Summary
finding that creditor's systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation was reckless and intentional and caused plaintiff and her family to suffer anxiety, concern, fear, and mental anguish
Summary of this case from Rivera v. Corporate Receivables, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-0412-P-S.
February 8, 2001.
JUDGMENT
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that in connection with the Default Judgment entered by this court on July 19, 2000, against defendants Aegis Consumer Funding Group, Inc., Aegis Consumer Finance, Inc., and Aegis Auto Finance, Inc., Aegis Acceptance Corp., plaintiff Melissa T. Black be and is hereby awarded damages in the amount of $79,600.00 ($4,800.00 for medical expenses ¶ $35,000.00 in compensation ¶ $39,800.00 in punitive damages), with post-judgment interest calculated from this date at the legal rate of 6.052% pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 1961, until paid in full, plus costs in the amount of $431.00, to plaintiffs attorney.
ORDER REGARDING DAMAGES
Pending before this court, in this tort action alleging invasion of privacy and outrageous debt collection, are plaintiffs Motion To Establish Facts as Admitted (doc. 36) and Plaintiffs Statement of Damages (doc. 38). With regard to damages, plaintiff seeks total damages in the amount of $79,6000.00 ($4,800.00 for medical expenses + $35,000.00 in compensation + $39,800.00 in punitive damages), plus costs in the amount of $431.00. Defendants have failed to respond to plaintiffs filings or to otherwise defend this action.
As defendants herein, plaintiffs named Aegis Consumer Funding Group, Inc., Aegis Consumer Finance, Inc., Aegis Auto Finance, Inc., Aegis Acceptance Corp., Aegis Systems Services Technologies, Inc., and/or Systems Services Technologies, Inc., d/b/a SST, and Rocky Ford (doc. 1-Complaint). On November 1, 1999, Judgment was entered dismissing defendant Rocky Ford pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) (doc. 12). On November 1, 1999, Judgment was entered dismissing defendants Systems Services Technologies, Inc., and Systems Services Technologies d/b/a SST pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(i) (doc. 14).
On July 19, 2000, Default Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs and against Aegis Consumer Funding Group, Inc., Aegis Consumer Finance, Inc., and Aegis Auto Finance, Inc., Aegis Acceptance Corp. (collectively referred to hereinafter as "Aegis") (doc. 30).
On October 2, 2000, plaintiffs' jury demand was withdrawn (doc. 34), and this court granted plaintiffs' Motion To Dismiss all but two counts of the Complaint (doc. 35); Judgment of Dismissal was entered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) on December 13, 2000 (doc. 39), leaving two counts remaining: Count One — invasion of privacy; and Count Two — outrage.
Plaintiffs Complaint included five counts: 1) invasion of privacy; 2) outrage; 3) defamation; 5) improper employment practices; and 6) loss of consortium — there was no count 4 (doc. 1).
It is regarding Counts One and Two that plaintiff Melissa Black submits her claim for damages. On January 10, 2001, at a conference before this court, plaintiffs counsel presented the subject claim for damages with exhibits in support thereof (see Exhibits 1-5, attached). Plaintiff was excused from appearing as she currently resides in Arizona.
Notice of the conference was mailed to Aegis, certified mail return receipt requested (see doc. 41); defendants did not respond or appear.
Accordingly, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 36, plaintiffs Motion To Establish Facts As Admitted (doc. 36) was granted and the court's acceptance of the affidavit of the plaintiff as evidence of the allegations two counts, one and two, with the supporting documentation (see doc. 27, attachment — Affidavit of plaintiffs counsel, Jeffry N. Gale; 36) is, hereby GRANTED. This court now addresses plaintiffs claims and request for damages.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Melissa Black's financing for the November 19, 1996, purchase of her 1996 Hyundai from Grady Buick Co., was provided by Aegis. Aegis was assigned the note and, as of June 5, 2000, still held the note and the title to the Hyundai. Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 1-4. Plaintiff made monthly payments on the vehicle in a timely manner for approximately six to seven months. Ex. 2-Affidavit of Melissa Black Tenery, p. 1, ¶ 1.
