehl v. Ritchie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) Although an arbitrator has no power to use this process “to correct or modify the terms of an original award,” we apply a deferential standard of review to the arbitrator’s determinations regarding his or her contractual power to render a subsequent award, and “resolve any doubts in favor of upholding the second arbitration award.” (Id. at pp. 350-351.)
In the present case, the arbitrator retained jurisdiction to resolve any remedy disputes following the original award through an agreement of the parties. As the original award had not been confirmed when CFA sought clarification of the pertinent remedies, the award had only the force of a contract between the parties. (Doyle v. Giuliucci (1965) 62 Cal.2d 606, 609 [awards are binding as contracts, regardless of whether they are confirmed]; Code Civ. Proc., §1287.6.) Accordingly, the arbitrator's position was akin to that of an arbitrator authorized by the parties’ arbitration agreement to settle a dispute regarding the implementation of a contract-based remedy.
The general principles applicable to these circumstances were explained in Advanced Micro Devices. Our Supreme Court stated that “arbitrators, unless expressly restricted by the agreement of the parties, enjoy the authority to fashion relief they consider just and fair under the circumstances existing at the time of arbitration, so long as the remedy may be rationally derived from the contract and the breach.” (Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 383.) In such cases, the question before the court is “whether the award is ‘so outré that [the court] can infer that it was driven by a desire to do justice beyond the limits of the contract.’” (Id. at p. 380, italics deleted, quoting Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America (7th Cir. 1985) 768 F.2d 180, 187.) However, because “arbitrators may not award remedies expressly forbidden by the arbitration agreement or submission,” parties who wish to restrict the arbitrator’s remedial authority “would be well advised to set out such limitations explicitly and unambiguously in the arbitration clause.” (Advanced Micro Devices, at pp. 383, 381.) Accordingly, we examine the remedial ruling in light of the restriction on the arbitrator’s authority in the parties’ stipulation, namely, that she “not [] consider the merits of [the award].”
B. Award and Remedial Ruling
1. Award
We begin by describing the award. As noted below, the arbitrator framed the issues before her in several ways. In the introductory portion of the award, she characterized both grievances as presenting a single issue about “CSU’s assignment of workload and/or statements of policy about workloads.” In accordance with this description of the issue, her resolution of both grievances relied on a single conclusion she drew from the collective bargaining agreement, the parties’ bargaining history, and their past practices: that a FERP participant’s direct teaching assignment must be proportionate to his or her pre-retirement direct teaching responsibilities, regardless of whether the FERP participant had been placed on an “all teaching” assignment. This general conclusion enabled the arbitrator to resolve the Meisenhelder grievance, which involved a faculty member who had not received an “all teaching” assignment, but an assignment with direct teaching responsibilities disproportionate to those he had carried the year before he retired. Nonetheless, the arbitrator suggested in portions of the award that she confronted only a narrower issue about “all teaching” assignments, even though the Meisenhelder grievance presented no such issue.
At the outset of the award, the arbitrator stated: “The parties are unable to agree on a joint statement of the issue, but instead stipulated that the Arbitrator is to frame the issue, based on their respective positions and arguments. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is stated as follows: [¶] Did [] CSU’s assignment of workload and/or statements of policy about workloads for FERP faculty members violate the collective bargaining agreement? If so, what shall the remedy be?”
Following this characterization of the issue, the arbitrator stated CFA’s and CSU’s positions. According to the arbitrator, CFA contended that CSU had violated the collective bargaining agreement by “authoriz[ing] workloads for FERP participants that are inconsistent with the workload of tenured faculty.” The arbitrator described CFA’s position as follows: “Rather than offering assignments that contain a mix of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ weighted teaching units (WTU’s), [] CSU is attempting to credit FERP participants with only ‘direct’ WTU’s. That results in a greater workload for FERP participants than for regular tenured faculty, because they are still required to provide the indirect instructional services for which they are not being credited.” Regarding CSU’s position, the arbitrator stated: “CSU contends that the contract permits assigning FERP participants a workload that consists of all teaching (direct instructional duties).”
After identifying the pertinent provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator stated: “In each grievance, the issue is whether the contract allows [CSU] to assign FERP participants ‘all teaching’ rather than an assignment that consists of a mix of classroom instruction and related activities normally required of regular tenured faculty members.” As noted above, this remark is inaccurate, as it does not encompass the Meisenhelder grievance.
