Opinion
CIV-21-824-PRW
02-09-2023
MATTHEW R. BLAIN, Plaintiff, v. JACKIE JENKINS and TONY SNOWDEN, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Matthew R. Blain (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner appearing pro se,filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations. (Doc. 1).United States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). (Doc. 4). Before the Court is Defendant Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39), requesting that the Court dismiss this action because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. For the reasons set forth fully below, the undersigned recommends the Court GRANT Defendant summary judgment and DISMISS the Complaint without prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The court construes Plaintiff's pro se filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Citations to the parties' pleadings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court's CM/ECF pagination.
I. Plaintiff's Complaint
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of his civil rights by Defendants Jackie Jenkins and Tony Snowden while he was detained at the Greer County Jail. (Doc. 1, at 12). Plaintiff alleges inadequate medical care, negligence, and excessive police force. (Id. at 3). Specifically, Plaintiff contends:
I broke my T-II vertebra and received (20+) staples in my head, by repeatedly jumping on it in 2019. I was refused mental healthcare up until this incident. Tony Snowden seen me on camera and instead of stopping me he called Sheriff Jenkins to the Jail (waiting while I kept jumping on my head). I believe that's negligence, when I made my final jump Sheriff Jenkins proceeded to tase me while I was on the ground bleeding in shock (excessive police force).(Id. at 2).
II. Plaintiff Failed To Exhaust His Administrative Remedies, And Defendant Is Therefore Entitled To Summary Judgment.
A. Standard of Review
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When a defendant asserts an affirmative defense - such as a failure to exhaust administrative remedies - as a basis for summary judgment, he “must demonstrate that no disputed material fact exists regarding the affirmative defense asserted when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff's Office, 743 F.3d 726, 746 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] defendant bears the burden of ‘proving that the plaintiff did not [exhaust his] administrative remedies.'” May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011)). If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff would incur a duty to “demonstrate with specificity the existence of a disputed material fact,” Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997), or to “show that remedies were unavailable to him as a result of” the actions of prison officials. Tuckel, 660 F.3d at 1254. In the absence of either showing, the defendant would be entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense. See id.
B. Exhaustion Requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Because exhaustion of available remedies “is mandatory under the PLRA[,] . . . unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). This means a prisoner must use “all steps that the agency holds out, and do[] so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted). “An inmate who begins the grievance process but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a . . . claim under PLRA for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Thomas v. Parker, 609 F.3d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But, as noted above, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is limited to such administrative remedies as are available to be exhausted. “Administrative remedies are deemed unavailable if, among other things, ‘prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.'” May, 929 F.3d at 1234 (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016)). The court liberally construes grievances filed by unrepresented inmates. Greer v. Dowling, 947 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 2020).
C. The Greer County Jail's Grievance Procedure.
When determining whether administrative remedies have been exhausted, the Court must look to the grievance process at the institution where the inmate is confined. At the time of the alleged incident, Plaintiff was confined at the Greer County Jail, which is operated by the Greer County Sheriff's Office. (Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 36, at Ex. 15). Defendants have submitted the relevant grievance policy. (Doc. 38, at Ex. 4).
The Greer County Jail's Policies and Procedures establish the offender grievance process related to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants. (Doc. 38, at Ex. 4, at 14). As detailed in Chapter 12, Section 3, of the Policies and Procedures, a prisoner who wishes to file a grievance must do so by writing to the Sheriff. (Id.) Per the Policies and Procedures, staff members must make available the necessary materials to file a grievance and are not allowed to discourage an inmate from filing a grievance. (Id.) After the Sheriff reviews the grievance, the prisoner is notified of the outcome of the grievance. (Id.) All grievances are recorded and saved in the inmate's file. (Doc. 36, at Ex. 15, at 2). The Sheriff is the final decision maker for inmate grievances. (Id.)
D. Plaintiff Failed To Exhaust Administrative Remedies On His Claims.
Defendant Jenkins states in his declaration that as the acting Sherriff, he has never received any grievances from Plaintiff that relate to the allegations made in this lawsuit. (Doc. 36, at Ex. 15, at 2). Additionally, Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he did not seek informal or formal relief from administrative officials. (Doc. 1, at 5). Plaintiff did not state why he did not seek administrative relief, nor does he allege that anything prevented him from pursing administrative remedies. (Id.)
Defendant Jenkins states that Plaintiff has submitted Requests to Staff, which Defendant Jenkins attached; however, these are not grievances. (Doc. 36, at Ex. 15; Doc. 39, at Ex. 2). A review of these Requests to Staff show they have no relation to the underlying claims of this lawsuit. (Doc. 39, at Ex. 2).
The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies on his claims as he never filed any grievances related to inadequate medical care, negligence, or excessive police force, as required by the Policies and Procedures of the Greer County Jail. (Id.; Doc. 36, at Ex. 15; Doc. 1, at 5). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39), be granted. See Calbart v. Sauer, 504 Fed.Appx. 778, 784 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on plaintiff's § 1983 claims based on plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies). Because judgment can be granted in favor of Defendants Jenkins and Snowden on the basis of lack of exhaustion, the undersigned does not address the merits of Plaintiff's claims against them.
III. Recommended Ruling and Notice of Right to Object.
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT Defendant Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) on Plaintiff's claims for failing to exhaust, and DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) without prejudice to the re-filing. See Hannah v. Hawk, 53 Fed.Appx. 895, 896 (10th Cir. 2003).
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before March 2, 2023, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.