In June 1997, plaintiff and her husband were experiencing some financial problems and she missed some payments. Id. On June 15, 1997, approximately two weeks after her first missed payment, plaintiff received a telephone call from Rocky Ford ("Ford"), a collection agent for Aegis. Id., ¶ 2.
Ford was an employee/agent of Aegis in 1997. Ex. 1, ¶¶ 5, 26. Plaintiffs collection file was assigned to Ford by Aegis. Id., ¶ 6.
Ford placed fifteen (15) or more telephone calls to plaintiffs home and more than one telephone call to plaintiffs place of employment, despite plaintiffs request that he not do so. Id., ¶¶ 7-10, 19. "Starting with the first call, Ford made approximately twenty calls, that I am aware of, to my home and work despite my persistent objections." Ex. 2, p. 2, ¶ 1.
Ford placed the telephone calls to plaintiffs home early in the morning and late at night. Ex. 1, ¶¶ 21-22. Many of the calls occurred after 11:00 o'clock at night. Ex. 2, p. 3, ¶ 2. On one occasion, he called at 11:30 p.m., warning plaintiff that he would be at her home "bright and early" to get the car; he stated "I will get the money from you either one way or another, and I'll start with your kids' clothing." Id. The next morning, at 7:00 a.m., he called again, and denied making the call the night before and told plaintiff she must be losing her mind. This conduct became repetitive. Id. He also called during her daughter's birthday party making remarks "in a sarcastic, threatening tone" which had a "sinister quality." Id, Id., ¶ 4. Plaintiff states that "[i]t ruined the day for me and caused me to worry for my child's safety that this man knew who and where she was." Id.
Ford, on various occasions, also spoke with plaintiffs husband, her child, and to the babysitter. Ex. 1, ¶¶ 11-13. Ford also called plaintiffs parents "suggesting that they were responsible for the debt" and that he would lien their home. Ex. 2, p. 4., ¶ 1. On more than one occasion Ford used profanity. Id., ¶¶ 14-15.
Plaintiffs husband, Charles Black, spoke with Ford on three different occasions. Ex. 4 Affidavit of Charles Black, p. 1, ¶ 1. On one occasion, Mr. Black was listening while Ford was speaking to plaintiff. Mr. Black states "Ford stated that he was going to get his money and that he would do so by selling everything in our home starting with our f___ing kids' clothing and working his way . . . through the house. His tone was very harsh and he was slurring his words like he was drunk." Id.
Ford told plaintiffs six year old son that his "mommy will be going to jail." Id., p. 4, ¶ 1.
Ford telephoned one weekend evening, after dark, and spoke with plaintiffs fifteen year old babysitter, Amy Hinton. When Miss. Hinton informed Ford that plaintiff was not at home, Ford "screamed . . . 'tell the bitch to get her shit out of my f___ing car' and threatened that if I were to lock the car in the 'f___ing' garage, he would break down the door . . . [and] "[d]on't think I won't and don't get in my way.'" Ex. 3-Affidavit of Amy Hinton, p. 1, ¶ 2. Miss. Hinton states "I was very shaken and scared by this and called my mother. I then went around making sure all the doors were locked . . ." Id. Ford called on at least three other occasions while Miss. Hinton was babysitting. Id., p. 1-2.
In his telephone calls to plaintiff, Ford inquired into details of her personal life. Ex. 1, ¶ 16. "He asked me where I worked, how much I made, whether I was married, who my husband was, whether we had kids and whether marital or financial problems were the reason I was not paying." Ex. 2, p. 1-2. He made "references" to plaintiffs "psychological state in an attempt to harass and intimidate." Id., p. 3, ¶ 1. "Ford told me that I needed to get my 'shit straight.'" Id., p. 1, ¶ 3. Plaintiff states that his late night calls were the worst in that he would make comments such as "Who the f___ do you think you are that you can walk around and not make your car notes." Id., p. 3, ¶ 3. Ford also threatened plaintiff with criminal prosecution. Id., ¶ 1.
