Opinion
Civil No. CV 01-53-HA
August 16, 2001
Richard J. Stone, James C. Prichard, Ball Janik LLP, for Plaintiff.
William N. Mehlhaf, David B. Markowitz, Whitney L. Grubbs Markowitz, Herbold, Glade Mehlhaf, PC, for Defendant.
O P I N I O N AND O R D E R
Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, specific performance, and breach of contract on February 20, 2001. Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to abstain. Oral arguments were heard on July 9, 2001. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case is brought by plaintiff, the former husband of defendant and currently a resident of Washington, to enforce an alleged oral settlement agreement regarding the division of property following the issuance of a decree by the Multnomah County Circuit Court dissolving the marital status of plaintiff and defendant on November 27, 1997. See Marriage of H. Gerald Bidwell and Marilyn D. Bidwell, Case No. 9611-72413. In addition to dividing real and personal property, the decree ordered plaintiff to pay $17,817,297 to defendant, which represents one-third of the value of plaintiff's business at the time of the decree. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court should have decreed that plaintiff sell the company and divide the proceeds proportionately. While that appeal was pending, plaintiff alleges counsel for the parties orally agreed upon a settlement, pursuant to which the parties would modify the circuit court's judgment and dismiss the appeal.
On October 4, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion affirming the circuit court's division of assets under the divorce decree. In re Bidwell, 170 Or. App. 239 (2000). Plaintiff alleges that following that decision, defendant denied the existence of the oral settlement agreement. Plaintiff then requested the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision. This request was denied. In re Bidwell, 172 Or. App. 292, 2001 WL 95817 (2001). On June 26, 2001, the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Plaintiff's suit before this court seeks a declaratory judgment that the oral agreement is binding, as well as specific performance of the agreement and damages for breach of contract.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND, ALTERNATIVELY, TO ABSTAIN
Defendant moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the matter falls within the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has described the scope of the modern domestic relations exception as "narrowly confined." See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 n. 6 (1992); see also Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968) (the field of domestic relations involves local problems "particularly suited to state regulation and control, and particularly unsuited to control by federal courts"). Under Ankenbrandt, the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction exists only when the case involves "the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree." Id. at 704. The Ankenbrandt Court emphasized that "`[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule,'" and should be rarely invoked. Id. at 705 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)).
Federal courts have followed Ankenbrandt's guidance consistently. In relying upon the decision, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction is narrow, "generally only prohibiting federal courts from issuing divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees." Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 386 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Days later, the First Circuit also issued an opinion in which it commented that the "aim of the [domestic relations] exception is to keep federal courts from meddling in a realm that is peculiarly delicate, that is governed by state law and institutions (e.g., family courts), and in which inter-court conflicts in policy or decrees should be kept to an absolute minimum." Dunn v. Cometa, 238 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2001) (tort claims based on former wife's management of former husband's care, insurance and property during period when former husband was incapacitated did not fall within domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction). The Dunn court recognized that "lawsuits affecting domestic relations, however substantially, are not within the exception unless the claim at issue is one to obtain, alter or end a divorce, alimony or child custody decree." Id.
Because plaintiff's suit asks this court to alter a divorce decree, the domestic relations exception is applicable. Plaintiff seeks to enforce an alleged oral settlement agreement regarding the division of property as defined in a state court decree that dissolved his and defendant's marital status. Accepting the facts as alleged by plaintiff as true compels this court to recognize that the agreement in question arose after plaintiff objected to the circuit court's judgment and decree, and filed an appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals. The parties allegedly came to an agreement in an attempt to settle issues pertaining to the division of property, and thereby resolve plaintiff's appeal of the decree. Plaintiff is now before this court attempting to enforce this agreement. Since the agreement would modify, or alter, the parties' division of property, it would also necessarily alter the parties' divorce decree.
In McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit recognized that the domestic relations jurisdictional exception applied in a case in which the plaintiff sued her ex-husband claiming that she was seeking damages for breach of contract and tortious interference with a contract in regard to residential property under Ohio tort and contract law. The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's contention that the exception was inapplicable, holding instead that the contract in dispute was part of a separation agreement, and that "[t]his case thus involves issues arising out of conflict over a divorce decree, and according to Ankenbrandt, comes within the `domestic relations exception.'" McLaughlin, 193 F.3d at 413. The court concluded that "[t]herefore, the federal court lacks jurisdiction, as this case is not a tort or contract suit that merely has domestic relations overtones, but is one seeking a declaration of rights and obligations arising from marital status." Id. at 414. The same is true here.
Plaintiff contends that the decision in McLaughlin is distinguishable from this case because the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a contractual suit pertaining to terms of an agreement that were incorporated previously into a divorce decree. This is a distinction without a difference. The fact that plaintiff failed to incorporate the alleged agreement into the divorce decree before the Oregon Court of Appeals issued its ruling on plaintiff's appeal fails to render this suit as merely a "contract suit with domestic relations overtones." Rather, this suit clearly seeks a determination of rights and obligations pertaining to the parties' decree and its division of property. A federal court entertaining this suit would unavoidably find itself litigating the terms of the parties' decree and determining rights arising from the parties' marital status, and the only possible dispositions plaintiff could obtain from this court would either affirm, or alter, the parties' divorce decree. This court is incapable of resolving the parties' dispute without disturbing or upholding the parties' divorce decree, and therefore the court would be determining the parties' rights related to their marital status. Under the teachings of Ankenbrandt, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such a determination. Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or alternatively to abstain, is granted.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Defendant also moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant argues that any remedy afforded plaintiff would violate the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where it is necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.28 U.S.C. § 2283. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted "proceedings" to be steps the state court takes in concluding the case, and applies not only to the original proceedings, but any supplementary or ancillary proceedings involved in assisting the case to completion. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935) (citations omitted).
The Oregon Supreme Court denied plaintiff's request for review on June 26, 2001, thereby leaving nothing pending in any state court. Assuming, but not deciding, that the claim before this court involved a valid federal claim upon which this court has subject matter jurisdiction, any relief afforded plaintiff would not violate the Anti-Injunction Act. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied as moot, but also would be denied on its merits if plaintiff presented a valid claim for which federal jurisdiction was proper.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion (doc. # 7) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED and to dismiss for failure to state a claim is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.