Opinion
Civil Action No. 8:98-1996-13AK, Civil Action No. 8:98-3450-13AK
February 22, 1999
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs' motion for joinder and the defendant's motion to sever. The defendant is a municipality located in South Carolina, with different divisions including Public Safety, which encompasses the City of Anderson Police Department. The plaintiffs in these actions consist of a group of six current employees and one former employee of the defendant's police department.
FACTS PRESENTED
The first action, C.A. 8:98-1996-13AK, was filed by plaintiffs Donnie Blassingame and Michael Bracone. Blassingame is a black male who is employed as a police officer in the community patrol division. He has brought claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, race discrimination in employment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws. Blassingame's specific complaints relate to an incident on June 1, 1997, when he was allegedly told by a coworker that another coworker got to attend a radar training course before Blassingame because the other coworker was white. Def. mem., ex. A.
Plaintiff Bracone, who is a white male also employed in the community patrol division, has brought claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, race discrimination in employment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws. He argues that because he is closely associated with blacks, he should therefore receive the same protections as that class. He claims that on June 6, 1997, he was called a "nigger lover" by a white coworker because of his interracial dating. When he complained to a supervisor, he was involuntarily transferred to another shift. Def. mem., ex. B.
The second action, C.A. 8:98-3450-13AK, was filed by plaintiffs Lamarr Norris, Andrew Marshall, Standon Carpenter, Johnie Johnson, and Channtay lbekwe. Plaintiff Norris is a black male employed by the defendant as a police officer. He has brought causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, race discrimination in employment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaliation for Title VII assertions, violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981, and violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws. He claims that he was denied promotional opportunities and has not received supervisory pay or title that he is due. He further claims that he has been called racially demeaning and offensive names and been subjected to unwarranted discipline and threats of discipline in retaliation for his opposition of unlawful employment practices. Def. mem., ex. C.
Plaintiff Marshall is a black male employed by the defendant as a police officer. He has brought causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, race discrimination in employment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaliation for Title VII assertions, violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981, and violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws. He claims that he has been denied promotional opportunities because of his race and has been subjected to racial slurs and jokes. Def. mem., ex. D.
Plaintiff Carpenter is a black male formerly employed as a police officer by the defendant. He has brought causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, race discrimination in employment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaliation for Title VII assertions, violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981, violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws, wrongful discharge, and malicious prosecution. He claims that he was terminated because of his race. Carpenter further alleges wrongful discharge, retaliation, and malicious prosecution arising out of his arrest on fraudulent check charges.
Plaintiff Johnson is a black female employed by the defendant as a communications specialist. She has brought causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981, and violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws. In her EEOC charge, she claimed that the defendant retaliated against her in that she was written up by Lieutenant Terry Mitchell for not answering the radio on the third shift. Def. mem., ex. F.
Plaintiff Ibekwe is a black female employed by the defendant as a detention officer. She has brought causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981, and violation of the whistleblower provisions of Section 8-27-10, et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws. She alleges race discrimination in that, unlike a white coworker, she did not receive flowers from her shift upon the deaths of her mother and father. She also claims that she was subjected to seeing a Confederate flag and picture of Robert E. Lee in Lieutenant Otis Green's office. Finally, she alleges that Lieutenant Green told her she would be terminated if she took more time off while her sister was sick. Def. mem., ex. G.
APPLICABLE LAW
The plaintiffs have moved for joinder of their claims. They contend that the two cases arise out of the same series of occurrences, are logically related, and contain several questions of law and fact common to all the plaintiffs. Pl. motion at 1. The defendant contends that the plaintiffs in each lawsuit are improperly joined and moves to sever the claims in each lawsuit. Def. mem. at 1-2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) provides for permissive joinder of plaintiffs if they assert claims "arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 authorizes the court to drop any party or claim at any stage of the lawsuit when parties are misjoined. Parties of a lawsuit are misjoined when they fail to satisfy either of the preconditions for permissive joinder set forth in Rule 20(a). Jonas v. Conrath, 149 F.R.D. 520, 523 (S.D. W. Va. 1993). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that the court may, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, " order separate trials of any claims or issues. The question is committed to the discretion of the court. See Dixon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440, 1443 (4th Cir. 1993).