Ford called plaintiff at work; "he wanted to find out when I was going to get a paycheck again." Id., p. 2, ¶ 1. When plaintiff asked Ford not to call her at work in fear that she would lose her job, he responded:
Well, if you lose your job, then we can come get the car . . . Your boss must be f___ing stupid to have you, I wonder if he knows you can't even pay your own car note, if we come get the car, you won't be able to get to work and you will lose your job . . . I can send somebody to get the car in front of your work and embarrass you . . . How do you know that I am not across the street watching you, [y]ou don't know where I am calling from, and How do you know I can't see the car right now[?].
Ex. 2, p. 2, ¶ 1-2. Ford did eventually speak with plaintiffs supervisor and in that regard plaintiff states
it is my understanding that Ford made derogatory statements about me and asked my supervisor if I was going to lose my job due to my marital problems. Understandably, my supervisor did not appreciate being called . . . and . . . told Ford not to call our office again. This did not stop Ford, who called several more times . . .Id.
Plaintiff offered the car to Ford, but he would never come pick it up, he continued with "harassing" calls. Ex. 2, p. 5, ¶ 1. Plaintiff states that she felt that Ford was "stalking" her Id., p. 5, ¶ 4.
Plaintiff called Aegis to complain about Ford; she was left on hold and her messages were ignored and never returned. Id., ¶ 2. Aegis was aware of, and authorized, ratified or approved all of Ford's conduct. Ex. 1, ¶¶ 27-36.
With regard to her psychological state plaintiff states:
I admittedly was suffering difficulty with my marriage and our financial situation. The conduct of Ford was, . . . enough, in and of itself, to put extreme strain on me emotionally and additional pressure on my already strained marriage. It caused me to suffer depression, anxiety, guilt and humiliation in front of my husband, children, parents, neighbors, and employer. It was especially hurtful for my children to be exposed to such harsh language . . . It also caused me greater pain to see them afraid.
. . . Ford's strong language and the threatening references to my children caused me to needlessly suffer fear. Many of the calls did not even involve the debt, but were simply accusations and threats. I felt like I was being stalked instead of being asked to pay a debt. I felt that I was constantly looking over my shoulder, worried that someone was going to show up in the middle of the night and frighten my children, worried that I should move the car away from the house or that my kids could be hurt if something happened. I felt that I could no longer leave my children . . .
. . . I was forced to seek psychiatric help. I entered Charter Hospital on July 13, 1997 for approximately one week.
Ex. 2, p. 5-6.
Mr. Black states:
At the time that Ford's calls started coming, we were having some, but not major marital problems. The situation with Ford . . . pushed the situation over the edge. It was a very dramatic crisis for Melissa. It caused her to be emotional, withdrawn from the family, distant to me and to essentially have a nervous breakdown. Melissa would have moments of uncontrollable crying and could often not be able to take care of the kids.
* * *
. . . the Ford situation had a snowball effect on [plaintiffs] relationship with me, her kids and her work. She would miss time from work . . . she did not feel well . . . Melissa was a key employee. This put the company in a bind and put even more stress on Melissa . . . Melissa would go through periods of seclusion . . .
Melissa was scared to be left alone . . .
. . . I feel that the Ford situation played a large role in her need for treatment . . . [W]e had to pay 25% of the charges. These extra bills added to our financial strain . . . Melissa's emotional change and distance, for which I believe Ford's conduct was largely responsible . . . eventually led me to file for divorce . . . We were subsequently divorced.
Ex. 2, p. 2-3.
Miss. Hinton states with regard to the situation with Ford, "[plaintiff] simply did not seem to be herself . . . She seemed very scared, anxious and stressed . . . she was worried every time the phone rang because it might be him calling." Ex. 3, p. 2, ¶ 2.
Following plaintiffs release from the hospital, Ford called plaintiff and told her that she was "obviously, 'out of [her] mind' and needed to go back to the hospital . . . because [she] was not in the right mental state." Ex. 2, p. 6.