The arbitrator next examined the collective bargaining agreement, the parties’ bargaining history, and their past practices. In discussing the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator observed that CFA had advanced the broad proposition that all FERP direct teaching assignments must be proportionate to pre-retirement direct teaching responsibilities; moreover, the arbitrator concluded that the collective bargaining agreement supported this proposition. The arbitrator stated: “CFA interprets the contract to require that the FERP workload assignment be proportional to the actual content of the participant’s pre-retirement workload, not merely the percentage of the ‘time base’ of the pre-retirement appointment. Under CFA’s interpretation, if the participant had a pre-retirement full-time position in which he or she was assigned to teach... six courses in an academic year, plus related instructional duties and responsibilities..., then a 50 % FERP appointment would mean an assignment of three courses over the academic year, with a proportional assignment of related duties and responsibilities.... [¶]” (Italics added.) The arbitrator concluded: “The contract’s language on its face support[s] CFA’s interpretation....” (Italics added.) She found additional support for this conclusion in the parties’ bargaining history and practices.
The arbitrator stated her conclusions as follows: “Article 29 [of the collective bargain agreement] requires that a FERP participant's workload... be a combination of teaching (direct) and non-teaching (indirect) instructional duties... that reflects the individual’s pre-retirement assignment as a regular faculty member, but proportionate to the reduced time[] base. Requiring a FERP participant to accept involuntarily an ‘all teaching’ assignment violates the contract because it imposes an excessive workload. [¶] Absent voluntary agreement of the FERP faculty member..., the combination of direct and indirect instructional duties is to be proportionate to that which was assigned to that individual prior to retirement.” (Italics added.)
The arbitrator then addressed remedies. Regarding the systemwide grievance, the arbitrator ordered an injunctive remedy: “CSU is directed to issue a written directive... expressly stating that the collective bargaining agreement requires FERP faculty members to be assigned proportionate workloads, consisting of direct and indirect instructional duties, in the same manner as regular tenured faculty are assigned.”
The arbitrator also ordered a “make-whole” remedy: “The appropriate remedy is for [] CSU to review FERP records on all campuses to identify any FERP faculty who were assigned an ‘all teaching’ workload after March 2004.... CSU has the affirmative duty to provide evidence from which it can be determined whether each FERP faculty member’s teaching load was a mix of direct or indirect WTUs[,] rather than ‘all teaching.’ [¶] For any assignment that was ‘all teaching,’ the FERP faculty member is eligible for a make-whole remedy, unless CSU provides evidence that that FERP participant voluntarily accepted such an assignment. [¶] FERP participants who were assigned but did not voluntarily elect an ‘all-teaching’ workload are entitled to a monetary award. The award will compensate each FERP faculty member for the excess workload during terms in which that individual was not allowed compensated time for indirect instructional duties. Alternatively, a FERP participant may elect a prospective remedy of accepting a reduced workload in the subsequent terms to offset the excessive workload caused by an ‘all teaching assignment,’ if the duration of their FERP appointment allow[s] sufficient time.” (Italics added.)
Regarding the Meisenhelder grievance, the arbitrator ordered “a monetary make-whole remedy to compensate [Meisenhelder] for the excessive workload, by the difference between 33.3 [percent] and 42 [percent] of salary.”
The arbitrator repeated the remedies in a section entitled “Award.” She stated: “CSU is directed to issue a written directive correctly stating the contract requirement that FERP faculty members are to be assigned proportionate workloads, consisting of direct and indirect instructional duties.... CSU is directed to identify any FERP faculty who were involuntarily assigned an ‘all teaching’ workload after March of 2004 and to make them whole, consistent with the above discussion of remedy. [¶]... [¶]... CSU is directed to make [Meisenhelder] whole, consistent with the above discussion of remedy.”
2. Remedial Ruling
In the introductory portion of the remedial ruling, the arbitrator acknowledged that she “ha[d] retained jurisdiction only to resolve ‘any dispute over the implementation of the remedy.’” She thus directed her attention to “clarification of the remedial language needed to enable the parties to implement that remedy.”
