Opinion
533495
10-20-2022
In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF June F. BLAINE, Also Known as June F. Jarvis, Deceased. Hope A. Blaine, as Administrator of the Estate of June F. Blaine, Also Known as June F. Jarvis, Deceased, Respondent; v. Michael H. Blaine, Appellant.
Michael H. Blaine, Sun City Center, Florida, appellant pro se. Hope A. Blaine, Plattsburgh, respondent pro se.
Michael H. Blaine, Sun City Center, Florida, appellant pro se.
Hope A. Blaine, Plattsburgh, respondent pro se.
Before: Lynch, J.P., Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Fisher and McShan, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McShan, J. Appeal from a decree of the Surrogate's Court of Clinton County (William A. Favreau, S.), entered May 4, 2021, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to SCPA article 22, for judicial settlement of the accounting of decedent's estate.
June F. Blaine (hereinafter decedent), died testate in February 2018, survived by her eight adult children (hereinafter collectively referred to as the siblings), including petitioner and respondent. Decedent's eldest daughter, Diane Akey, was appointed by Surrogate's Court as the executor pursuant to decedent's will and, in April 2018, Akey sought to admit decedent's will to probate. Pursuant to decedent's will, beyond a specific bequest of certain real property to one of her children, the "remainder of [decedent's] property and estate, both real and personal," was bequeathed to all of the siblings in equal shares, per stirpes. Relevant to this appeal, decedent's property subject to this bequest included a 2004 Ford Taurus (hereinafter the vehicle) and an 8.6–acre vacant lot located on Lyons Road in the Town of Peru, Clinton County (hereinafter the property).
In September 2018, petitioner requested the issuance of letters of administration c.t.a. after probate (see SCPA 1418 ). Subsequently, in January 2019, Akey sought to resign as the executor, citing the acrimony that had arisen amongst the siblings over the settling of decedent's modest estate. Akey simultaneously petitioned for an intermediate accounting, which, among other things, denoted that the vehicle was being transferred to one of the siblings for an estimated value of $2,000. Respondent opposed Akey's resignation as well as the intermediate accounting, and sought to withdraw his prior consent to petitioner's appointment as administrator. Ultimately, over respondent's objection, Surrogate's Court issued an intermediate decree of judicial settlement and, separately, granted petitioner letters of administration c.t.a.
The sibling renounced his interest in the remainder of the estate in exchange for the vehicle.
In July 2020, after listing the property on the Multiple Listing Service, petitioner sold it for $41,500. Accounting for the proceeds from the sale of the estate property, petitioner then commenced this proceeding in September 2020 to judicially settle the account. A one-day virtual hearing was held in January 2021, in which respondent appeared in a self-represented capacity to object to the settlement and examine petitioner (see SCPA 2211[2] ). Respondent primarily contended that his request to subdivide the property at the expense of the estate was not properly considered and that petitioner sold the property for an amount that did not represent its actual value. Respondent also renewed his prior contention that the vehicle was unlawfully transferred to one of the siblings, and that Akey had failed to obtain an accurate valuation of the vehicle prior to the transfer. Surrogate's Court ultimately determined that the actions taken by petitioner were "appropriate and valid in completing the liquidation of the [e]state assets including ... [petitioner's] arm's length sale of the [property]." Specifically, Surrogate's Court determined that subdividing the property into seven parcels would not be feasible given the "unique nature and character of real estate" and that respondent failed to demonstrate that the property was sold for less than fair market value. Accordingly, the court granted the petition to judicially settle the final account and issued a decree to that effect. Respondent appeals, and we affirm.
"Where the beneficiary of an estate has demanded an accounting, the party submitting the account has the burden of proving that he or she has fully accounted for all the assets of the estate" ( Matter of Carbone, 101 A.D.3d 866, 868, 955 N.Y.S.2d 209 [2d Dept. 2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Tract, 284 A.D.2d 543, 543, 727 N.Y.S.2d 148 [2d Dept. 2001] ). The party submitting objections "has the initial burden of coming forward with evidence to establish that the amounts set forth are inaccurate or incomplete" ( Matter of Robinson, 282 A.D.2d 607, 607, 724 N.Y.S.2d 424 [2d Dept. 2001] ; see Matter of Jewett, 145 A.D.3d 1114, 1115–1116, 42 N.Y.S.3d 443 [3d Dept. 2016] ). If the objecting party meets that burden, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to establish that the account is accurate and complete (see Matter of Johnson, 166 A.D.3d 1435, 1436, 89 N.Y.S.3d 377 [3d Dept. 2018] ; Matter of Jewett, 145 A.D.3d at 1116, 42 N.Y.S.3d 443 ).