Plaintiffs hospitalization costs amounted to approximately $12,000.00. Plaintiff attributes 40% of the total cost of her hospitalization directly to her experience with Ford. Id.
B. Discussion
Count 1: Invasion of Privacy
Alabama recognizes that a person has an actionable right to be free from the invasion of privacy. Norris v. Moskin Stores. Inc., 132 So.2d 321 (1961). The tort of invasion of the right of privacy, insofar as it applies to a creditor and a debtor, is "the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering. shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities." Jacksonville State Bank v. Barnwell, 481 So.2d 863, 865 (1985); Liberty Loan Corp. v. Mizell, 410 So.2d 45, 47 (1982); Norris, 132 So.2d at 177-78; accord I.C.U. Investigations. Inc. v. Jones, ___ So.2d ___, 2000 WL 869595, *3 (June 30, 2000 (Ala.)); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services. Inc., 435 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.) (on certified questions from the United States Circuit Court of appeals for the Eleventh Circuit), 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983).
It is generally accepted that the tort of invasion of privacy consists of four distinct wrongs: 1) the intrusion upon the plaintiffs physical solitude or seclusion; 2) publicity which violates the ordinary decencies; 3) puffing the plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory position in the public eye; and 4) the appropriation of some element of the plaintiffs personality for a commercial use. Norris, at 323 (citing Prosser, Law of Torts 637-39 (2nd ed. 1955)).
As Norris cautioned, however, not every effort by a creditor to collect a debt rises to the level of a cause of action for the debtor. Mizell, 410 So.2d at 47. "The mere effort of a creditor, . . . to collect a debt cannot without more be considered a wrongful and actionable intrusion. A creditor has and must have the right to take reasonable action to pursue his debtor and collect his debt." Norris, 132 So.2d at 323. It is only "where the creditor takes actions which exceed the bounds of reasonableness, [that] the debtor has an action against the creditor for injuries suffered. Barnwell, 481 So.2d at 865-66. What constitutes "reasonableness" depends on the facts of the case. Norris, 132 So.2d at 323 (citing with approval Housh v. Peth, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955), aff'd, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
In Housh, the creditor "deliberately initiated a systematic campaign of harassment . . ., not only in numberous telephone calls to the plaintiff herself every day for a period of three weeks, some of which were late at night, but also calls to her supervisors . . . informing them of the debt." Norris, 132 So.2d at 323 (quoting Housh, 135 N.E.2d at 449). The plaintiff in Housh lost a tenant in her rooming house due to the repeated telephone calls and was threatened with loss of employment unless the calls ceased. Id.
In Norris, in an attempt to collect a debt owed, an employee of the defendant/collector, "Doris," called Mrs. Norris twice at her place of employment suggesting an illicit relationship with the plaintiff/debtor Mr. Norris. Doris stated that she had dated Mr. Norris, and that she had to get in touch with him on a matter of importance, and had to meet with him alone. The same day, a third call was placed to Mr. Norris' sister-in-law inquiring as to his whereabouts in that Doris was "in trouble" and had to get in touch with Mr. Norris to find out if he was married. The conversations were orchestrated to lead the listeners "into believing that [Mr. Norris] had engaged, or was engaging, in activities contrary to the recognized conventions of his marital status" Id., 132 So.2d at 322.
Mr. Norris asserted that his right of privacy had been violated, he was humiliated and embarrassed, his marital relations and home life were disrupted, his wife had separated from him for a short period, he suffered mental anguish, and his character and reputation were damaged. Id. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court characterized the collection tactic "a vicious attempt to coerce payment," and stated:
This course of conduct cannot be justified as reasonably related to a legitimate effort to collect the debt . . . In view of the nature of these . . . conversations, which a jury could find outrageous and humiliating to a person of ordinary sensibilities, we must conclude that the complaint sets forth sufficient 'harassment' and the activities of the defendants fall beyond the realm of reasonable action and into the area of wrongful and actionable intrusion.Id., at 325. The Court concluded that Norris' had stated a "good" cause of action for invasion of privacy and reversed and remandedId., at 326.
