Opinion
September 21, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Driscoll, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff is a former probationary teacher who alleges that the defendants forced him to resign from his position on March 3, 1992, based upon unsubstantiated accusations of misconduct. In May 1995, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for the deprivation of his employment in violation of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and N Y Constitution, article I, § 6. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff could not recover for the loss of his employment because he resigned, and that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the Statute of Limitations and his failure to serve a timely notice of claim upon the school district. The Supreme Court granted the motion upon the ground that the plaintiff's resignation foreclosed him from seeking damages for the defendants' alleged failure to provide him with procedural due process, and did not reach the defendants' remaining claims. We now affirm, but upon an alternative basis ( see, Parochial Bus Sys. v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 539; Giaimo v. Roller Derby Skate Corp., 234 A.D.2d 340).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a general remedy for injuries to personal rights, and a claim seeking damages under the statute must be commenced within the three-year limitations period which governs personal injury actions in this State ( see, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279; 423 S. Salina St. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 486-487; Legal Aid Socy. v. City of New York, 242 A.D.2d 423). Since the plaintiff commenced this action more than three years after his resignation and the termination of his employment, his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is time-barred. Furthermore, the plaintiff's second cause of action, which asserts a violation of his constitutional rights under State law, is barred by his failure to serve a timely notice of claim upon the school district, or to apply for leave to serve a late notice within the applicable one-year-and-ninety-day limitations period ( see, Education Law § 3813; Peek v. Williamsville Bd. of Educ., 221 A.D.2d 919; Hoger v. Thomann, 189 A.D.2d 1048).
O'Brien, J. P., Santucci, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.