Opinion
No. 05-16-00564-CR
05-16-2017
KRIS TIARA BLOCK, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2-15-403
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Evans, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Evans
Kris Tiara Block was charged with the third-degree felony offense of driving while intoxicated. Appellant filed a motion to suppress challenging the legality of appellant's detention. After the trial court denied appellant's motion, appellant pled guilty to the offense preserving his right to appeal, and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and assessed a fine of $1,000.00. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In the motion, appellant also challenged the voluntariness of appellant's consent to the blood draw. However, on appeal, appellant does not raise any issues pertaining to the trial court's ruling on the consent issue.
BACKGROUND
During the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, Corporal Nosic of the Rowlett Police Department testified that at approximately 11:36 a.m. on July 20, 2015, he was on routine patrol heading southbound on Dalrock Road when he observed a vehicle with its front tires on the grass of the median which separated the opposing lanes of Dalrock Road. He then saw the vehicle back up, and instead of completing a turn as expected, hit the curb again. Corporal Nosic testified that the road conditions were good and that this was a simple median to navigate under normal driving behavior. He testified that when he saw the vehicle hit the curb the second time he had two concerns: (1) the welfare of the driver, in particular whether she was in any type of medical distress; and (2) whether the driver was intoxicated based on his training and experience.
The video of the traffic stop shows that there was a paved area in this part of the median for making turns.
When the vehicle struck the curb a second time, Corporal Nosic's patrol car was situated parallel to the vehicle and he was trying to make contact with appellant. Appellant seemed confused, however, and it appeared to Corporal Nosic that she was trying to roll down the window, but then "just kind of stare[d] off." Failing in his effort to communicate with appellant, Corporal Nosic pulled his patrol car behind her vehicle in the median in order to clear the lane of traffic. After approaching and speaking with appellant, Corporal Nosic observed that she was slow and lethargic, and that her speech was thick and slurred; he called for paramedics to check her out for any medical problems. In the meantime, Officer Hoedebeck arrived to continue the investigation and perform field sobriety tests. At the conclusion of the field sobriety tests, appellant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and transported to the hospital for a blood draw. Corporal Nosic also testified that Dalrock Road is a roadway separated by a physical barrier to keep traffic from entering the other lanes and that it is a traffic violation to drive over, across, or in such a dividing space or physical barrier.
Officer Hoedebeck also testified during the hearing on the issue of the consent given by appellant for the blood draw. As previously noted, on appeal, appellant does not challenge the trial court's ruling on this issue.
ANALYSIS
Appellant claims that her detention was not justified under the community caretaking doctrine. The State urges that regardless of the community caretaking argument, the record provides facts that would have justified Corporal Nosic's detention of appellant's vehicle because he reasonably suspected that appellant had violated a traffic law. We agree with the State.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (per curiam). In conducting this review, we employ a bifurcated standard. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to a trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility. Id. We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. When, as in this case, the trial court makes findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, supports those findings. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In its brief, the State sets forth the standard of review pertaining to the circumstances when the trial court does not file findings of fact. Although the trial court did not file written findings of fact as requested by appellant, the record shows that the trial court orally stated its reasons for the ruling on the record. The trial court also entered a written order stating that "The Court Denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Arrest under the community care taking exception to the 4th Amendment (sic) to the US Constitution." See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699-700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
An appellate court should affirm the trial court's ruling if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not rely on that theory, as long as the record is sufficiently well developed to support a correct ruling on the alternate theory. Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Here, the trial court ultimately concluded that Corporal Nosic had a right to approach and investigate the vehicle in the median. This is in the nature of a legal conclusion. With respect to the trial court's historical fact-finding, it found that the officer observed a vehicle hit a curb on multiple occasions in the median in a high-traffic area. The trial court also found that the video corroborated those observations. Whether there was reasonable suspicion to detain appellant is a function of the legal significance of those facts. Thus, we review de novo, the ultimate question of whether Corporal Nosic was justified in detaining and approaching appellant's vehicle.
The trial court also found that once the driver of the vehicle began talking to the officer, you can "clearly hear on the video the problems with her speech." On appeal, appellant challenges only the officer's initial detention and approach to the vehicle.
A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In making a reasonable suspicion determination, we are to use an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and look solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. See Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A reasonable-suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id.
An officer may lawfully stop and reasonably detain a person for a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court took judicial notice of § 545.063 of the Transportation Code. Section 545.063(b) provides that "An operator may not drive over, across, or in a dividing space, physical barrier, or section constructed to impede vehicular traffic except: (1) through an opening in the physical barrier or dividing section or space; or (2) at a crossover or intersection established by a public authority." TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.063(b) (West 2011). Corporal Nosic testified that when he was heading southbound on Dalrock Road he observed a vehicle with both of its front tires on the grass of the median which separated the northbound and southbound lanes of Dalrock Road. He then saw the vehicle back up and hit the curb again. He also testified that Dalrock Road is a roadway separated by a physical barrier to keep traffic from entering the other lanes and that it is a traffic violation to drive over, across, or in such a dividing space or physical barrier. The video introduced in evidence at the hearing shows appellant's vehicle in the median against the curb. Although Corporal Nosic's testimony regarding the reason for the detention does not indicate that he detained the vehicle based on the traffic violation, as long as an actual violation of the law occurred, law enforcement officers are free to enforce the laws and detain a person for that violation regardless of the officer's subjective reason for the detention. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 944.
Based upon the trial court's findings and denial of the motion to suppress evidence, as well as its discussion with defense counsel at the end of the hearing about whether an officer can approach a vehicle based on both a suspicion of a traffic violation and their community caretaking role, it is clear that the judge believed the testimony that was presented from Corporal Nosic. The trial court explicitly found that the officer observed a vehicle hit a curb on multiple occasions in the median in a high-traffic area and that the video corroborated those observations. While the trial court did not explicitly find that the officer had observed the vehicle's front tires on the median barrier as Corporal Nosic testified, we imply factual findings in favor of the trial court's ruling for matters on which it has failed to make an express finding. See Miller v. State, No. PD-0891-15, 2017 WL 1534213, at 7, fn. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. April 26, 2017). We conclude the circumstances existed upon which an officer could, at the very least, reasonably suspect that appellant had violated a traffic law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that the detention and approach of appellant's vehicle was lawful.
Defense counsel argued that the evidence showed that the officer was investigating a traffic violation and therefore the community caretaking exception did not apply because you cannot do both. The trial court disagreed, stating "Where is there a case that says you've got to . . . to choose."
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment.
/David W. Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
160564F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court, Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2-15-403.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices Bridges and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 16th day of May, 2017.