In Barnwell, the Jacksonville State Bank ("the Bank") in an attempt to collect on an installment loan agreement began a series of harassing telephone calls to Barnwell, at his home and at his place of employment, ranging from twenty-eight to thirty-five in number. This conduct ran from early September until mid October, 1982. Barnwell asked that the Bank not call him at work but the calls continued. Threats of garnishment were made. Barnwell was reprimanded by his work supervisor as a result of the calls. The Bank also called Barnwell's mother. Id. at 864.
In October, the Bank contracted with an individual named Nicholas Trevino to have two automobiles, subjects of the installment loan, repossessed, but upon further investigation found that loan documents defective. The documents were altered and the repossession recommenced. An unsuccessful attempt to repossess took place at Barnwell's place of employment. "In front of other employees, Trevino called Barnwell a 'dead beat' and a 'son of a bitch' and threatened to use 'whatever force was necessary' . . ." Id. at 865.
Ultimately, as a result of the Bank's conduct, Barnwell experienced two on-the-job reprimands, he developed an "anxious condition," was hospitalized and required medication, and suffered a weight loss, nausea, and diarrhea. Barnwell filed suit for inter alia invasion of privacy. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Barnwell and awarded damages in the amount of $10,000. Id. The Bank appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. In so doing, the Court found
the tendencies of the evidence in this case, . . . support a finding that the [B]ank far exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in its efforts to collect the Barnwell debt. Twenty-eight to thirty-five phone calls to one's home and place of employment fall within the realm of a "systematic campaign of harassment," a tactic admonished by this court in Norris . . . Further, Trevino's remarks at Barnwell's place of employment, as the bank's agent, unequivocally constitute coarse, inflammatory, malicious, and threatening language . . . Most importantly, fraudulently altering the terms of a security instrument in order to attempt to collect a debt flies in the face of reasonableness, public policy, and the law. The jury was warranted in finding these actions on the [B]ank's part were outrageous to a person of ordinary sensibilities.Id. at 866.
The case sub judice is analogous to the facts of Barnwell, 481 So.2d 863, Norris, 132 So.2d 321, and Housh, 135 N.E.2d 440. Plaintiff experienced, through the conduct of Aegis' employee/agent Ford, a deliberate "systematic campaign of harassment"; approximately twenty phone calls within a period of about one month, mid-June to mid-July, 1997, late at night and early in the morning, at home and at work. Plaintiffs parents were called as well.
Agency is determined by the facts. National Security Fire Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 447 So.2d 133, 137-38 (Ala. 1983). The facts herein establish an employee/agent relationship between Aegis and Ford.
As in Norris, the collection of plaintiffs debt impacted members of her family with no responsibility to Aegis, her parents, her children and their babysitter, and her employer. Plaintiff, her family members, and her babysitter were subjected to profanity, and threats; Ford's language was far more "coarse, inflammatory, malicious, and threatening," than that noted inBarnwell.
As a result of defendants' conduct, as in Barnwell, plaintiffs employment was impacted, she suffered stress, depression, anxiety, guilt, and humiliation; she was forced to seek psychiatric help and was hospitalized. More so, however, plaintiff feared for her personal safety and the safety of her children, and plaintiffs less than stable marriage suffered a fatal blow.
This court finds, based on the facts presented, as the Alabama Supreme Court found in Norris, that the activities of Ford, the undisputed employee/agent of Aegis fall beyond the realm of reasonable action and well into the area of wrongful and actionable intrusion (invasion of privacy) causing not only outrage but mental suffering, shame, and humiliation. 132 So.2d at 323, 326.
Count 2: Outrage
The Alabama Supreme Court recognized the tort of outrage inAmerican Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala. 1981).
[O]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress. The emotional distress thereunder must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Any recovery must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, liability ensuing only when the conduct is extreme.Id., at 365; accord House v. Corporate Services. Inc., 882 F. Supp. 161, 164 (M.D.Ala. 1995) (involving a workers compensation claim).
