Opinion
Civil Action 17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (SLC)
01-06-2023
BMADDOX ENTERPRISES LLC, Plaintiff, v. MILAD OSKOUIE, OSKO M LTD, and PLATINUM AVENUE HOLDINGS PTY, LTD, Defendants. MILAD OSKOUIE and PLATINUM AVENUE HOLDINGS PTY, LTD, Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. BMADDOX ENTERPRISES LLC and BRANDON MADDOX, Counterclaim Defendants.
HONORABLE RONNIE ABRAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SARAH L. CAVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court in this copyright infringement action, following entry of final judgment in favor of Plaintiff BMaddox Enterprises LLC (“BMaddox”) and against Defendants Osko M Ltd. (“Osko”), Platinum Avenue Holding Pty, Ltd. (“Platinum,” with Osko, the “Entity Defendants”), and Milad Oskouie (“Oskouie,” with the Entity Defendants, “Defendants”), is BMaddox's unopposed motion for attorneys' fees and costs under section 505 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505. (ECF No. 236 (the “Motion”); see ECF No. 232). For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and BMaddox be awarded $223,560.00 in attorneys' fees only.
II. BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background of this action is set forth in the four prior decisions of the Honorable Ronnie Abrams and the undersigned, and is incorporated by reference. See BMaddox Enters. LLC v. Oskouie, No. 17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (SLC), 2022 WL 539437, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (“BMaddox IV”) (awarding BMaddox $83,568.68 in damages against the Entity Defendants); BMaddox Enters. LLC v. Oskouie, No. 17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (SLC), 2022 WL 543050, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022) (“BMaddox III”) (recommending that BMaddox be awarded $83,568.68 in damages against the Entity Defendants); BMaddox Enters. LLC v. Oskouie, No. 17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (SLC), 2021 WL 3675072, at *1-2, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2021) (“BMaddox II”) (granting BMaddox's motions for summary judgment against Oskouie on two claims for copyright infringement (“Count 1” and “Count 2”) and for default judgment against the Entity Defendants on Counts 1 and 2, and awarding BMaddox $100,000.00 in statutory damages on Count 1); BMaddox Enters. LLC v. Oskouie, No. 17 Civ. 1889 (RA) (SLC), 2017 WL 4797906, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2017) (“BMaddox I”) (dissolving asset restraining order without prejudice to renewed application by BMaddox).The Court sets forth only the background necessary for analysis of the Motion.
Unless otherwise indicated, all internal citations and quotation marks are omitted from case citations in this Report and Recommendation.
Since 2005, BMaddox has “created and sold educational materials related to federal firearms licensing [(‘FFL')] through its website, ffl123.com[,]” (the “BMaddox Website”), for which BMaddox obtained several copyright and trademark registrations. BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *1. Platinum also sold FFL educational materials through its website, FFLTrust.com, (“Defendants' Website”), which BMaddox alleged infringed the copyrights in the BMaddox Website. Id. at *2, *8-9.
On March 14, 2017, BMaddox filed this action under seal and moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order, an order to disable Defendants' Website, and an asset restraining order. BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *4. (See ECF Nos. 6 (the “Complaint”); 17). In the Complaint, BMaddox asserted eight claims, including, as is relevant here, Counts 1 and 2. (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 63-89). “Pending a hearing on [BMaddox]'s application for a preliminary injunction, the Court temporarily restrained Defendants from transferring or disposing of any money or assets.” BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *4. (See ECF No. 15 (the “TRO”)). The Court held a show cause hearing, at which Defendants appeared, and following which they filed an answer and counterclaims,and sought a temporary restraining order against BMaddox and Brandon Maddox. (ECF Nos. 32; 34). In response, BMaddox, based on third-party discovery, informed the Court of numerous “willful misrepresentations” by Defendants in their application. (ECF No. 37 at 11). At a July 28, 2017 hearing, the Court denied Defendants' request for a temporary restraining order, and maintained the TRO against Defendants. (ECF No. 39; see ECF min. entry July 28, 2017). Judge Abrams subsequently dissolved the TRO without prejudice to BMaddox's renewed application. BMaddox I, 2017 WL 4797906, at *1-2. (See ECF Nos. 58; 78).
