Opinion
99 C 6793
February 17, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants the City of Chicago's ("the City") and six individual police officers' (the "Police Officers") motions to dismiss Plaintiff Lawrence Bledsoe's ("Bledsoe") amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted.
BACKGROUND
Bledsoe's pro se complaint contains the following factual allegations, which the Court must accept as true for the purposes of this motion. At 10:59 p.m. on the night of September 2, 1999, Chicago police officers Robert Distasio ("Distasio") and Frank Cascale, Jr. ("Cascale") arrested Bledsoe near 5200 S. Justine Avenue in Chicago. The police officers handcuffed Bledsoe, forced him onto the backseat of their police car, and transported him to the police station at 155 W. 51st Street where he was locked in a room. Bledsoe was charged with committing a battery against Allison Booker ("Booker").
Though the state court proceedings involving this charge ultimately ended in his favor, Bledsoe remained in police custody on September 3, 1999 pursuant to officer Joseph Moseley's ("Moseley") request that his release await the issuance of a search warrant. Police officers Frank McDermott ("McDermott") and Robert Smith ("Smith") assisted in holding Bledsoe in custody during this time. Meanwhile, Lieutenant John Halpin ("Halpin") approved of probable cause for Bledsoe's arrest and battery charge. At some point while he was in police custody, Bledsoe was transferred to the Ninth District police station at 3105 S. Lowe Avenue in Chicago and placed in a jail cell. Two unidentified police officers handcuffed him and dragged him from the jail cell into another room. In that room, a third unidentified police officer asked Bledsoe if he could extract a saliva tissue sample from Bledsoe's mouth with a swab. Bledsoe refused to cooperate, stating "no, because I don't have an attorney present." The two other police officers then held Bledsoe, who was still handcuffed and now struggling to get away, as the third officer forcibly extracted the saliva tissue sample from Bledsoe's mouth. This action allegedly caused Bledsoe's gums to bleed. After this episode, Bledsoe's handcuffs were removed and he was placed back in a locked jail cell. According to Bledsoe, the police took his DNA to maliciously prosecute him for a murder. Bledsoe was released on his own recognizance at 2:47 a.m. on September 4, 1999.
On November 1, 1999, Bledsoe initiated this action against the City of Chicago and the Police Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") based on false arrest and false imprisonment. Bledsoe also brought state law claims against the Police Officers for false arrest and false imprisonment.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. Defendants must meet a high standard to have a complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint's allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded facts and allegations the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true. See Brontkowski v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993). The allegations of a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Sherwin Manor Nursing Center Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficiently setting forth the essential elements of a cause of action. See Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court is limited to the allegations contained in the pleadings themselves. Documents incorporated by reference into the pleadings and documents attached to the pleadings as exhibits are considered part of the pleadings for all purposes.See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). In addition, "[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered a part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to their claim." Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). With these principles in mind, we address the motions before us.
DISCUSSION
The crux of Bledsoe's § 1983 claim is that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was arrested and held in custody without probable cause. Bledsoe sets forth different theories of liability for the City and the individual officers. The City and the Police Officers respond with separate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). This Court considers each motion in turn.
I. The City's Motion
To state a § 1983 claim against the City for its police officers' actions, Bledsoe must allege that the police officers acted in accordance with a municipal policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff successfully alleges such a municipal policy or custom when he shows: (1) an express municipal ordinance, (2) a custom which is so widespread or persistent that it rises to the level of a policy which can be fairly attributed to the municipality, or (3) a single action taken by an official policymaker. See Dulceak v. Paxson, 803 F. Supp. 164, 168 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Bledsoe has not alleged any such policy or custom. Nor does he allege any facts from which this court can reasonably infer the existence of any of the three manners by which such a policy or custom may be shown.
Instead, Bledsoe asserts that the City is liable for the police officers' actions under the theory of respondeat superior. He maintains that Monell v. Department of Social Services and Owen v. City of Independence support this proposition. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. Bledsoe misinterprets these cases. Both Monell and Owen clearly instruct that municipalities are not liable for the actions of their employees under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 633; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Thus, Bledsoe's § 1983 claim against the City is insufficient because he incorrectly bases his claim on the theory of respondeat + superior and because he does not allege a municipal policy. Accordingly, the court grants the City's motion to dismiss.
