Opinion
C/A No. 4:17-cv-01925-RBH-KDW
07-28-2017
Sepia Vonnetta Blackstock, Plaintiff, v. Hartsville YMCA, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action filed by a pro se litigant requesting to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. I. Factual Background
Sepia Vonnetta Blackstock ("Plaintiff") alleges that she was treated differently from other patrons at the Hartsville YMCA. Compl. 4, ECF No. 1. She claims that the different treatment was negative and that it caused her to suffer "hurt feelings, mental anguish, [and] emotional distress . . . ." Id. She asks for damages, id., and asserts that her claim is submitted pursuant to the accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Id. at 3. II. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324- 25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Complaint in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(I), (ii). Hence, under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980). The mandated liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a pleading to "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se Complaint under review in this case is subject to summary dismissal. III. Discussion
It is settled that initial pleadings, whether submitted by attorneys or by pro se litigants, must contain sufficient "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Godbey v. Simmons, No. 1:11cv704 (TSE/TCB), 2014 WL 345648, at *4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2014) ("Whether filed by a pro se litigant or not, 'claims brought in federal court are subject to the generally applicable standards set forth in the Supreme Court's entire Rule 8(a) jurisprudence, including [Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly [550 U.S. 544 (2007)] and Iqbal.'") (quoting from Cook v. Howard, 484 F. App'x 805, 810 (4th Cir. 2012)). Even though a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are to be liberally construed, a pro se complaint must still contain sufficient facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted); see Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248, 253-54 (4th Cir. 2005) (pro se pleading dismissal affirmed where insufficient facts alleged to put defendants on notice of or to support asserted due-process claim). The claims need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but must contain sufficient factual allegations to suggest the required elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (examining sufficiency of factual allegations under Iqbal standards). "[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will mere labels and legal conclusions suffice. Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, any litigant, including a pro se litigant like Plaintiff, must provide sufficient factual allegations supporting each element of the kind of legal claim he seeks to pursue in this court to allow this court to "draw the reasonable inference that [Defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.; see Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 2003) (a plaintiff must allege facts that support each element of the claim advanced); Leblow v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 1:12-CV-00246-MR-DLH, 2013 WL 2317726, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 28, 2013) (same).
Plaintiff's Complaint allegations do not establish a plausible claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 ("Title II") because they fail to set forth facts that satisfy the required elements of such a cause of action. To state a plausible claim under Title II, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that he or she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise the right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public accommodation; (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment; and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated persons who are not members of the protected class. Taylor v. Ahold, No. 3:16CV241, 2017 WL 377935, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2017). First, Plaintiff does not allege that she is a member of the protected class: race, color, religion, or national origin, nor does she allege that she was mistreated at the YMCA as a result of her membership in such class. See Burnette v. Bredesen, 566 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745 (E.D. Tenn. 2008); Whitten v. Petroleum Club of Lafayette, 508 F. Supp. 765, 773 (W.D. La. 1981). Second, there are no factual allegations showing that the Defendant is a place of public accommodation. See Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc. 456 F.3d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, N. C., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968). Finally, the request for damages is improper because damages are not an available remedy under Title II. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). In absence of facts establishing a plausible claim, Plaintiff's Complaint should be summarily dismissed insofar as it attempts to state a Title II claim.
Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a United Nations General Assembly resolution, is only a statement of principles. It is not a treaty or international agreement that would impose legal obligations on the United States or its citizens, and it does not provide a private right of action for individual litigants in federal court. See Nix v. NASA Fed. Credit Union, 200 F. Supp. 3d 578 (D. Md. 2016); see also Moore v. Solomon, No. 1:16-CV-238-FDW, 2016 WL 6272406, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2016), aff'd, No. 16-7653, 2017 WL 1829025 (4th Cir. May 3, 2017) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004)). Plaintiff also fails to state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because she does not allege that the YMCA impaired any contractual rights based on her race. See Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006). Also, no plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim is stated because there are no allegations that state action was involved in the problems that Plaintiff allegedly experienced at the YMCA. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151 (1970). IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 324-25. IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. July 28, 2017
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).