Opinion
2011-03-29
In the Matter of Karina BIBOLOVA, respondent, v. Andrei RADU, appellant.
Law Firm of Natalia Skvortsova, PLLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Lance Kramer, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
Law Firm of Natalia Skvortsova, PLLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Lance Kramer, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the appeal is from (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Weinstein, J.), dated February 3, 2010, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree and directed him to comply with the conditions set forth in an order of protection dated February 3, 2010, for a period not to exceed 12 months, and (2) the order of protection of the same court dated February 3, 2010, which, inter alia, directed him to stay away from the petitioner, her residence, and their son, subject to court-ordered visitation, for a period up to and including February 2, 2011.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order of protection, and the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as directed the appellant to observe the conditions of behavior specified in the order of protection for a period not to exceed 12 months, are dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from the order of protection, and the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as directed the appellant to observe the conditions of behavior specified in the order of protection for a period not to exceed 12 months, have been rendered academic by the passing of the time limits contained therein ( see Matter of Zieran v. Marvin, 2 A.D.3d 870, 871–872, 770 N.Y.S.2d 408). Nevertheless, even though the order of protection has expired, “in light of the enduring consequences which may flow from an adjudication that a party has committed a family offense,” the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as made that adjudication is not academic (Matter of Pastore v. Russo, 38 A.D.3d 556, 556, 832 N.Y.S.2d 577;see Matter of Rochester v. Rochester, 26 A.D.3d 387, 387–388 809 N.Y.S.2d 178; Matter of Kravitz v. Kravitz, 18 A.D.3d 874, 875, 796 N.Y.S.2d 376;Matter of Zieran v. Marvin, 2 A.D.3d at 871–872, 770 N.Y.S.2d 408).
The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see Matter of Creighton v. Whitmore, 71 A.D.3d 1141, 898 N.Y.S.2d 585). Here, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing supported a finding that the appellant committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree ( see Penal Law § 240.26[1]; Matter of Gonzalez v. Acosta, 73 A.D.3d 921, 921–922, 901 N.Y.S.2d 332;Matter of Halper v. Halper, 61 A.D.3d 687, 875 N.Y.S.2d 916;Matter of Wissink v. Wissink, 13 A.D.3d 461, 787 N.Y.S.2d 60).