Defendants asserted 16 counterclaims for, inter alia, cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d) and 8131, unfair competition, invasion of privacy under South Dakota law, monopolization under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of civil rights. (See ECF No. 32).
After the Court entered a scheduling order setting a fact discovery deadline of March 30, 2018, Defendants moved for a stay, citing Oskouie's diagnosis with Stage B Leukemia. (ECF Nos. 87 - 89). Finding that Defendants failed to submit adequate evidence of Oskouie's diagnosis as well as “various other anomalies in Defendants' submissions,” BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *4, which included a doctor's note of questionable “authenticity,”(ECF No. 110 at 11), the Honorable Henry B. Pitman denied Defendants' request for a stay without prejudice and ordered Defendants to produce documents responsive to BMaddox's requests. (See id.; see also ECF No. 111 at 1).
The doctor's note that Defendants submitted in support of their request for a stay listed an “illegitimate” address” and a phone number for the doctor that connected instead to “an elevator repair company[.]” (ECF No. 110 at 11).
“On May 11, 2018, Defendants' counsel, the third attorney to file an appearance on their behalf in this action, moved to withdraw because of failure to pay legal fees.” BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *4 (citing ECF No. 150). Defendants' attorney subsequently informed the Court that he had “‘learned some facts which further make[] it impossible for me to ethically represent [Oskouie].'” BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *4 (quoting ECF No. 168). BMaddox subsequently filed two motions for sanctions, including under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on the ground that Defendants had made fraudulent and meritless filings. (ECF Nos. 153 (the “Discovery Sanctions Motion”); 161 (the “Rule 11 Sanctions Motion”)). On August 30, 2018, Judge Abrams permitted Defendants' counsel to withdraw and stayed the case until October 5, 2018 to enable Defendants to obtain new counsel. (ECF No. 169). Oskouie later “advised the Court that he would be proceeding pro se.” BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *4.
On September 30, 2019, Judge Pitman denied the Rule 11 and Discovery Sanctions Motions, but ordered Defendants to produce “all remaining discovery by October 21, 2019,” or face sanctions, including a possible default judgment. BMaddox II, 2021 WL 3675072, at *5. (See ECF No. 178 (the “Sept. 30 Order”)). On October 22, 2019, BMaddox renewed its request for sanctions, citing Defendants' failure to produce any documents in response to the Sept. 30 Order. (ECF No. 180). The Court entered an order that “reminded” Oskouie “that he cannot represent” the Entity Defendants, warned that their failure to appear through counsel could “risk an entry of default against them[,]” and permitted BMaddox to seek a certificate of default should no attorney appear for the Entity Defendants by February 28, 2020. (ECF No. 186). On March 3, 2020, the Court granted the Entity Defendants' request for an extension of time to find representation, but by June 18, 2020, after no attorney had appeared on their behalf, the Clerk of the Court entered a certificate of default against them. (ECF Nos. 188; 197).
On July 17, 2020, BMaddox moved for a default judgment against the Entity Defendants, and on July 31, 2020, moved for summary judgment against Oskouie. (ECF Nos. 200; 210). In BMaddox II, Judge Abrams found “numerous similarities” between the BMaddox Website and Defendants' Website, and, as to Counts 1 and 2 for copyright infringement, granted summary judgment against Oskouie and default judgment against the Entity Defendants. 2021 WL 3675072, at *8-9, *15. In particular, Judge Abrams found that “[t]he evidence clearly establishes that Defendants' infringement of [BMaddox]'s copyright in its FFL Guidebook was willful within the meaning of the Copyright Act[,]” and that “Oskouie copied, with minor modifications, entire portions of a guidebook created by [BMaddox] . . . by hacking into [BMaddox]'s accounts.” Id. at *14. Judge Abrams awarded BMaddox statutory damages of $100,000 on Count 1, but referred to the undersigned a damages inquest on Count 2 as against the Entity Defendants. Id. at *16. Following the inquest, the undersigned recommended that BMaddox be awarded $83,568.68 against the Entity Defendants, BMaddox III, 2022 WL 543050, at *5, a recommendation that Judge Abrams adopted. BMaddox IV, 2022 WL 539437, at *1.
