Summary
In Blatz v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 274 A.D.2d 491 (2nd Dept., 2000), the Court affirmed the application of a New Jersey statute of repose which barred actions based on unsafe conditions of improvements to real property more than ten years after construction or the finishing of improvements.
Summary of this case from Crowder v. A.W. Chesterton Co.Opinion
Argued April 25, 2000
July 24, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Weiner, J.), entered June 16, 1999, which granted the motion of the defendant Westinghouse Electric Corporation for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Worby Borowick Groner, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Richard S. Vecchio and William H. Groner of counsel), and Brian J. Isaac, New York, N Y, for appellant (one brief filed).
Sonageri Fallon, LLC, Garden City, N.Y. (James L. Sonageri of counsel), for defendant third-party plaintiff-respondent.
Before: GUY JAMES MANGANO, P.J., WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant Westinghouse Electric Corporation (hereinafter Westinghouse), a Pennsylvania corporation at the time of the accident and the commencement of this action, manufactured a transformer pursuant to specifications given to it by the third-party defendant, Public Service Electric Gas (hereinafter PSE G),; a New Jersey corporation. The transformer was then shipped to a PSE G; substation located in New Jersey.
The plaintiff, a New York resident, was employed by PSE G; as a mechanic at the substation, and was injured when the transformer exploded. After the plaintiff commenced this action, Westinghouse moved for summary judgment, contending that New Jersey Statutes Annotated, title 2A, § 14-1.1, barred the action. In pertinent part, that statute provides that claims arising out of defective and unsafe conditions of improvements to real property are barred where the claims are made more than 10 years after the construction or furnishing of the improvements (see, NJ Stat Annot, tit 2A, § 14-1.1). The parties do not dispute that the transformer at issue constitutes an improvement to PSE G's; real property within the meaning of the statute.
The Supreme Court properly determined that New Jersey Statutes Annotated, title 2A, § 14-1.1, constitutes a statute of repose and is a substantive law for purposes of New York choice of law analysis (see, Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., 93 N.Y.2d 48; see also, Ebert v. South Jersey Gas Co., 723 A.2d 599; Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Gruzen, Samton, Steinglass, Architects, 590 A.2d 1171; E. A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo Dev. Corp., 411 A.2d 697; O'Connor v. Altus, 335 A.2d 545; Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 293 A.2d 662; Van Slyke v. Worthington, 628 A.2d 386). The Supreme Court also correctly determined that under New York choice of law rules, the New Jersey statute is applicable to this action (see, Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., supra; Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519, 521; Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 73-80; Frato v. Roadway Express, 221 A.D.2d 187; Roach v. McGuire Bennett, 146 A.D.2d 89, 93).