The arbitrator offered the following explanation of the language: “The [a]ward in setting out the remedy used the term ‘all teaching,’ which was the term used in the grievance itself. The grievance was filed upon issuance of the March 2004 directive that authorized campuses to require FERP faculty members to accept an ‘all teaching’ workload, but before any campuses or departments had yet acted on that directive. The remedy not only required [CSU] to rescind that directive with a communication that correctly stated the contract's requirements, but it also required [CSU] to make whole any individual FERP participant adversely affected by any campus that had acted on the March 2004 directive.”
Regarding the latter requirement, the arbitrator pointed to the portion of the remedy we italicized above (see pt. B.1, ante): “The [monetary] award will compensate each FERP faculty member for the excess workload during terms in which that individual was not allowed compensated time for indirect instructional duties.” The arbitrator concluded: “Because the contract requires FERP participants to have an assignment proportional to their pre-FERP workload assignment, a remedy that only compensated individuals who were literally assigned an ‘all teaching’ (100 percent) workload would not be consistent with the contract and would not constitute a make-whole remedy for individuals adversely affected by [CSU’s] misapplication of the contract.” The arbitrator added: “[T]his conclusion does not require clarification or modification of the [a]ward’s ruling on the [collective bargaining agreement] interpretation issue, but is based solely on the remedy language that appears in the [a]ward itself, and is well within the parties’ stipulation granting retained jurisdiction over remedy disputes.”
C. Analysis
Appellant contends that the remedial ruling improperly modified or corrected the award, arguing that the award’s “make-whole” remedy regarding the systemwide grievance applied only to FERP participants with “all teaching” assignments. We conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers in interpreting the “make-whole” remedy to encompass all FERP participants whose teaching workloads were disproportionate to their pre-retirement workload.
We find guidance on appellant’s contention in Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179 (Gueyffier). There, the parties’ franchise agreement stated that the franchisor could be held liable for breach of the agreement only if the franchisee gave the franchisor notice of the alleged breach and an opportunity to correct it; moreover, the agreement identified this as a “material term.” (Id. at pp. 1182-1183.) The agreement also required the parties to submit disputes to arbitration, but expressly provided that the arbitrator could not modify or change “‘material provisions’” of the agreement. (Id. at p. 1183.) After the franchisee requested arbitration regarding an alleged breach by the franchisor without giving notice and opportunity to cure, the arbitrator determined that the franchisor’s conduct had excused the franchisee’s duties under notice-and-cure provision, and issued an award in the franchisee’s favor. (Ibid.)
In concluding that the arbitrator had not exceeded his powers, our Supreme Court determined that the award had not “contravene[d] an express, unambiguous limitation in the contract itself,” as the no-modification clause did not unequivocally preclude a determination that performance under the notice-and-cure provision had been excused. (Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1185-1187.) The court explained: “The arbitrator was empowered to interpret and apply the parties’ agreement to the facts he found to exist; included therein was the power to decide when particular clauses of the contract applied. In concluding the notice-and-cure provision was inapplicable on the facts as he found them, the arbitrator did no more than exercise this power. [Citation.] The no-modification clause could perhaps be interpreted as also precluding equitable excusal of a condition, but the arbitrator evidently did not adopt such an interpretation. As construction of the contract was for the arbitrator, not the courts, we cannot say he exceeded his powers... by failing to adopt a particular interpretation of the agreement." (Id. at pp. 1185-1186.)
Here, unlike Gueyffier, the restriction on the arbitrator’s power to modify or change the award was rooted in the parties’ stipulation and statutory law (see Roehl v. Ritchie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 350-351). Nonetheless, in agreeing that the arbitrator had continuing jurisdiction to resolve “any dispute over implementation of the remedy ordered in this [a]ward,” they accorded her authority to interpret the award’s remedy provisions for this purpose. As explained in Gueyffier, the issue before us is whether the arbitrator exceeded her powers in construing the provisions, not whether a court would have rendered the same interpretation of the provisions. (Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1186.)