On April 18, 2022, BMaddox filed and served the Motion, accompanied by a memorandum of law, the declaration of its counsel, Anderson J. Duff (“Duff”), and billing records. (ECF Nos. 236-38; 238-1 - 238-5 (“Billing Records”); see ECF No. 237 at 8). Judge Abrams referred the Motion for this Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 239). Defendants have not responded to the Motion.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
“A court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party under the Copyright Act.” McDermott v. NYFireStore.com, Inc., No. 18 Civ. 10853 (AJN) (SLC), 2021 WL 952455, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2021) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 505), adopted by, 2021 WL 950507 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2021); see Malibu Media, LLC v. Greenwood, No. 17 Civ. 1099 (PAE) (SLC), 2019 WL 7580083, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019), adopted by, 2020 WL 209140 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020). An award of attorneys' fees in a copyright action is “‘not automatic,'” but rather “a matter of the court's discretion.” Lucerne Textiles, Inc. v. H.C.T. Textiles Co., No. 12 Civ. 5456 (KMW) (AJP), 2013 WL 174226, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)), adopted by, 2013 WL 1234911 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013).
In analyzing whether to award attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act, courts consider several factors, including “(1) the frivolousness of the non-prevailing party's claims or defenses; (2) the party's motivation; (3) whether the claims or defenses were objectively unreasonable; and (4) compensation and deterrence.” Bryant v. Media Right Prods., 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19). The Court must give “substantial weight” to the third factor, objective unreasonableness. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 144 (citing Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Pub. Co., 240 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001)).
In calculating a reasonable award of attorneys' fees, the Court must determine the “presumptively reasonable fee” by looking to “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany & Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2008); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”). The Second Circuit has explained that the “‘presumptively reasonable fee'” is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours engaged in litigating the matter.” Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Chong, No. 13 Civ. 3846 (RA), 2014 WL 6611484, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2014) (quoting Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 183-84). A party requesting an award of attorneys' fees must provide “contemporaneous time records establishing ‘for each attorney [for whom fees are sought], the date [on which the work was performed], the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.'” Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill Imp. & Safety Funds of Int'l Union of Oper. Engineers, Loc. 15, 15A, 15C, 15D, AFL-CIO ex rel. Callahan v. Integrated Structures Corp., No. 12 Civ. 436 (LGS) (KNF), 2013 WL 2649644, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013) (quoting N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983)), adopted by, 2013 WL 3684933 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2013).
B. Application
BMaddox seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $279,450.00, reflecting 558.9 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of $500.00. (ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 8, 18-19). The Court finds that an award of attorneys' fees is warranted in this case given the Entity Defendants' default, Judge Abrams' finding that Oskouie's infringement was willful, and the frivolousness of at least some of Defendants' counterclaims, and concludes that an award of attorneys' fees “will further serve the goal of deterrence of copyright infringement.” See Mockingbird 38, LLC v. Int'l Bus. Times, Inc., No. 21 Civ. 283 (LJL), 2022 WL 154137, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2022). The Court therefore turns to the appropriate amount of the award, using the framework set forth above.
1. Hourly Rate
To determine whether an hourly rate is reasonable, the Second Circuit has instructed district courts to “apply the prevailing rate within the district for similar services by lawyers of comparable experience and skill.” Galeana v. Lemongrass on B'way Corp., 120 F.Supp.3d 306, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir. 1998)). A court may also adjust the hourly rate to account for case-specific variables such as:
[i] the time and labor required; [ii] the novelty and difficulty of the questions; [iii] the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; [iv] the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; [v] the customary fee; [vi] whether the fee is fixed or contingent; [vii] time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; [viii] the amount involved and the results obtained; [ix] the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; [x] the “undesirability” of the case; [xi] the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and [xii] awards in similar cases.Gamero v. Koodo Sushi Corp., 328 F.Supp.3d 165, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3). The movant bears the “burden to establish the prevailing market rate.” Sub-Zero, Inc. v. Sub Zero NY Refrig. & Appliances Servs., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 2548 (KMW) (JLC), 2014 WL 1303434, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2014).
