Opinion
No. 3787.
November 28, 1929. Rehearing Denied December 5, 1929.
Appeal from District Court, Hunt County; Newman Phillips, Judge.
Suit for injunction by W. F. Bledsoe and others against P. W. Wesley and others. From an order dissolving a temporary injunction, complainants appeal. Affirmed,
This suit for an injunction was commenced and prosecuted by appellants W. F. Bledsoe, H. T. Alexander, W. L. Davis, R. F. Bird, and J. E. Knox, in their own behalf as individuals, and by said appellants and Knox and appellant W. L. Davis, as trustees of the Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention, "for the benefit," it was alleged in their petition, "of said Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention and the entire membership thereof." It was against P. W. Wesley, H. T. Wise, and 16 other persons as defendants, all of whom are appellees here. In their petition appellants alleged that said convention was "an independent religious organization, without capital stock," and that its membership "was composed of delegates and messengers from various Baptist churches within the state of Texas, who yearly contributed substantial sums of money to the convention." They alleged, further, that at the regular annual meeting of the convention in August, 1928, said W. F. Bledsoe was elected president thereof, said H. T. Wise and J. E. Alexander vice presidents, said W. L. Davis secretary, said R. T. Bird treasurer, and said Bledsoe, Knox, and Davis trustees. They alleged, further, that they were "in full possession of said offices," and were "in possession of all funds belonging to the convention, and all records, books, papers, and documents and rights pertaining to said offices, together with the seal of this convention." They alleged, further, that the convention, "if permitted to operate through its duly elected officers and trustees," would "receive from its members more than $1.000" at its regular forty-ninth annual meeting, to be held in Marshall August 20 to 25, 1929. They then alleged that appellees, "acting together and in conjunction with others unknown" to appellants, entered into a conspiracy whereby they (said appellees) had wrongfully attempted to oust them (appellants) from their respective offices, bring them "in disrepute and deprive them of the honors and influence incident to said offices," destroy confidence theretofore reposed in them by the Baptist churches and Sunday schools of the state, and "hinder them, Jointly and individually, in the promotion of their work as officers of the convention"; that "in furtherance of and as part of such conspiracy" appellees, acting together, had "falsely published and declared themselves to be the officers and trustees of the Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention," instead of appellants; had "caused the said H. T. Wise, presuming to act as president" of the convention, and as said Bledsoe's successor, to call a meeting of the convention to be held in Longview August 19 to and including August 25, 1929, which he "falsely designated as the forty-ninth annual meeting of said convention"; and had "collected sums of money rightfully belonging to the Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention," and would "collect still further sums of money belonging to the convention, which plaintiffs say will exceed more than $1,000 and that "unless [quoting] the defendants, and each of them, were restrained from further interference with the plaintiffs herein, their right to hold their said offices and conduct the affairs of the said Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention, the plaintiffs, as such officers of said convention, will be injured in their reputation, and their influence as such officers will be greatly impaired, their official acts subject to question, and the work they are endeavoring to do as such officers materially injured, and the Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention will suffer through the loss of large sums of money by way of contributions rightfully belonging to said convention, and through the loss of services rendered it by its said officers, and the plaintiffs, as such officers, and the convention as an organization will suffer irreparable loss and injury." They alleged, further, that said convention "had a vested property right" in its name, in services "rendered it by its said officers, and in the contributions made to it through its said officers," and "should not be required to submit to the state of confusion in its business affairs which has been brought on and is now being promoted by the defendants," and that "if the acts of the defendants, as hereinbefore alleged, are permitted to continue, and the defendants are permitted to hold a meeting of this convention at Longview, Texas, on the date hereinbefore mentioned, or at any other time or place, as a regular meeting of the plaintiff Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention, and if the defendants are permitted to collect money from churches and Sunday schools in the name of the Texas Baptist State Sunday School Convention, and to continue to publish the false reports whereby the officers of this convention are repudiated, this convention will suffer irreparable loss and injury, and plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law." The prayer in the petition was for a temporary writ of injunction restraining appellees from "holding themselves out as officers and trustees" of said convention and assuming to act as such; from collecting or receiving money as officers and trustees of said convention; from holding a meeting in Longview August 19 to 25, 1929, or at any other time or place, as a meeting of said convention; and from using the name of the convention "with prefix or suffix attached thereto." The court, by an order made August 17, 1929, granted a temporary writ of injunction as prayed for. He later, to wit, on August 21, 1929, in vacation, on his own motion and without notice to appellants, made an order dissolving the injunction he had granted. The appeal is from the last-mentioned order.
Mike E. Smith and Fred S. Dudley, both of Fort Worth, for appellants.
W. J. Durham, of Sherman, for appellees.
We agree with appellants in their contention, so far as it is that, if the allegations in their petition, taken as true, as they should be, entitled them to relief by injunction, the court below did not have a right, on his own motion and without notice to them, and an opportunity to be heard about the matter, to dissolve the injunction he had granted (articles 4657 and 4658, Rev.St. 1925; Walker v. Meyers, 114 Tex. 225, 266 S.W. 499: Water Supply Co. v. Green [Tex. Civ. App.] 198 S.W. 631), but we do not agree with them in their contention, so far as it is that their petition stated a case entitling them to such relief.
It will be noted, on referring to the statement above, that appellants' complaint, so far as it was not about conduct of appellees prior to the time the petition was filed, was that appellees were at that time falsely asserting that they, and not appellants, were the officers and trustees of the convention, and that appellees, if not enjoined from doing so, would collect more than $1,000 belonging to the convention. It seems to be well settled that injunction is not available as a remedy for wrongs already perpetrated (32 C.J. 45, and authorities there cited), for mere libel or slander (32 C.J. 272, and authorities there cited), or to enforce mere personal rights, as distinguished from property rights (32 C.J. 272). The only pretense of a property right in the convention as against appellees set up in the petition was as to money which, it was alleged, had been donated and would be donated to the convention. It is obvious the convention had no property right in money not already donated to it, and injunction was not available as a means of collecting money intended for it, but in fact paid to appellees. 32 C.J. 154.
In holding, as we do, that the petition did not state a case for an injunction, and that the court below therefore did not err when he dissolved the writ he had granted, we have assumed (maybe wrongfully) that at the annual meeting of the convention in Marshall in August, 1929, appellants were re-elected to the offices they were holding at the time they commenced this suit, and hence were entitled to continue to prosecute it.
The judgment is affirmed.