It is well established that "[a] fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect" ( Matter of Shambo, 169 A.D.3d 1201, 1205, 94 N.Y.S.3d 690 [3d Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 73 N.Y.2d 461, 466, 541 N.Y.S.2d 746, 539 N.E.2d 574 [1989] ). In this respect, "[a] fiduciary acting on behalf of an estate is required to employ such diligence and prudence to the care and management of the estate assets and affairs as would prudent persons of discretion and intelligence in their own like affairs" ( Matter of Billmyer, 142 A.D.3d 1000, 1001, 37 N.Y.S.3d 330 [2d Dept. 2016] ; accord Matter of Shambo, 169 A.D.3d at 1205, 94 N.Y.S.3d 690 ). This requires that the fiduciary utilize good business judgment and, to the extent that he or she does not, the beneficiaries of the estate may seek a surcharge (see Matter of Billmyer, 142 A.D.3d at 1001–1002, 37 N.Y.S.3d 330 ; see Matter of Jewett, 145 A.D.3d at 1123, 42 N.Y.S.3d 443 ). "To obtain such a surcharge, it is not enough for the contestants to show that the representatives of the estate did not get the highest price obtainable; it must be shown that they acted negligently, and with an absence of diligence and prudence which an ordinary [person] would exercise in his [or her] own affairs" ( Matter of Lovell, 23 A.D.3d 386, 387, 808 N.Y.S.2d 227 [2d Dept. 2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Billmyer, 142 A.D.3d at 1002, 37 N.Y.S.3d 330 ; see Matter of Donner, 82 N.Y.2d 574, 585, 606 N.Y.S.2d 137, 626 N.E.2d 922 [1993] ). "No precise formula exists for determining whether the prudent person standard has been violated in a particular situation; rather, the determination depends on an examination of the facts and circumstances of each case" ( Matter of Janes, 90 N.Y.2d 41, 50, 659 N.Y.S.2d 165, 681 N.E.2d 332 [1997] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Skelly, 284 A.D.2d 336, 336, 725 N.Y.S.2d 666 [2d Dept. 2001] ).
Respondent's primary contention on appeal is that petitioner and Akey breached their fiduciary duty to preserve decedent's estate and did not properly distribute assets in accordance with decedent's will. We disagree. As to the sale of the property, we find that petitioner's determination to forego subdivision in accordance with respondent's demand was not a breach of her fiduciary duty. The record demonstrates that petitioner gave the appropriate consideration to respondent's request to subdivide the property, which he insisted be done at the expense of the estate, and his accompanying request to receive a plot with 150 feet of road frontage in the center of the property. However, after discussing with counsel to the estate what the expenses associated with subdivision of the property would amount to, and considering the amount of funds that the estate had on hand at that time alongside the overall value of the estate, petitioner acted prudently in determining that subdivision would be cost prohibitive. Contrary to respondent's contention, petitioner was not obligated to provide respondent a subdivided portion of the property as opposed to the proceeds from a sale (see EPTL 11–1.1[b][5][B] ; see generally Matter of Lovell, 23 A.D.3d at 387, 808 N.Y.S.2d 227 ). Moreover, the valuations submitted by respondent fail to establish that petitioner's decision to sell the property was negligent or that it was undertaken in the absence of diligence (see Matter of Robinson, 282 A.D.2d at 608, 724 N.Y.S.2d 424 ; Matter of Holmberg, 206 A.D.2d 479, 480, 614 N.Y.S.2d 751 [2d Dept. 1994] ; Matter of Atkinson, 148 A.D.2d 839, 841, 539 N.Y.S.2d 112 [3d Dept. 1989] ; compare Matter of Shambo, 169 A.D.3d at 1205, 94 N.Y.S.3d 690 ; Matter of Braasch, 140 A.D.3d 1341, 1342–1343, 33 N.Y.S.3d 541 [3d Dept. 2016] ).
Similarly, we find no breach of fiduciary duty arising from the disposition of the vehicle. While respondent accurately notes that the valuation used at the time the vehicle was distributed utilized an incorrect mileage figure, respondent's submissions fail to support his assertion that the vehicle would have fetched an amount that exceeded the $2,000 valuation used by Akey (compare Matter of Billmyer, 142 A.D.3d at 1002, 37 N.Y.S.3d 330 ). Moreover, we discern no error in Surrogate's Court's decision to order the recipient of the vehicle to reimburse $540.52 to the estate in order to ensure a just result (see Matter of Polsinelli, 111 A.D.3d 1131, 1133, 975 N.Y.S.2d 263 [3d Dept. 2013] ; see also Matter of Schnare, 191 A.D.2d 859, 861, 594 N.Y.S.2d 827 [3d Dept. 1993], lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 653, 601 N.Y.S.2d 582, 619 N.E.2d 660 [1993] ).
As to respondent's argument that the Surrogate failed to maintain independence and improperly interjected during the proceedings, such contention is unpreserved owing to his failure to object to the perceived "interruption[s]" during the hearing (see Matter of Gallo v. Gallo, 138 A.D.3d 1189, 1190, 30 N.Y.S.3d 355 [3d Dept. 2016] ). In any event, the transcript reveals that the court "remained impartial and only questioned [petitioner] to facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the hearing" ( id. [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Matter of Borggreen v. Borggreen, 13 A.D.3d 756, 757, 785 N.Y.S.2d 792 [3d Dept. 2004] ). Further, we find that respondent's request for the surrender of counsel fees is similarly unpreserved (see Matter of Rockefeller, 44 A.D.3d 1170, 1172 n, 843 N.Y.S.2d 732 [3d Dept. 2007] ; see also Matter of Collins, 36 A.D.3d 1191, 1193, 828 N.Y.S.2d 689 [3d Dept. 2007] ) and, in any event, without merit (see Matter of Piterniak, 38 A.D.3d 780, 781, 833 N.Y.S.2d 530 [2d Dept. 2007] ).
To the extent that respondent's remaining contentions have not been addressed herein, they have been considered and found to be unavailing.
Lynch, J.P., Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Fisher, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the decree is affirmed, without costs.