BMaddox requests that the Court employ an hourly rate of $500 in calculating the award of attorneys' fees. (ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 18-19). Two attorneys worked on the BMaddox matter, Duff and Eric Misterovich (“Misterovich”). (Id. ¶ 11; see ECF Nos. 238-1 - 238-3). Duff was admitted to the New York State bar in 2010, and since then has “regularly litigated in federal and state courts throughout the country and before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.” (ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 10, 16). Duff is admitted to the bars of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as well as several federal courts, and regularly litigates intellectual property disputes. (Id. ¶ 17). Misterovich graduated the same year as Duff, and was admitted to the bar of the State of Michigan in 2009. (Id. ¶ 11). Courts awarding attorneys' fees in copyright cases have regularly found rates in the range of $400 to $750 an hour for partners to be reasonable. See Mockingbird, 2022 WL 154137, at *7 (finding $500 to be a reasonable hourly rate for partner); Tetra Images, LLC v. Grahall Ptrs., LLC, No. 19 Civ. 5250 (PMH), 2021 WL 2809566, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2021) (finding $450 and $475 to be reasonable hourly rates for partners); Latin Am. Music Co. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 1526 (RJS), 2020 WL 2848232, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020) (noting that courts in this District have found hourly rates in the range of $400 to $750 to be reasonable hourly rates for partners). Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that an hourly rate of $500 is reasonable for both attorneys in this case.
2. Hours Expended
To determine the reasonable number of hours required by a case, the critical inquiry is “whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992). Courts must perform “a conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.” Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994). “If the Court finds that some of the claimed hours are ‘excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary,' it may reduce the number of reasonable hours accordingly.” Bumble & Bumble, LLC v. Pro's Choice Beauty Care, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 6911 (VEC) (JLC), 2016 WL 658310, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434), adopted by, 2016 WL 1717215 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2016). An across-the-board percentage reduction is permitted as a “practical means of trimming fat” from a fee application. Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146.
The Court is not required to “set forth item-by-item findings concerning what may be countless objections to individual billing items.” Lunday, 42 F.3d at 134. The Court notes, however, that the Billing Records contain at least three areas of improper or excessive billing. First, Duff and Misterovich regularly billed time for calls, emails, and meetings with each other (and other individuals who are not identified). (See ECF Nos. 238-1 at 1-10 (Duff recording time for discussions, correspondence, and phone calls with Misterovich); id. at 10-13 (Misterovich recording time for discussions, correspondence and phone calls with Duff); 238-2 at 1, 3-5 (Duff recording time for discussions and correspondence with Misterovich and “JAD”); Id. at 7 (Misterovich recording time for discussions with Duff); 238-4 at 1 (Duff recording time for phone calls with “attorney B. Duffy”)). As this Court has previously noted, “due to ‘corporate scrutiny of outside counsel fees and commonplace rules prohibiting billing for internal conferences, it is highly unlikely counsel would be able to bill a client for this quantity of internal conferences.'” Greenburger v. Roundtree, No. 17 Civ. 3295 (PGG) (SLC), 2020 WL 6561598, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2020) (quoting Williams v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., No. 17 Civ. 03847 (JGK), 2018 WL 3370678, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018)), adopted by, 2020 WL 474640 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2020); see Cooper v. Sunshine Recoveries, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8898 (LTS) (JCF), 2001 WL 740765, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2001) (applying reduction for excessive interoffice communications). Courts have applied reductions of up to 75% for such excessive interoffice communications. See Williams, 2018 WL 3370678, at *10.