In our view, the arbitrator did not exceed her jurisdiction, as the remedy provisions did not unambiguously limit the “make-whole” remedy regarding the systemwide grievance. Although the provisions focused on FERP participants who had received “all teaching” assignments, they do not expressly limit the remedy to such participants. On the contrary, as the arbitrator observed, the provisions stated that “[t]he award will compensate each FERP faculty member for the excess workload during terms in which that individual was not allowed compensated time for indirect instructional duties.” (Italics added.) Moreover, the injunctive relief encompassed all such FERP participants, and the arbitrator expressly ordered a “make-whole remedy” for one such participant, namely, Meisenhelder.
Pointing to excerpts of arbitration hearing testimony, appellant contends that the systemwide grievance, as submitted to the arbitrator, was limited in scope to FERP participants who received “all teaching” assignments. The full evidentiary record of the hearing is not before us. However, the limited record contains appellant’s post-hearing brief, which stated: “The grievances at issue here... were all filed over a similar issue, the assignment of workload to [FERP] participants. Briefly, CFA feels that FERP Faculty must have the same proportion of direct and indirect instruction that they had when they were full time tenured faculty.” As the partial record before us contains evidence that appellant viewed the systemwide grievance as encompassing all FERP participants with an excessive workload, we cannot conclude that the arbitrator’s remedial ruling exceeded the scope of the systemwide grievance. (See Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1187.)
Under the circumstances, the arbitrator’s construction of the “make-whole remedy” cannot be regarded as “‘outré’” or “‘beyond the limits’” of the parties’ stipulation. (Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 380, quoting Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, supra, 768 F.2d at p. 187.) In view of the breadth of the award’s conclusion about the issues before the arbitrator -- namely, that all FERP direct instructional workloads must be proportional to pre-retirement assignments -- and the corresponding breadth of the injunctive relief, interpreting the “make-whole” remedy narrowly would produce -- as the trial court put it -- “an illogical result.” As we must “resolve any doubts in favor of upholding the second arbitration award,” we do so here. (Roehl v. Ritchie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 350.)
Appellant contends that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the award’s remedy provisions was “not only convoluted but clearly wrong on its face.” However, as our Supreme Court had explained, terms that appear unequivocal in isolation may be ambiguous, when viewed in context. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 391 [“That the phrase ‘at any time’ is not in itself ambiguous with respect to cause for termination does not preclude the possibility that AWI’s letter, when considered as a whole, contains ambiguity on the topic.”].) As explained above, that is the case here.
Appellant’s reliance on California Faculty Assn. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 935, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof. Law Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1718, and Hughes Aircraft v. Elec. & Space Tech. (9th Cir. 1987) 822 F.2d 823, is misplaced. In each case, the arbitrator issued a ruling in clear contravention of a limitation on arbitral authority, unlike the circumstances before us. (California Faculty Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 935 [arbitrator determined that faculty member merited tenure, despite provision expressly limiting arbitrator’s review of tenure decision to procedural errors]; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof. Law Corp, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1718 [arbitrators resolved attorney fee dispute between attorney and non-client, notwithstanding statute limiting their authority to resolving fee disputes between attorneys and clients]; Hughes Aircraft v. Elec. & Space Tech., supra, 822 F.2d at pp. 826-827 [arbitrator resolved grievances never submitted to arbitration].)
D. Amended Award
We also conclude that the remedial ruling was properly confirmed, even if the ruling constituted an amendment of the award. As the court explained in A.M. Classic Construction, Inc. v. Tri-Build Development Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478 (A.M. Classic), “California’s contractual arbitration law permits arbitrators to issue an amended award to resolve an issue omitted from the original award through the mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect of the arbitrator if the amendment is made before judicial confirmation of the original award, is not inconsistent with other findings on the merits of the controversy, and does not cause demonstrable prejudice to the legitimate interests of any party.”
In A.M. Classic, a subcontractor working on a public elementary school fell into a contract dispute with the contractor and the city employing the contractor. (A.M. Classic, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1472-1473.) After the subcontractor sued the contractor and the city for damages, the matter was submitted to an arbitrator, whose decision awarded the subcontractor damages against the contractor, but did not resolve the dispute between the subcontractor and the city. (Ibid.) Prior to the award’s confirmation, the subcontractor asked the arbitrator to amend the award. (Ibid.) The arbitrator issued an amended award, which contained a ruling in the subcontractor’s favor against the city. (Id. at p. 1473.)