In Inmon, however, the Court concluded that the facts did not support a finding of outrage. Inmon was able to establish, in connection with his employer's investigation of an alleged "kickback" scheme, that "he had been harassed, investigated without cause, humiliated, accused of improper dealings, treated uncustomarily, . . . terminated without justification . . . [and that he suffered] emotional distress resulting in loss of weight and insomnia" Id., at 366.
In order to recover under the tort of outrage, a plaintiff must demonstrate conduct that (1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.Wilson v. Gayfers Montgomery Fair Co., 953 F. Supp. 1415, 1423 (M.D.Ala. 1996) (in the employer/employee context); Green Tree Acceptance. Inc. v. Standbridge, 565 So.2d at 44. The conduct complained of "must be so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Brogdon v. Alabama Dept. of Economic and Community Affairs, 864 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (M.D.Ala. 1994) (involving tenured employment) (citing Standbridge).
In Standbridge, the Court categorized the conduct complained of by Standbridge as (1) threatening, abusive, and insulting language, (2) wrongful threats of repossession, and (3) the filing of an adverse credit report resulting in embarrassment and credit problems, including increased interest rates on a later loan. Id. at 45. However, the Court found that Standbridge failed to meet his burden of proof in that the "oppressive collection practices," although not to be condoned, did "not rise to the level of extreme behavior contemplated by this Court when it recognized the tort," and because Standbridge failed to demonstrate that he suffered emotional distress to a degree more severe than a reasonable person could be expected to endure.Id.
Since Inmon, the Alabama Supreme Court has found the standard sufficiently satisfied in but a modicum of instances which fall into three categories: 1) cases having to do with wrongful conduct in the context of family burials; 2) a case where insurance agents employed heavy-handed, barbaric means in attempting to coerce the insured into settling an insurance claim, National Security Fire Casualty Co., v. Bowen, 447 So.2d 133 (Ala. 1983); and 3) a case involving egregious sexual harassment. House, 882 F. Supp. At 164-65.
In Standbridge, the Court noted Whitt v. Hulsey, 519 So.2d 901 (Ala. 1987) ("the reckless desecration of a family cemetery by an adjacent landowner was held to be sufficiently outrageous to present a jury question and support an award of punitive damages"); Levite Undertakers Co. v. Griggs, 495 So.2d 63 (Ala. 1986) ("an undertaker's misrepresentation of the condition of the remains of the plaintiffs husband, coupled with the wrongful retention of those remains in an attempt to force payment of funeral expenses, justified an award of punitive damages"); andCates v. Taylor, 428 So.2d 637 (Ala. 1983) ("the defendants, 30 minutes before a planned burial, withdrew permission for the plaintiffs to use a cemetery plot to bury their father"). Id. at 44-45.
Busby v. Truswal Systems Corp., 551 So.2d 322 (Ala. 1989).
As noted, in National Security Fire Casualty Co., v. Bowen, 447 So.2d 133, the Alabama Supreme Court found facts sufficient to meet the standard. Bowen alleged that defendants while investigating an alleged arson and insurance fraud claim, harassed him "by continually telephoning, at all times of the day, the plaintiff and other members of plaintiffs family and threatening the plaintiff and members of his family in an effort to coerce plaintiff to drop the insurance claim" Id., at 135. Bowen also alleged that the abusive telephone calls did cause the plaintiff and his family extreme mental suffering and anguish. IA. Plaintiff claimed damages of one million dollars; the jury returned a general verdict of $1,500,000 Id. Defendants filed a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict or in the alternative a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.
In Bowen, the Court determined that plaintiff established that the defendants, "so-called private investigators," beyond the telephone campaign, attempted to bribe or threaten a number of individuals to induce them to implicate the plaintiff as the arsonist; they threatened to kill his two small sons, to cut off their arms, and to kill the plaintiff Id., at 136-37. They went as far as acting out a mock execution with the plaintiff which lasted about one and one-half hour until the plaintiff managed to escape. IA. The Court opined that the defendants' conduct "was so horrible, so atrocious, so barbaric, that the jury could find as a matter of fact that Bowen suffered emotional distress; that no civilized person could be expected to endure the acts committed without suffering mental distress," and affirmed the decision.Id., at 141-42.
