Opinion
C. A. 20-cv-03019-SAL-MGB
12-07-2021
GWENDOYLN BITTLE, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, [1] Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Gwendolyn Bittle ("Plaintiff), brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C. Section 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration regarding her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). See Section 205(g) of the SSA, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding for an award of benefits.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on May 12, 2017, alleging a disability onset date of July 25, 2015. (R. at 12.) Plaintiff was 54 years old on her alleged disability onset date. (R. at 166.) Plaintiff originally claimed disability due to left arm/wrist fracture, "bone protrusion left wrist, " decreased mobility and use of left hand/fingers, frozen shoulder, continued pain, and "limited use/range of motion/rotation of entire arm." (R. at 169.) Plaintiff has past relevant work as an office manager and administrator of social welfare. (R. at 19.)
Plaintiffs application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 12.) After a video hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on July 2, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision on July 31, 2019, in which the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 12-20.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, (R. at 1-5), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2018.
(2) The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of July 25, 2015 through her date last insured of December 31, 2018 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
(3) Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: left radius fracture status-post open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) with joint dysfunction and left shoulder impingement syndrome (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
(4) Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with the following additional limitations: occasional climbing of ramps or stair; no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; occasional reaching and handling with the left upper extremity; occasional fingering on the left (non-dominant); the avoidance of unprotected heights, work place hazards and machinery; the avoidance of vibration with the left upper extremity; no lifting, carrying,
pushing, or pulling more than five pounds with the left upper extremity; and no overhead reaching with the left upper extremity.
(1) Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past relevant work as an administrator of social welfare. This work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
(2) The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from July 25, 2015, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).(R. at 12-20.)
APPLICABLE LAW
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). "Disability" is defined in the Act as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of "disability" to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the analysis. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Comm 'r o/Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017). Once the claimant has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant-considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity-can perform alternative jobs and that such jobs exist in the national economy. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; Grant, 699 F.2d at 191; Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the Commissioner supported his findings with substantial evidence and applied the correct law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 201%); Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires that the court uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); Bird v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Dowling v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
"Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is "more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance." Pearson, 810 F.3d at 207 (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court does not undertake to "reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95; Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383. "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled," the reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision. Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472).
However, the court does not "reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ's findings." Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ may not cherry -pick, misstate, or mischaracterize material facts. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 99 (citing Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869). Rather, ALJs "must 'build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions." Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly assess Plaintiffs statements on the limiting effects of her symptoms and that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence for this reason. (Dkt. No. 14.) The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiffs limitations do not preclude all work activity. (Dkt. No. 15.)
As discussed further below, the undersigned cannot find that the ALJ appropriately assessed Plaintiffs subjective statements such that her decision is supported by substantial evidence. For this reason, the undersigned recommends the Commissioner's decision be reversed and remanded.
A. Standards
SSR 16-3p provides a two-step process for evaluating an individual's symptoms. First, the ALJ must determine whether the individual has a medically determinable impairment "that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's alleged symptoms." SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017). In the second step the ALJ must "evaluate the intensity and persistence of an individual's symptoms such as pain and determine the extent to which an individual's symptoms limit his or her ability to perform work-related activities . . . ." Id. at *4. In evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual's symptoms, the ALJ should discuss the following factors, to the extent they are "pertinent to the evidence of record":
In March 2016 the Social Security Administration published SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (2016), which rescinds and supersedes SSR 96-7p, eliminates use of the term "credibility," and clarifies that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual's character. SSR 16-3p applies to determinations and decisions made on or after March 29, 2016. Thus, this regulation applies to the instant ALJ decision, which was decided on December 3, 2020. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *13 n.27 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017) ("Our adjudicators will apply this ruling when we make determinations and decisions on or after March 28, 2016."). Although SSR 16-3p eliminates the assessment of credibility, it requires assessment of most of the same factors considered under SSR 96-7p.
1. Daily activities;
2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;
3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and
7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-*8.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) provides that when evaluating a claimant's subjective statements about his or her symptoms, the ALJ "will consider whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between your statements and the rest of the evidence, including your history, the signs and laboratory findings, and statements by your medical sources or other persons about how your symptoms affect you." The ALJ is required to explain which of the claimant's symptoms he found "consistent or inconsistent with the evidence in [the] record and how [his] evaluation of the individual's symptoms led to [his] conclusions." SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *8.