In determining that the amended award had been properly confirmed, the appellate court in A.M. Classic noted that no statute authorizes arbitrators to make substantive amendments in awards. (A.M. Classic, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1476.) Although Code of Civil Procedure section 1284 permits arbitrators to correct awards, corrections are limited to miscalculations of amounts, mistakes in the description of persons and property, and defects in the form of the award. (70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1476.) Pointing to the strong public policy favoring the final resolution of disputes through arbitration, the court concluded that substantive amendments were permissible under the conditions described above. (Id. at pp. 1476-1479.) Following A.M. Classic, several courts have recognized the existence of a nonstatutory amendment doctrine. (Century City Medical Plaza v. Sperling, Isaacs & Eisenberg (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 865, 881 (Century City Medical Plaza); Delaney v. Dahl (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 647, 658-660 (Delaney); Landis v. Pinkertons, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 985, 992 (Landis).)
Appellant does not dispute that the arbitrator issued the remedial ruling before the award was confirmed, but contends that the ruling does not satisfy the other conditions stated in A.M. Classic. Pointing to Landis, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 985, appellant argues that the ruling did not add a ruling on an issue submitted to the arbitrator, but changed the award by expanding the scope of the “make-whole” remedy to encompass all FERP participants whose teaching workload was disproportionate to their pre-retirement responsibilities, even though they had not received “all teaching” assignments. We disagree. As explained above (see pt. C., ante), the remedial ruling reflects the arbitrator’s substantive determinations in the award, and the FERP participants that it declares as eligible for the “make-whole” remedy comport with the scope of the award’s injunctive relief.
Landis is distinguishable. There, the arbitrator’s award accorded the plaintiff damages of various kinds, including damages for emotional distress. (Landis, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) Prior to the award’s confirmation, a defendant asked the arbitrator to strike the portion of the award granting damages for emotional distress, arguing that the plaintiff had not requested such damages, and that the plaintiff could not recover them for his claims. (Id. at p. 988.) The arbitrator granted the request, but the trial court confirmed the original award. (Id. at pp. 988-989.) The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the modified award fell outside the nonstatutory amendment doctrine because the modification to the award did not “add a ruling on an issue submitted for decision but not addressed in the original award.” (Id. at p. 992.) Here, unlike Landis, the remedial ruling may reasonably be regarded as such a ruling.
Appellant also contends that the remedial ruling violates a condition properly imposed on the nonstatutory amendment doctrine, beyond the conditions stated in A.M. Classic. In Century City Medical Plaza, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 865, the court concluded that the doctrine requires the satisfaction of another condition, namely, that the amended award is requested and acted upon within the statutory time limits allowed for correction of an award (as well as any other time limits imposed by applicable rules). (Id. at p. 881; see also Landis, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1284, a request for a correction of the award must be filed within 10 days after the award is served, and the arbitrator must rule on the request no later than 30 days after the service of the award. The court in Century City Medical Plaza explained: “This condition is not mentioned in A.M. Classic, but we believe it is necessarily required. A judicially endorsed right to modify or amend an award upon proof of an inadvertent omission should not enjoy more generous temporal restrictions than those provided for expressly authorized corrections or modifications under section 1284... or applicable arbitration rules... in those cases where the parties have agreed to be bound by such rules.” (Century City Medical Plaza, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 881, fn. 25.)
In Delaney, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659 to 660, the court rejected this condition, reasoning that it operated to frustrate the policy underlying the nonstatutory amendment doctrine. The court stated: “The temporal requirement set forth in A.M. Classic --that the amendment must be made before judicial confirmation of the award -- is a reasonable, bright-line test. To permit amendment until the trial court confirms the award furthers the policies set forth in Moncharsh and its progeny of ensuring finality of, and limiting judicial intervention in, the arbitration process. The additional time requirement imposed in Century City Medical Plaza is not necessary to achieve these goals.” (Id. at p. 659.) Moreover, the court observed, the additional condition would produce harsh results that serve no legitimate purpose, as it would prevent parties from obtaining final decisions on issues submitted to the arbitrator. (Id. at pp. 659-660.) We find Delaney persuasive on this matter, and thus decline to apply the fourth condition stated in Century City Medical Plaza. In sum, the trial court properly confirmed the remedial ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P. J., SUZUKAWA, J.