Herein, this court finds that plaintiff, in the creditor/debtor context, has established outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants. Plaintiffs undisputed facts demonstrate that Aegis, through their employee/agent Ford, carried out a systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation was reckless and intentional. Ford's conduct implicating plaintiff and her husband, her children and their babysitter, her parents and her employer caused plaintiff to suffer anxiety, concern and fear, and mental anguish.
This court finds that Ford's conduct was extreme and outrageous. He led plaintiff to believe he was "stalking" her. He exploited the fact that plaintiff and her husband were experiencing financial and marital difficulties. Ford used unnecessary profanity with her children and their babysitter, and told plaintiffs small son that his "mommy will be going to jail."
This court finds that a severe level of recklessness and outrageousness was demonstrated when Ford continued his campaign against plaintiff and her family even after she was hospitalized and released, and further when he failed to actually repossess the car when it was offered to him. Instead, he unnecessarily continued with his harassing and intimidating tactics.
Herein, unlike Standbridge, plaintiff has established, through undisputed facts, emotional distress and mental anguish to a level requiring hospitalization and for which damages resulted, demonstrating the third element required for the tort of outrage. Moreover, although plaintiff did not experience the same type of barbaric conduct as did Bowen, Ford's conduct amounted, as noted, to a systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation which caused plaintiff to fear not just for her own safety, but the safety of her children, and the security of her home and property. Plaintiff suffered psychological illness which impacted on her marriage, her family, and her job. As such, this court finds that plaintiff has proven the requisite elements necessary to establish the tort of outrage in the creditor/debtor collection context. See Norris, 132 So.2d at 323.
Damages:
Having found that plaintiff has established the intentional torts of invasion of privacy and outrage, this court concludes that plaintiffs request for medical expenses in the amount of $4,800., and for compensation in the amount of $35,000., is reasonable under the circumstances involved see Phillips, 435 So.2d at 707 (compensatory damages of $25,000 were awarded on the invasion of privacy claim) (relied on by 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983)); Barnwell, 481 So.2d at 865 (a general verdict in the amount of $10,000), along with plaintiffs request for punitive damages in the amount of $39,800.
In Phillips, a case involving the invasion of psychological solitude, the Alabama Supreme Court noted:
A plaintiff may recover substantial general damages that naturally and necessarily flow from the wrongful act, and may also recover all special damages which proximately result from the breach of his privacy . . . This authority suggests a jury instruction that allows assessment of damages for "mental suffering," "shame or humiliation," and "other damages," and observes that in such cases it is not necessary to plead or prove special damages.
While a negligent tortfeasor is responsible for all injuries which are proximately caused by his tort . . ., there is "extended liability" for intentional torts and the rules of proximate causation are more liberally applied than for mere negligence.435 So.2d at 711-712. Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has determined that conduct rising to the level of the tort of outrage supports an award of punitive damages, see Standbridge, 565 So.2d at 44-45. As such, this court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to the damages she seeks.
C. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to the Default Judgment entered by this court on July 19, 2000, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Aegis Consumer Funding Group, Inc., Aegis Consumer Finance, Inc., and Aegis Auto Finance, Inc., Aegis Acceptance Corp., (doc. 30), and plaintiff having established the torts of invasion of privacy and outrage, plaintiff Melissa T. Black is hereby awarded damages in the amount of $79,600.00 ($4,800.00 for medical expenses + $35,000.00 in compensation + $39,800.00 in punitive damages) on each count but not cumulative damages on each count and Judgment is ordered to be entered at a total of $79,600.00, plus costs in the amount of $431.00, the plaintiffs attorney's affidavit is treated as a claim for his costs and Judgment is to be entered for plaintiffs attorney's costs in the amount stated.