Second, the Billing Records exhibit a significant number of “block-billing” entries, where the time for multiple tasks is aggregated without specifying the time spent on each individual task, which “mak[es] it difficult to determine the amount of time expended on a given task,” and is a disfavored billing practice in this District. Sprint, 2014 WL 6611484, at *8 (noting that courts “frequently” apply 20-30% across-the-board reductions for block-billed time records); see Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd v. Arevenca S.A., No. 11 Civ. 4296 (DLC) (DF), 2014 WL 2624762, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014) (“Vague and ‘block-billed' time records are insufficient to substantiate a party's claimed expenditure of time.”); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov't of Lao People's Dem. Rep., No. 10 Civ. 5256 (KMW) (DF), 2012 WL 5816878, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (noting that “courts have reduced or even disallowed requested attorneys' fees where the supporting time records were not broken out with sufficient detail to enable it to determine the reasonableness of the time spent on particular tasks”). (See, e.g., ECF No. 238-1 at 1 (single entry for 5.4 hours for “Research relevant case law and various claims; discuss strength of each proposed claim with E. Misterovich; review and revise Complaint; draft memorandum in support of motion for temporary restraining order”)).
Third, the Billing Records reflect instances in which Duff recorded time at his partner rate for administrative tasks, rather than at an administrative hourly rate closer to $100. (See, e.g., ECF No. 238-2 at 6 (Duff recording 1.0 hours for “Courtesy copies of letter to judges”); id. at 7 (Duff recording 1.0 hours for “Service of Court order to Address for Platinum Holdings”)). These entries should have been billed at an administrative, rather than a partner, rate. See Mockingbird, 2022 WL 154137, at *7 (reducing fee award for “multiple entries on the billing records appear to be administrative in nature but billed at [the] partnership rate”).
Taking into account these problematic billing issues reflected on the Billing Records, the Court elects to make an across-the-board percentage reduction in hours to arrive at the reasonable hours Duff and Misterovich expended on representing BMaddox in this action. Courts, exercising their discretion to make across-the-board reductions to arrive at the reasonable number of hours expended, have applied percentage reductions of up to 75% to address overbilling issues depending on the specifics of the case. See Top Jet Enterprises, Ltd. v. Kulowiec, No. 21-MC-789 (RA) (KHP), 2022 WL 1184245, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2022) (applying 75% reduction in hours and noting cases applying percentages up to 50%); see also Kirsch v. Fleet St. Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming 20% fee reduction for vagueness and other deficiencies in attorney billing records); Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that 30% fee reduction for “lack of specific record keeping” was not an abuse of discretion); Sprint, 2014 WL 6611484, at *9 (applying 10% across-the-board reduction for “vague block billing and excessive time expenditure”); Suchodolski Assocs., Inc. v. Cardell Fin. Corp., Nos. 03 Civ. 4148 (WHP), 2008 WL 5539688, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2008) (collecting cases applying percentage reductions of up to 30%). The Court finds that a reduction of 20%, at the lower end of this range, is appropriate to take account of the block-billing, internal communications, and administrative entries described above. Applying a 20% reduction to the hourly rate recommended above, the Court calculates the award of attorneys' fees as follows:
Timekeeper
Requested Rate
Awarded Rate
Requested Hours
Hours Reduced by 20%
Total
A. Duff
$500
$500
492.3
393.84
$196,920.00
E. Misterovich
$500
$500
66.6
53.28
$26,640.00
TOTAL
$223,560.00
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that BMaddox be awarded $223,560.00 in attorneys' fees.
Finally, because BMaddox has not submitted contemporaneous documentation evidencing costs incurred in this action, I respectfully recommend that no costs be awarded. See Suriel v. Cruz, No. 20 Civ. 8442 (VSB) (SLC), 2022 WL 1750232, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022) (denying costs where party failed to submit documentation substantiating the amounts reflected in attorney billing records) (collecting cases), adopted by, 2022 WL 1751163 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2022).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and BMaddox be awarded $223,560.00 in attorneys' fees only.
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Abrams.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).