Opinion
2020-311 Q C
04-08-2022
Bonnie Blansett, Respondent, v. Haydee Zambrana, Appellant.
Haydee Zambrana, appellant pro se. Bonnie Blansett, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
Unpublished opinion
Haydee Zambrana, appellant pro se.
Bonnie Blansett, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
PRESENT:: THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, P.J., WAVNY TOUSSAINT, DONNA-MARIE E. GOLIA, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Rachel Freier, J.), entered October 28, 2019. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,738.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover from defendant, her former landlord, a security deposit as well as damages for, essentially, a breach of the warranty of habitability. It is undisputed that plaintiff had paid a security deposit and that she lived in the apartment for more than 12 years. Following a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff a judgment in the principal sum of $2,738, which included the security deposit. Defendant appeals.
In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has... been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807; see CCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 A.D.2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 A.D.2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 A.D.2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 A.D.2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 A.D.2d at 126).
In general, a security deposit remains the property of the tenant (see General Obligations Law § 7-103) and, upon the tenant vacating the premises, must be returned to the tenant "absent proof, for example, that the tenant caused damage beyond that attributable to ordinary wear and tear" (Quijano v Rowinski, 64 Misc.3d 128[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50990[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; see Yafei Li v Dao Ying Gao, 71 Misc.3d 139 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50478[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]). As defendant failed to demonstrate that any repairs she made were necessary to remedy damage to the apartment that was beyond normal wear and tear, we find that the judgment rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804, 1807). We note that this court does not consider factual assertions which are dehors the record (see Chimarios v Duhl, 152 A.D.2d 508 [1989]).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
ALIOTTA, P.J., TOUSSAINT AND GOLIA, JJ., CONCUR.