Opinion
02 Civ. 6553 (WK)
September 25, 2002
Dennis T. D'Antonio, Esq., Weg and Myers, P.C., New York, NY, For Plaintiffs.
Peter L. Simmons, Esq., Fried, Frank, Harrris, Shriver Jacobson, New York, N.Y. For Defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers:
ORDER
Defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC") requests, by way of a letter dated September 19, 2002, that we grant it an extension of time (in this instance, until October 18, 2002) in which to file a response to the Plaintiffs' Complaint. PwC purportedly received the Complaint just before Labor Day and its counsel, which was retained earlier this month, is apparently still investigating the facts and claims set forth therein so that it can "respond appropriately" to the numerous causes of action articulated in the lengthy Complaint. See September 19, 2002 Peter L. Simmons Letter at 1. Although the Plaintiffs are amenable to an agreement which would allow PwC to file an Answer to the Plaintiffs' Complaint by October 18, 2002, they oppose any extension of time which would allow PwC to file any response to the Complaint other than an Answer (such as a motion) by that same date.
The Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny PwC's request to the extent that it would allow PwC more time in which to file a motion rather than an Answer. The Plaintiffs' opposition to PwC's request is premised, in large measure, on the argument that any motion filed in response to the Complaint in lieu of an Answer would "merely [be] used by defendants to further delay the proceedings" and that the denial of the request would not prejudice PwC whereas "delaying the proceedings does prejudice plaintiffs." See September 24, 2002 Dennis T. D'Antonio Letter at 1-2. Under the circumstances, we find that argument to be unpersuasive. Pretrial expense and delay are, unfortunately, inherent in litigation. See Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing Finishing Corp. (2d Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 20, 26. While a motion submitted in response to the Complaint would force both the parties and this Court to expend time and effort in addressing the issues raised therein, this type of motion practice in the early stages of a lawsuit is specifically contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, e.g., FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b), and this Court is here to serve, in part, as a forum for precisely this type of litigation. Moreover, since the Plaintiffs are already willing to delay the proceedings until at least October 18, 2002, in order to allow PwC to submit an Answer, we see no reason why we should not grant PwC an extension of time until that same date to file any pleading or motion responsive to the Complaint.
Accordingly, we hereby GRANT Defendant PwC's request for an extension of time. PwC is directed to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint on or before October 18, 2002.
SO ORDERED.