Summary
In BGM Enterprises v. State Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (1983), 673 P.2d 1205, 40 St.Rep. 1827, this Court dismissed on appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant had not taken advantage of a hearing in the administrative proceedings which would have been provided if BGM had acted in time.
Summary of this case from Mitchell v. Town of West YellowstoneOpinion
Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1984.
OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
SHEEHY, Justice.
B.G.M. Enterprises, d/b/a Park Place Nursing Home and Rehabilitation Center appeals from an order of the District Court, Eighth District, Cascade County, dismissing its complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In its complaint, B.G.M. had petitioned for a judicial review of an administrative decision of the State of Montana, Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), disallowing certain costs claimed by B.G.M. for skilled nursing care services and intermediate care services.
B.G.M. is a licensed nursing home that was under contract with SRS to provide skilled nursing care services and intermediate care services through the Medicaid program consistent with federal and state rules. SRS is the state agency authorized to administer and supervise a vendor payment program called Medicaid in compliance with section 53-6-101, et seq., MCA, and Sec. 46.12.201, et seq. A.R.M. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, B.G.M. filed with SRS cost reports for the time reported April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1979. On February 25, 1980, SRS issued its initial determination disallowing certain costs claimed by B.G.M. In that letter, SRS informed B.G.M. that if it was not satisfied with the determination it could request a fair hearing according to SRS Rule 46-2.10(18)-S11451F (now Sec. 46.12.1206, A.R.M.). B.G.M. requested extensions of time to submit objections and justifications of those objections. SRS agreed to the extension on the basis that plaintiff would submit its objections and justifications within the extended time periods. On October 17, 1980, SRS notified B.G.M. by letter that it would allow B.G.M. until October 31, 1980, to submit its objections. B.G.M. did not file objections by the due date and subsequently SRS issued its final rate, in effect disallowing the objections of B.G.M. Thereafter, B.G.M. filed its complaint in the District Court for judicial review of the SRS decision. SRS responded with a motion to dismiss, but did not supply a supporting brief as required by the rules of the District Court in that district. On January 13, 1981, the district judge denied the motion to dismiss of SRS. It was, however, stipulated in writing between counsel that SRS could have until January 18, 1982, in which to file a brief in support of its motion to dismiss. After considering the brief, the District Court reversed its position and on February 18, 1982, entered its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Notice of the order was duly served upon counsel for B.G.M. by the clerk of the District Court. On February 24, 1982, B.G.M. filed its motion for reconsideration before the District Court. Thereafter, briefs were filed by the parties, and on August 24, 1982, the District Court entered its order denying motion for reconsideration and affirming its decision to dismiss B.G.M.'s complaint. Notice of appeal from that order was filed on September 15, 1982.
SRS now moves to dismiss the appeal of B.G.M. on two grounds: (1) that the appeal was not timely taken; and (2) that in any event there is no jurisdiction for judicial review of the SRS order because B.G.M. had not filed its objections within the time allowed under the rules and extensions granted by SRS.
If we regard the motion for reconsideration filed by B.G.M. in the District Court as a Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P. post-trial motion or a Rule 60, M.R.Civ.P. motion, the appeal should be dismissed because it would be considered that the District Court had lost jurisdiction of the case by the time it entered its order in August 1982. However, B.G.M. raises in its briefs certain considerations relating to oral stipulations between counsel which do not appear of record. In any event, however, it appears that B.G.M. is not entitled to judicial review.
As the District Court noted, by letter SRS informed plaintiff that if it wasn't satisfied with the agency determination B.G.M. could request a fair hearing. Thereafter B.G.M. requested extensions of time to submit suggestions and justifications of the objections. SRS agreed to the extensions until October 17, when by letter it notified plaintiff that it would grant no further extensions past October 31, 1980. B.G.M.'s objections were not filed by the due date and on that basis, SRS issued its final decision. The court found specifically that it could not say that SRS did not use a fair procedure with its dealings with B.G.M., or that it acted arbitrarily.
A person may not seek judicial relief before available administrative avenues have been exhausted. State ex rel. Jones v. Giles (1975), 168 Mont. 130, 541 P.2d 355.
By not filing its objections timely, plaintiff was not entitled to an administrative hearing as provided by the rules applicable to proceedings before the SRS. Under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) a person who has exhausted all administrative remedies is entitled to a judicial review if he is aggrieved by a final decision "in a contested case." Section 2-4-702. A contested case is defined as a proceeding in which a determination of legal rights "after an opportunity for hearing." Because there was no hearing in this case, the District Court was without jurisdiction to provide judicial review of the administrative action. Selon v. Board of Personnel Appeals (Mont.1981), 634 P.2d 646, 38 St.Rep. 1676.
Under the 1982 Internal Operating Rules of this Court, if an appeal is lacking in merit, it should be denied summarily. Accordingly, the appeal herein is hereby DISMISSED.
HASWELL, C.J., and HARRISON, WEBER, GULBRANDSON, MORRISON and SHEA, JJ., concur.