The ALJ is not to evaluate a claimant's symptoms "based solely on objective medical evidence unless that objective medical evidence supports a finding that the individual is disabled." Lewis, 858 F.3d at 866; see also Arakas, 983 F.3d at 98 ("We also reiterate the longstanding law in our circuit that disability claimants are entitled to rely exclusively on subjective evidence to prove the severity, persistence, and limiting effects of their symptoms."); see also Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 565 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that a claimant's allegations about his pain may not be discredited solely because they are not substantiated by objective evidence of pain and suggesting that such complaints should not be rejected unless evidence in the record is inconsistent with the underlying impairment or level of pain alleged) (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 595).
'"[A] necessary predicate to engaging in a substantial evidence review is a record of the basis for the ALJ's ruling,' including 'a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.'"Mowroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (quoting Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, the ALJ must '"build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)).
B. The ALJ's Decision
In her decision, the ALJ summarized Plaintiffs subjective statements regarding her impairments and resulting limitations as follows:
The claimant initially alleged disability due to left arm/wrist fracture; bone protrusion left wrist requiring additional surgery; decreased mobility/use of the left hand/fingers; a frozen shoulder; continued pain and limited use/range of motion/rotation of the entire arm. (2E). In her mobility questionnaire, the claimant alleged inability to bend her wrist or fingers well. (9E). She also stated her arm pain affects her ability to walk for long periods. (9E). At the hearing, the claimant
testified to similar limitations. She testified that she is unable to rotate her arm from left to right and unable to bend her wrist. (Hearing Testimony).
After review of the record, the undersigned determined that it does not support the claimant's allegations of disabling symptoms. The medical evidence of record shows that the claimant has a left radius fracture status-post ORIF with joint dysfunction and left shoulder impingement syndrome. (See generally treatment records). She complained of symptoms including left wrist/forearm/shoulder pain, neck pain, loss of motion, reduced strength, and tingling/numbness in the left upper extremity. (See generally treatment records).(R. at 16.)
After summarizing Plaintiffs allegations, the ALJ found that "the extent of the claimant's physical allegations is not supported by the findings on physical examination, imaging/testing, or the nature of the claimant's treatment." (R. at 16.) She then detailed Plaintiffs physical examination records, radiographic evidence, and the treatment Plaintiff received for her impairments. (R. at 16-17.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff "experienced a left radius fracture requiring surgical correction," and found that, thereafter, Plaintiff s "treatment for her impairments was conservative and limited in nature suggesting a successful procedure." (R. at 17.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiffs "treatment was limited to physical therapy, custom orthotics, and steroid injections" and that Plaintiff "was not compliant with home exercises and stopped attending physical therapy." (R. at 17.)
The ALJ concluded,
The medical evidence fails to indicate that the claimant experienced symptoms that caused work-related functional limitations beyond those outlined in the above stated residual functional capacity. Specifically, the evidence of record indicates that, despite treatment in the form of physical therapy, injections, orthotics, medication, and surgery, the claimant had functional limitations due to left radius fracture status-post open reduction internal fixation (ORIF) with joint dysfunction and left shoulder impingement syndrome. However, this evidence shows that she retained the functional abilities to perform light work with postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations, as reflected in the above stated residual functional capacity.(R. at 17.) The ALJ found that Plaintiffs "physical impairments, which caused left wrist/forearm/shoulder pain, neck pain, loss of motion, reduced strength, and tingling/numbness in the left upper extremity" warranted the additional limitations she assigned to Plaintiffs RFC. (R at 17.)
The ALJ later found that while Plaintiffs "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the above alleged symptoms reasonably related to those impairments," her "allegations concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence for the reasons explained in this decision." (R. at 18.) In support of this conclusion, the ALJ stated,
The claimant's statements and medical records indicate inconsistencies with respect to the severity of her limitations, which weakens the persuasiveness of her allegations. As discussed above, physical examination and imaging do not support the degree of alleged limitation. The claimant did undergo surgery for the alleged impairment, which certainly suggests that the symptoms were genuine. While that fact would normally weigh in the claimant's favor, it is offset by the fact that the record reflects that the surgery was generally successful in relieving the symptoms. Additionally, there is evidence that the claimant stopped working for reasons not related to the allegedly disabling impairments. The claimant testified she voluntarily resigned from her previous employment after she contacted the FBI regarding fraud. (Hearing Testimony). Furthermore, records indicate daily activities, which are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. For example, the claimant's orthopedic specialist repeatedly notes she is independent with her activities of daily living. (7F; 8F; 9F). As a result of the above, the persuasiveness of the claimant's allegations regarding her symptoms and limitations during the relevant period is diminished because those allegations are greater than expected in light of the record and in light of the claimant's own allegations.
