Opinion
April 10, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Burrows, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the amended judgment entered September 22, 1993, is dismissed as it was entered upon the appellant's default (see, CPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that the order entered January 19, 1994, and the order dated January 24, 1994, are affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
"'Although this court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating default judgments in matrimonial actions (see, D'Alleva v D'Alleva, 127 A.D.2d 732; Antonovich v Antonovich, 84 A.D.2d 799; Hegarty v Hegarty, 48 A.D.2d 891), the opening of a default is discretionary'" (Sayagh v Sayagh, 205 A.D.2d 678-679, quoting Black v Black, 141 A.D.2d 689).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant husband's motion to open his default and vacate the amended judgment (see, Candeloro v Candeloro, 133 A.D.2d 731). The defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his failure to timely return for the trial of this matter, having voluntarily absented himself from the State after having been apprised of the trial date. The alleged inability of the defendant to timely contact the court to confirm the starting date of the trial is, under the circumstances herein, an insufficient excuse for his failure to appear on the date this matter was heard.
Moreover, the evidence adduced at the inquest was sufficient to permit the court to make the determinations it did as to equitable distribution, maintenance, and child support. There was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was more than capable of earning $150,000 per year as found by the court (see, Feldman v Feldman, 194 A.D.2d 207; Cusimano v Cusimano, 149 A.D.2d 397; Raviv v Raviv, 153 A.D.2d 932).
We also reject the defendant's contention that the amended judgment of divorce should have been vacated insofar as it directed ancillary relief, because of the Supreme Court's failure to explicitly state the factors it considered in making its judgment. While the Supreme Court failed to explicitly state which enumerated factors it relied upon in making its determination (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [g]; [6] [b]; [7] [b]), the record contains sufficient information to permit this Court to make an informed review (see, Kokalari v Kokalari, 199 A.D.2d 469).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Miller, J.P., O'Brien, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.