II. The Police Officers' Motion
Bledsoe claims that the individual Police Officers whom he names in his complaint are personally liable under § 1983 because they falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that Distasio, Casale, Moseley, McDermott and Smith are personally liable because they directly caused his injuries, while Halpin is liable as a superior officer for condoning the other officers' actions. The Police Officers respond that the existence of probable cause for Bledsoe's arrest precludes his § 1983 claim. The law in this district supports this argument.
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that the existence of probable cause for arrest is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim for false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution. See Jones v. Webb, 45 f.3d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1995);Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1247 (7th Cir. 1994);Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989);Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985);Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985); Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1980). Thus, the next question in determining whether Bledsoe has sufficiently stated a § 1983 claim is whether Bledsoe has properly alleged the absence of probable cause for his arrest.
Although Bledsoe has made a conclusory allegation that his arrest was without probable cause, documents attached to Defendants' motion to dismiss, of which the Court takes judicial notice, belie this assertion. The Police Officers argue that there was probable cause for Bledsoe's arrest because a citizen, Booker, had filed a formal complaint alleging Bledsoe committed a crime. Defendants attach a copy of the September 2, 1999 complaint filed by Booker (the "Booker Complaint") alleging that Bledsoe committed a battery on her. Courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Nat'l Industrial Chemical Co. v. Steege, No. 98 C 4081, 1998 WL 887065, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1998), citing General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1997). Courts may, in this way, avoid unnecessary proceedings when an undisputed fact in the public record demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).See Nat'l Industrial Chemical, 1998 WL 887065, at 2.
Courts may take judicial notice of a fact when it is both "not subject to reasonable dispute" and either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or (2) "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." General Electric Capital Corp, 128 F.3d at 1081, citing Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). The Booker Complaint meets this criteria. For purposes of this motion, the Court takes judicial notice of the Booker Complaint, not for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but merely to acknowledge that it was filed. The fact of its filing against Bledsoe is not subject to reasonable dispute and it is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably by questioned." General Electric Capital Corp. 128 F.3d at 1081. Thus, the Court may properly take judicial notice of the Booker Complaint and thus refer to it.
A citizen's complaint establishes sufficient probable cause for an arrest. See Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 200 (7th Cir. 1985); McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the police had probable cause for arresting him. That Bledsoe was ultimately not convicted of the battery charge does not negate the existence of probable cause.See Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 200 (stating citizen's complaint established probable cause even if complaint turned out to be unfounded); McKinney, 726 F.2d at 1187 (same). Thus, Bledsoe's § 1983 claim for false arrest and false imprisonment is barred by the existence of probable cause for his arrest. The Police Officers' motion to dismiss is granted.
Having dismissed Bledsoe's federal claims, the Court declines to entertain his state law claims. Accordingly, Bledsoe's state law claims are also dismissed.
The Court notes that, after the Police Officers replied to Bledsoe's response to their motion to dismiss, Bledsoe submitted an untitled document, the purpose of which is not clear from the document itself. The theme of the document appears to be that the police generally violate the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination when they take DNA samples from a person in custody who has not received Miranda warnings. Considering that Bledsoe alleged facts in his complaint indicating a sample of his saliva was taken for DNA analysis against his will and without the presence of his attorney, the Court surmises that Bledsoe now asserts that the Police Officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to self-incrimination.
Bledsoe did not, however, allege this constitutional violation in his complaint. The court's analysis of his § 1983 claim is restricted to the allegations of false arrest and false imprisonment in his complaint. Bledsoe cannot add a new claim through this late document. Even if he could, it is unclear from the complaint whether such a claim would be against any of the named individual defendants. Bledsoe may be alluding to other possible claims based on the taking of his saliva, but he has failed to develop them and has not stated them as a cause of action. Thus, the Court will not address these unformed claims. Further, the possibility of additional claims does not save Bledsoe's present § 1983 claim for false arrest and false imprisonment against the City, Distasio, Casale, Halpin, Moseley, McDermott and Smith from this motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the City's and the Police Officers' motions to dismiss.