In reaching the conclusion that the claimant was limited to work described in the above residual functional capacity statement, the undersigned considered the claimant's subjective allegations; the objective medical evidence; any evidence related to daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of alleged symptoms; the dosage and effectiveness of medication; precipitating and aggravating factors; functional restrictions; the prior administrative medical findings; and the medical opinions within the record (Social Security Ruling 16-3p and 20 CFR 404.1529). While the undersigned did not set forth all these factors in
a methodical fashion, the undersigned considered all these factors in assessing the consistency between the claimant's allegations and the evidence as a whole.(R. at 18-19.)
C. Record Evidence Pertaining to Subjective Statements
A review of the record provides some context to the ALJ's summary of Plaintiffs subjective statements and daily activities. In her decision, the ALJ found that "records indicate daily activities, which are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations." (R. at 18.) Here, the ALJ cited only treatment records from Plaintiffs orthopedic specialist "repeatedly not[ing] she is independent with her activities of daily living. (7F; 8F; 9F)." (R. at 18-19.) The cited treatment records, dated July 13, 2018, August 17, 2018, and September 24, 2018, show that under "Orthopedic Intake Data," it states: "Activities of Daily Living: Independent." (R. at 429, 458, 477.)
At the July 2, 2019 ALJ hearing, Plaintiff testified, "I have numerous problems with household chores [due to pain]. I obtain help from my husband and my daughter, who now comes in and helps me with the cleaning. But I do have to rely on them for the majority of things that are done." (R. at 35.) Plaintiff further testified, "my arm will not bend and rotate the way it should to be able to things such as a broom or vacuum." (R. at 35.) Plaintiff testified, "my shoulder has gotten to the point of where it is even difficult for me to ride in a car. I'm unable to wear the seatbelt portion, the shoulder portion of the seatbelt. Riding in the vehicle causes me pain and discomfort to sit for periods of time." (R. at 36.) She testified that this has been "an issue for at least a couple of years" and "has progressively gotten worse." (R. at 36.) Plaintiff testified that she sleeps during the daytime because she gets such poor sleep at night due to pain. (R. at 37.) Plaintiff also testified that "the pain from standing and sitting-it pulls on my arm and shoulder, and that, in itself, keeps me from being able to walk for long periods." (R. at 40.)
In her decision, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff "experienced a left radius fracture requiring surgical correction," and that, thereafter, Plaintiffs "treatment for her impairments was conservative and limited in nature suggesting a successful procedure." (R. at 17.) The ALJ stated that Plaintiffs "treatment was limited to physical therapy, custom orthotics, and steroid injections." (R. at 17.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff "was not compliant with home exercises and stopped attending physical therapy." (R. at 17.)
At the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff testified that her steroid injections for her shoulder have not helped and that "[t]he physical therapy actually went downhill." (R. at 39.) Plaintiff testified that physical therapy helped in the beginning, but "over time, it had gotten to where it was making my situation worse." (R. at 39.) Plaintiff testified that the physical therapy was causing her "more pain, to the point of being nauseated and unable to do the physical therapy." (R. at 39.) Plaintiffs physical therapy records dated September 5, 2018 note that Plaintiff canceled her physical therapy because "Gwen wants to be put on hold until seen by my MD on 9/20. She reports pain to the point of tears after therapy sessions." (R. at 508.)
D. Analysis
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff s subj ective statements regarding her functional limitations by, inter alia;. (1) "looking for objective evidence of pain itself; (2) relying on Plaintiffs daily activities; and (3) failing to discuss the pertinent factors under SSR 16-3p. (Dkt. No. 14 at 15-20.) Plaintiff argues that, given these alleged errors, the ALJ failed to build a "logical and accurate bridge from the evidence to her decision to find [Plaintiff] incredible." (Id. at 19.) The undersigned considers these argument, below.
Plaintiff first argues the ALJ erred in "looking for objective evidence of pain itself to substantiate Plaintiffs subjective statements. (Dkt. No. 14 at 17.) In her decision, the ALJ relied in part on the lack of supportive objective evidence to discount Plaintiffs subjective statements. (R. at 17, "[[T]he claimant's treatment records ... are not consistent with the claimant's subjective reports of disabling symptoms and suggest that her symptoms were not as severe as she has alleged. The medical evidence fails to indicate that the claimant experienced symptoms that caused work-related functional limitations beyond those outlined in the above stated residual functional capacity.") Such reliance on objective evidence is discouraged under recent Fourth Circuit case law. For example, in Arakas, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that an ALJ may not "disregard an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate them." 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5 (Mar. 16, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Likewise, in Lewis, the Fourth Circuit found that requiring objective medical evidence to support a plaintiffs subjective evidence of pain "improperly increase[s] [claimant's] burden of proof." 858 F.3d at 866.
