Opinion
2011-08-10
Bernard Tyshawn Anderson BEY, Plaintiff,v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, New York City Department of Finance, Defendant.
Bernard Anderson Bey, Plaintiff Pro–Se.Jacqueline Hui, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, Attorney for Defendant.
Bernard Anderson Bey, Plaintiff Pro–Se.Jacqueline Hui, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, Attorney for Defendant.
This case raises the apparent novel issue of whether the Civil Court of the City of New York (“Civil Court”) must grant a “motion to convert and correct” a summons and complaint filed in Civil Court into a proposed CPLR Article 78 proceeding and then transfer said proceeding to Supreme Court or, in the alternative, simply dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Bernard Tyshawn Anderson Bey (“Plaintiff”) filed a summons with endorsed complaint against defendants City of New York and the New York City Department of Finance (“defendants”) alleging loss of property for $5,459.14 with interest. He subsequently brought a “motion to correct” against the city defendants as well as a number of other city agencies “for an order correcting the initial summons and complaint into the proposed CPLR article 78 proceeding” which he attached to the motion, and for an order removing the proposed Article 78 proceeding to Supreme Court, Kings County, in accordance with CPLR § 325(b) on the grounds that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.
In the corpus of the proposed petition, plaintiff challenges the seizure and auction of his vehicles based on outstanding parking violations that had been issued against him. Thus, his request in the summons and complaint for a money order is predicated upon the alleged illegality of actions taken by the city defendants. Plaintiff also seeks to amend the caption to reflect
his proper name. While he does not specifically request this Court to add a number of new city entities as defendants, his proposed Article 78 petition contains defendants other than those named and served in the complaint.
The city defendants cross move to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2) on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to actions taken by a city agency. The city argues that pursuant to CPLR § 7804, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to rule upon challenges or appeals to administrative determination.
“The Civil Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that subject matter provided by law.” Washington v. Culotta, 13 Misc.3d 18, 21, 822 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Term, 2d and 11th Jud. Dists.2006). See N.Y. Const., art. VI, 15(b). Accord, Green v. Lakeside Manor Homes for Adults, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 16, 18, 914 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App.Term, 2d Dept.2010); Fuca v. City of New York, 15 Misc.3d 86, 87, 836 N.Y.S.2d 757 (App. Term, 2nd & 11th Jud., Dists.2007). See generally, Civil Court Act (“CCA”) § 201 et seq. Where the Civil Court, or any other lower court, lacks jurisdiction to hear a case, it may not determine any matter raised therein which is outside of the court's jurisdiction. See, Fuca v. City of New York, supra. (Small Claims Court without jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff filed the action within 4 months of determination). Put another way, where the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction, any proceedings had in that court are a nullity. Kaminsky v. Connolly, 73 Misc.2d 789, 342 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App.Term, 1st Dept.1972).
Pursuant to Article 2–B of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”), and Title 19, Section 201 of the New York City Administrative Code (“Code”), the Parking Violations Bureau (“PVB”) is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and render determinations on traffic infractions that constitute parking violations. VTL § 237(9); Administrative Code § 19–203(h). The PVB is empowered to enter into and enforce judgments in the same manner as the enforcement of money judgments in civil proceedings. VTL § 237(5). Pursuant to §§ 19–206 through 19–208, administrative review of parking violations commences before a hearing officer and a respondent aggrieved by a decision of the hearing officer may obtain review of said decision by the Appeals Board of the PVB (“RCNY”), § 39–12. The decision of the Appeals Board is the final determination of the PVB and judicial review of such proceeding may be had through a CPLR Article 78 proceeding. VTL § 243; NYC Administrative Code § 19–209. See generally, Hong Mai v. City of NY, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 51179(U), 8 Misc.3d 135(A), 2005 WL 1713626 (App. Term, 2 Dept.2005); Mtr. of Voccola v. Shilling, 88 Misc.2d 103, 388 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup.Ct., Kings Co.1976) aff'd 57 A.D.2d 931, 394 N.Y.S.2d 577 (2nd Dept.1977).
An Article 78 proceeding may only be brought in the Supreme Court. CPLR § 7804(b); Mtr. of Sovocool v. David, 7 A.D.2d 262, 266, 182 N.Y.S.2d 553; Mtr. of Voccola, supra, 88 Misc.2d at 109–111, 388 N.Y.S.2d 71. The Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of government actions, which, as set forth above, must be brought pursuant to Article 78 in Supreme Court. See, Fuca v. City, supra, 15 Misc.3d at 87, 836 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Civil Court Act (“CCA”) does not confer a private right of action against the city to contest an administrative determination by the TLC); Anderson v. Dutchess County, 12 Misc.3d 94, 95, 820 N.Y.S.2d 403 (App. Term, 2d Dept.2006) (the proper forum for challenging actions taken by the County Executive as being arbitrary and capricious was a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in
Civil Court; since the Small Claims Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss must be granted.) ( see CPLR §§ 7801, 7803(3); 7804(b)); Housing and Development Admin. v. Community Housing Imp. Program, Inc., 90 Misc.2d 813, 396 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App.Term, 2d Dept.1977) (Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to grant either a declaratory judgment or Article 78 relief which is limited solely to the Supreme Court).