The plaintiffs rely on two district court cases from the Fourth Circuit in their argument for joinder. However, the cases differ from the present case in important respects. In Hicks v. Maruchan Virginia, Inc., No. 3:96cv549, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13754 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1996), the district court in a sexual harassment case brought under Title VII, denied the defendant's attempt to sever the cases of the nine plaintiffs. However, importantly, all of the plaintiffs alleged that one employee had committed the acts of alleged sexual harassment and that the defendant had failed to take proper remedial action. Id. at *1. In Mentecki v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc., No. 96-1629-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1197 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 1997), a class action for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the district court denied the defendants' motion to sever. The court noted that although the claims were asserted against different defendants, "the right to relief they assert arises out of the same series of transactions. The questions of law, moreover, are the same, and the facts are substantially identical, differing only in the amount of yield spread premium charged." Id. at *19.
In the case at issue, however, the employment actions complained of by the plaintiffs were made by different supervisors working on different shifts at different times. The adverse employment actions alleged by the plaintiffs range from termination to denial of promotional opportunities to denial of training. Plaintiff Ibekwe is employed as a detention officer in the jail, while plaintiff Johnson is a dispatcher. The other five plaintiffs are or were employed as police officers on various shifts and in various positions. No single supervisor or manager is implicated in a claim common to all the plaintiffs.
In Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ga. 1994), a district court in Georgia granted the defendant's motion to sever the claims of 11 plaintiffs who attempted to join their age discrimination claims together in one lawsuit. Id. at 788-89. The court stated:
The decision to demote each Plaintiff originated with his district manager and was derived within the context of the business circumstances of each Plaintiffs store. Three different regional managers participated in the eleven demotion decisions at issue in these cases. While all of these decisions may not be completely unrelated . . . they hardly constitute a single action on the part of the defendant.Id. at 789.
Similarly, in Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Ok. 1970), a race discrimination case, the court found:
The dissimilarity in transactions and occurrences claimed to render the defendant liable appears in the allegations . . . of the Complaint and supporting Record. For example, plaintiff Smith alleges she was discriminatorily denied a promotion in Department 916. Plaintiff Roundtree complains of an entirely different occurrence, that he was discriminatorily denied an opportunity to attend Blueprint School. Mr. Roundtree was employed in an entirely different capacity than that of Mrs. Smith. Mr. Roundtree was subject to a collective bargaining agreement; Mrs. Smith was not. Again, Plaintiff Snoddy's complaint arises out of a separate and distinct transaction. He complains that he was discriminatorily denied a promotion in the Materials and Processes Laboratory. Finally, plaintiff Dews complains that she was discriminatorily denied a promotion in the Accounting Department. The general notion that there may have been three cases cannot support joinder, where any purported denials of promotion would have been made by different supervisory personnel in different labor union and work environments, with respect to employees performing different types of work.Id. at 522. Furthermore, the potential confusion to the jury weighs in favor of separate trials. The jury would be faced with deciding the merits of numerous claims and would have to evaluate an enormous amount of evidence relating to seven plaintiffs with up to eight different claims each. Similarly, in Weir v. Litton Bionetics, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1150 (D. Md. 1986), the court stated:
Were this case to be tried without a jury, a judge might well be able to consider the pertinent facts separately and fairly. However, plaintiffs' claims will be tried before a jury, and is highly likely that confusion will result when the different facts pertaining to these different claims are presented at a single trial. No prejudice can result to each plaintiff if each claim is tried separately, but the same cannot be said insofar as the defendant is concerned. This Court concludes that in view of the different facts which are pertinent to each of these two claims defendant would suffer prejudice if the claims were tried together.Id. at 1155.
Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for joinder is denied and the defendant's motion to sever is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.