While the ALJ considered factors in addition to the objective medical evidence to discount Plaintiffs subjective complaints of disabling limitations, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain how the remaining evidence she cited supported her assessment. As an initial matter, the ALJ's characterization of Plaintiffs treatment indicates the ALJ did not properly assess Plaintiffs subjective statements and the record evidence. In her decision, the ALJ described Plaintiffs treatment as "conservative" and "limited to physical therapy, custom orthotics, and steroid injections." (R. at 17.) She emphasized that Plaintiff "stopped attending physical therapy." (R. at 17.) She later stated that while Plaintiff "did undergo surgery for the alleged impairment," a "fact that would normally weigh in claimant's favor, ... the record reflects that the surgery was generally successful in relieving the symptoms." (R. at 18.)
The "successful" surgery referenced by the ALJ pertains to Plaintiffs "left radius fracture requiring surgical correction." (R. at 17-18.) The record indicates that Plaintiffs physical therapy and steroid injections mainly related to Plaintiffs issues with her shoulder. (R. at 39, 495.) The ALJ appeared to conflate the treatment Plaintiff received for her various impairments and implied that the surgery successfully "reliev[ed] the symptoms" generally alleged by Plaintiff. (R. at 18.) The record directly belies this finding, given the evidence that Plaintiffs shoulder continued to cause her pain and that treatment was generally unhelpful. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that her steroid injections for her shoulder have not helped and that, ultimately, the physical therapy was causing her "more pain, to the point of being nauseated and unable to do the physical therapy." (R. at 39.) Plaintiffs physical therapy records confirm that Plaintiff canceled her physical therapy because "Gwen wants to be put on hold until seen by my MD on 9/20. She reports pain to the point of tears after therapy sessions." (R. at 508.)
The ALJ's discussion of Plaintiff s daily activities is similarly flawed. The Fourth Circuit recently found that "[a] claimant's inability to sustain full-time work due to pain and other symptoms is often consistent with her ability to carry out daily activities." Arakas, 983 F.3d at 101. Accordingly, "[a]n ALJ may not consider the type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which she can perform them." Woods, 888 F.3d at 694 (citingBrown v. Commissioner, 873 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 2017)).
As noted above, the ALJ found Plaintiffs daily activities were "not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations." (R. at 18.) In support, however, the ALJ cited only treatment records from Plaintiffs orthopedic specialist that span a period of three months in 2018 and merely state, "Activities of Daily Living: Independent." (R. at 18, -19, 429, 458, 477.) The ALJ did not mention any specific daily activities performed by Plaintiff anywhere in her decision, despite Plaintiffs testimony on this issue. For example, at the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff testified that due to her pain, she relied on her husband and daughter for the majority of her household chores and that it was difficult for her to ride in a car. (R. at 35-36.)
Both Plaintiffs daily activities and the nature of her treatment are factors the ALJ should have properly considered, given their relevance to the evidence in this case. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-*8. Without a more detailed discussion of these factors by the ALJ, the undersigned cannot determine whether the ALJ findings as to Plaintiffs subjective symptoms are supported by substantial evidence, and remand is appropriate on this basis. See, e.g., Lewis, 858 F.3d at 866 (remanding in part because "the ALJ failed to explain in his decision what statements by [claimant] undercut her subjective evidence of pain intensity as limiting her functional capacity") (citing Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) ("A necessary predicate to engaging in substantial evidence review is a record of the basis for the ALJ's ruling," including "a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.")); Brisbon v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-00820-RMG-TER, 2021 WL 2143584, at *15 (D.S.C. May 11, 2021) ("As to the ALJ's finding that Plaintiffs allegations were inconsistent with her treatment history, the ALJ did not provide an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his finding. The ALJ is obligated to consider all evidence, not just that which is helpful to his decision."), adopted by, 2021 WL 2141726 (D.S.C. May 26, 2021); Cantrellv. Saul, No. 2:20-CV-00467, 2021 WL 1305384, at *12 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 19, 2021) ("In short, though the ALJ acknowledged Claimant's daily activities, there is a deficiency in the assessment as to the extent Claimant was able to perform them, and how this translates into the conclusion that Claimant remained capable of substantial gainful activity."), adopted by, 2021 WL 1299203 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 7, 2021); Billy H. v. Saul, No. 7:18-CV-0171, 2019 WL 4783116, at *9 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2019) ("the ALJ's reliance on Billy's daily activities is not substantial evidence on which to discredit his subjective allegations"; "the fact that Billy is comfortable at home and around family is not substantial evidence that his panic attacks are not disabling, or that he can otherwise work a full workday or workweek").
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and that the case be REMANDED for an award of benefits.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).