The Civil Court thus lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of the PVB appeals board. See CCA, Art. 2, 201 et seq. Mai v. City of New York, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 51179(U), 8 Misc.3d 135(A), 2005 WL 1713626 (App. Term, 2nd & 11th Jud. Dists., 2005); Mtr. of Voccola, supra, 88 Misc.2d at 109–11, 388 N.Y.S.2d 71. However, this court need not, and under set precedent cannot outright dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. As set forth in the leading case of Kemper v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 Misc.2d 7, 9, 304 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Civ.Ct., N.Y. Co.1969), the establishment of a unified court system in 1962, and subsequent amendments to the State Constitution, obviated the “drastic relief of dismissal” when a lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 6, § 19 of the Constitution, the Civil Court “shall transfer to the supreme court ... any action or proceeding which has not been transferred to them from any of said courts and over which the said courts for the City of New York have no jurisdiction.” The provisions of Section 19 are a self-executing grant of constitutional power not dependent upon any legislative enactment for implementation. B & R Textiles Corp. v. Empire Bias Binding Co., 126 Misc.2d 965, 966, 484 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co.1985) citing Kemper, supra at 9, 304 N.Y.S.2d 515.
Transfer of an action over which the court has no jurisdiction is required on the court's own motion.
Kaminsky v. Connolly, supra, 73 Misc.2d at 790, 342 N.Y.S.2d 394. See also, Baptist Temple Church v. Mann, 194 Misc.2d 498, 755 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co.2002) (where petitioner's claim for affirmative relief—the eviction of the respondent pastor cannot be accomplished without a declaratory judgment that the pastor was properly terminated, which was solely within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the proper remedy was not dismissal of the case but transfer of the case from Civil to Supreme); Simmons v. Simmons, 2 Misc.3d 536, 541, 769 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Civil Ct., Queens Co.2003) (the directive to transfer is cast in mandatory, and not permissive terms); Siegel's Practice Commentaries, Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 29A, CCA 202, at 37).
Plaintiff incorrectly cites CPLR § 325(b) as authorizing this court to remove the case to Supreme Court. CPLR § 325 does not contain a provision permitting a Civil Court judge to initiate the transfer to the Supreme Court. Simmons v. Simmons, supra, 2 Misc.3d at 541, 769 N.Y.S.2d 711. Rather, plaintiff could have moved in the Supreme Court to have this case transferred pursuant to CPLR § 325(a) or (b).
Furthermore, within the context of other courts of limited jurisdiction, Article VI § 19 has been interpreted as mandating transfer rather than dismissal where such lower court lacked jurisdiction. See Mtr. of Braker, 123 A.D.2d 585, 507 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dept.1986) (Article VI, § 19(d) mandates transfer, rather than dismissal when the Surrogate's Court lacks jurisdiction); Mtr. of Rita F., 12 Misc.3d 894, 819 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Family Court, N.Y. Co.2006) (article VI, § 19(e) obliges family court to transfer actions over which it has no jurisdiction to criminal court rather than dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction). In light of the above, this court is compelled
to transfer the case to Supreme Court, Kings County rather than dismiss it.
However, since any ruling by this court on any aspect of plaintiff's motion would be a nullity (see, Kaminsky v. Connolly, supra, 73 Misc.2d 789, 342 N.Y.S.2d 394), this Court is without jurisdiction to rule upon any of plaintiff's requests, including amending his summons and complaint to reflect his proper name, adding new parties as defendants, correcting the initial summons and complaint into the proposed CPLR Article 78 petition or accepting the Article 78 petition as the operative pleading prior to transferring it to Supreme Court. Rather the effect of a transfer by this court should be the same as if a transfer had been effected by a Supreme Court order pursuant to CPLR § 325(b). Kemper v. Transamerica Ins. Co. Supra, 61 Misc.2d at 10, 304 N.Y.S.2d 515. Rather, once the case is transferred, it is within the purview of the Supreme Court to convert the civil judicial proceeding not brought in the proper form into a CPLR article 78 proceeding pursuant to CPLR § 103(c). See, Walsh v. N.Y. State Thruway Authority, 24 A.D.3d 755, 756, 808 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dept.2005) (Supreme Court had authority to convert an action to recover damages from breach of contract into a CPLR Article 78 proceeding rather than dismiss action).
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent of transferring this case to Supreme Court, Kings County, under the State Constitution. To implement the transfer, the plaintiff shall purchase an index number in Supreme Court and a request for judicial intervention and complete and file the appropriate forms and papers, with a copy of this order. The plaintiff shall then present proof of the filing to the Clerk of the Civil Court, who shall then transfer this action and motion to Supreme Court. Simmons v. Simmons, supra, 2 Misc.3d at 544, 769 N.Y.S.2d 711. See, Kaufman v. CBS, Inc., 135 Misc.2d 64, 65–66, 514 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Civ.Ct., N.Y. Co.1987).
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.