Opinion
21-CV-2700 (LTS)
06-01-2021
SAYVION D. BLOUNT, Plaintiff, v. M. BADAMI, et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Fishkill Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated May 19, 2021, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. By order dated March 29, 2021, that court severed claims allegedly arising in this District, and transferred them here. See Blount v. Badami, ECF 21-CV-0147 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021). That order summarizes those facts as follows:
On August 20, 2020, Blount was transferred to Downstate C.F., where medical staff mistakenly prescribed him medication for a seizure condition that he did not have, which, in turn, rendered him ineligible for enrollment at Willard DTC. Compl. at 4-6. Plaintiff discussed this mistake with defendant Senior Offender Rehabilitation Counselor Cheverez and defendant Badami, a “medical staff member” at Downstate C.F., asking them to intervene, discontinue the medication, and correct the error. Id. at 7-12. Neither defendant Cheverez nor defendant Badami assisted plaintiff, and he continued to be treated for a seizure condition that he did not have. Id. Plaintiff refused the seizure medication on several occasions before being transferred from Downstate C.F. to Midstate C.F. on August 31, 2020. Id. at 13-14.(Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. Medical claim
To state a claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Deliberate indifference is evaluated under a two-pronged test comprised of both objective and subjective components. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). The objective component requires that a prisoner “show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The deliberate indifference standard “contemplates a condition of urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019); see Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the medical need must be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in depriving him of adequate medical treatment. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)). That is, the prisoner must state facts showing that the correctional staff possessed “a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that the subjective component requires that the plaintiff show that a defendant “was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that the defendant drew the inference).
Plaintiff alleges that, during his 11-day custody in Downstate, he was prescribed medication for a seizure condition that he did not have. Plaintiff alleges that the named defendants failed to do anything when he reported the error, and he also claims that he refused to take the medication. It is not clear whether he ever took the medication, and Plaintiff does not describe any impact on his health as a result of the misdiagnosis. These facts do not give rise to an inference that Plaintiff was denied medical treatment in a manner that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to provide any additional facts to support this claim.
B. Ineligibility for enrollment at Willard
“In a § 1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights, a court must determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.” Nnebe v. Days, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The threshold question for a due process claim “‘is always whether the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution.'” Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trs. of the Conn. State Univ., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1988)).
As a general matter, prisoners have no constitutional right to participate in drug treatment or other rehabilitative programs that might shorten their sentences or otherwise expedite their release. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (federal prisoners have no right to due process protections regarding “eligibility for rehabilitative programs”); Williams v. Carpenter, 214 F.Supp.3d 197, 201 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (no liberty interest in participating in a 45-day parole diversion program); Fifield v. Eaton, 669 F.Supp.2d 294, 297 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (same, with respect to rehabilitative programs) (citing Abed v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff asserts that he was rendered ineligible for transfer to the Willard drug treatment program because of the misdiagnosis and prescription of medication he did not need. These facts are insufficient to suggest that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in participating in Willard's drug treatment program. He therefore cannot state a claim that he was denied due process when Willard rejected him from its program. Any claim Plaintiff is asserting in connection with his ineligibility for the Willard program is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his medical care claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint, ” and label the document with docket number 21-CV-2700 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
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