Opinion
2:23-cv-3063-HMH-MGB
09-12-2023
Andrea Bloodworth, #13948-171, Petitioner, v. Warden, FCI Bennettsville, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Andrea Bloodworth, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge has reviewed the petition and submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Bloodworth is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution, Bennettsville (“FCI Bennettsville”) in South Carolina. On April 17, 2019, Bloodworth was sentenced to 107 months in prison on federal drug charges. (Crim. Case No. 7:18-cr-110-BO (E.D. N.C. ), Dkt. No. 60.) On June 28, 2023, Bloodworth brought the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) denial of his request for early home confinement under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. 116-136, 134 Stat 281 (2020). (Case No. 2:23-cv-3063-HMH-MGB, Dkt. No. 1 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-1.) According to the administrative records attached to the petition, the warden rejected Bloodworth's request to serve the remainder of his sentence in home confinement because his “violent offense history” precluded him from meeting the criteria under the CARES Act. (Case No. 3063, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 9.) Due to the bare, cursory nature of Bloodworth's petition, the specific relief sought in this case is not entirely clear; however, the administrative records suggest that Bloodworth wants the Court to transfer him to home confinement under the CARES Act or, at the very least, review the BOP's decision to deny the same. (Id. at 7, 10.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Bloodworth's underlying criminal case. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
Bloodworth appealed the warden's decision to the BOP Regional Director (“Form BP-10”) and, subsequently, the Central Office (“Form BP-11”). Bloodworth's BP-11 was denied for failure to “provide a copy of [his] Regional Office Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP-10) Form or a copy of the (BP-10) response from the Regional Director,” which was apparently issued on or around August 10, 2022. (Case No. 3063, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25.) Bloodworth then resubmitted his BP-11, suggesting-albeit somewhat unclearly-that the Regional Director did not issue a timely response to his appeal and/or failed to provide him with a copy of said response. (Id. at 19.) The Central Office once again rejected Bloodworth's appeal, redirecting him to provide a copy of his BP-10 or the Regional Director's response thereto. (Id. at 18.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Bloodworth's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”); and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply the rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Bloodworth is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, the warden must respond. Id. Because Bloodworth is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
To invoke the protections of habeas corpus, a petition at its core must challenge “the validity of [] confinement” or the “particulars affecting its duration.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (explaining that habeas corpus petitions are traditionally brought to challenge “the very fact or duration of [] physical imprisonment, and the relief [] is a determination that [the petitioner] is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment”). However, where an inmate merely challenges the conditions of his confinement, those claims are more appropriately considered in a non-habeas civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Wilborn v. Mansukhani, 795 Fed.Appx. 157, 162-64 (4th Cir. 2019); Rodriguez v. Ratledge, 715 Fed.Appx. 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2017).
A motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 typically attacks the validity of a federal conviction and/or sentence, while a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2441 challenges the computation or execution of a federal sentence. In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997).
Generally, this Court has found that challenges to an inmate's placement and/or housing involve conditions of confinement, rather than the validity or constitutionality of a sentence. See, e.g., McCarson v. Reherman, No. 2:22-cv-1386-HMH-MGB, 2020 WL 2110770, at *1-2 (D.S.C. May 4, 2020) (finding that inmate's claim seeking release to home confinement under the CARES Act was “not cognizable under § 2241” because it contested her conditions of confinement rather than the constitutionality of her sentence); Hardin v. Acting Warden F.C.I. Edgefield, No. 9:20-cv-1420-SAL-BM, 2020 WL 3259761, at *2 (D.S.C. May 6, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 3259308 (D.S.C. June 16, 2020) (same); see also Wilborn, 795 Fed.Appx. at 164 (explaining that an inmate's “claim seeking to have the BOP reconsider where he is being housed is one that would not fall within the scope of habeas corpus”). Thus, any such claims-including Bloodworth's challenge to the BOP's denial of his request for early home confinement-fall outside the purview of habeas corpus and are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Nevertheless, even if habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle to challenge Bloodworth's current placement, the Court lacks the authority to order an inmate's release into home confinement or review the BOP's decision to deny the same. Indeed, the CARES Act empowers only the Attorney General and Director of the BOP to lengthen the maximum amount of time an inmate may serve his sentence in home confinement. See § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat at 516; see also McCarson, 2020 WL 2110770, at *2 (explaining that the decision of whether to release an inmate to discretionary home confinement under the CARES Act “rests solely with the [BOP]”); Holt v. Warden, No. 0:22-cv-158-RMG-PJG, 2022 WL 837526, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2022) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to order home confinement under the CARES Act because “[t]he BOP's authority as to where to house inmates is completely discretionary and not subject to judicial review”); United States v. Clark, No. 5:18-cr-466-FL-1, 2020 WL 7360687, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 15, 2020) (explaining that the BOP has exclusive authority to determine an inmate's place of imprisonment, including home confinement, and such decisions are “not reviewable by any court”); United States v. Rucker, 853 Fed. App'x 893 (Mem.), 2021 WL 3124725 (4th Cir. 2021) (“The district court correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to grant Rucker the requested relief because, under the CARES Act, the Attorney General has plenary control over [federal] inmates placement.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court cannot provide the relief Bloodworth appears to seek in his petition.
To that point, it is well established that inmates do not have a constitutionally protected interest in “designation to home confinement,” or any security classification for that matter. Strohmetz v. Warden, FCI Forrest City Medium, No. 5:22-cv-8, 2022 WL 4100846, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 5, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 4100282 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 7, 2022); see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); George v. Harmon, No. 5:10-cv-336, 2010 WL 3910071, at *9 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 7, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 3910069 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 1, 2010).
To the extent this petition simply attempts to challenge the BOP's administrative procedure for home confinement requests-or suggests some sort of constitutional violation in relation to Bloodworth's access thereto- any such claims likewise fall outside the scope of habeas corpus and must be brought in a civil rights action. However, it is worth noting that federal inmates generally have no inherent constitutional right to participate in the BOP's administrative grievance process in any event. See Bey v. Kemper, No. 1:21-cv-69, 2021 WL 625256, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 1, 2021) (referencing Adams, 40 F.3d at 75); see also Moses v. Bledsoe, No. 1:03-cv-149, 2004 WL 3317657, at *4 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 28, 2004), aff'd, 124 Fed.Appx. 787 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, there is nothing in the administrative records to indicate that Bloodworth was somehow prevented from fully utilizing the BOP's appeals process. Even if the Regional Director failed to provide Bloodworth with a copy of his decision, Bloodworth could have proceeded to the next level of review by providing the Central Office with a copy of his “Regional Office Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP-10) Form,” which he apparently completed. (See Case No. 3063, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 18, 25.) See Zander v. Lappin, No. 5:08-CT-3117-FL, 2012 WL 3138012, at *3-6 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 1, 2012) (finding that BOP's administrative process was accessible where “plaintiff's own mistakes” precluded him from exhausting those remedies), aff'd, 509 Fed.Appx. 203 (4th Cir. 2013). Therefore, any such constitutional claims would be subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Bloodworth cannot cure the deficiencies in his petition by amendment and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a response.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).