Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-71395-DT
May 6, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
The Court has before it Plaintiff Theodis Clay Trimble Bey's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at the Pugsley Correctional Facility in Kinglsey, Michigan. The Court has reviewed plaintiff's complaint and now dismisses it without prejudice.
II. Standard of Review
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she was deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie. Hakken v. Washtenaw County, 901 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Under The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), district courts are required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). If a complaint fails to pass muster under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) or § 1915A, the "district court should sua sponte dismiss the complaint." Id. at 612. Even where a prisoner has paid the full filing fee, a court may properly dismiss the action prior to service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) or § 1915A. McClaine-Bey v. Woods, 194 F.3d 1313, 1999 WL 801525, *1 (6th Cir. September 30, 1999) (citing to McGore, 114 F.3d at 604-05). In other words, the screening procedures which have been established for prisoner civil actions by § 1915A apply whether the plaintiff has paid the entire filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis. Randolph v. Campbell, 25 Fed. Appx. 261, 263 (6th Cir. 2001). In this case, plaintiff has paid the full filing fee of $150.00. However, notwithstanding the full payment of the filing fee, this Court must dismiss the case if it finds that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Mullins v. Smith, 14 F. Supp.2d 1009, 1011 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
III. Complaint
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to kidnap him and place him in a condition of peonage in order to sell him into slavery by having him charged with, and convicted of, the criminal offense of second degree criminal sexual conduct. Although plaintiffs lengthy complaint, which is several hundred pages long, makes numerous allegations against the defendants that they conspired to deprive him of numerous federal constitutional and statutory rights and further accuses the defendants of violating several federal criminal laws, including laws against piracy, the gist of plaintiff's complaint appears to be that the defendants conspired to have him convicted of the crime of second degree criminal conduct, for which he was sentenced by the Wayne County Circuit Court on February 22, 1994 to three to fifteen years in prison. Plaintiff further alleges that members of the Michigan Parole Board have denied him parole on several occasions to further this conspiracy in order to keep plaintiff in a condition of peonage and slavery. Plaintiff does not specifically indicate the type of relief that he seeks from the Court.
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal for several reasons. To the extent that Plaintiff is challenging his criminal conviction for second degree criminal sexual conduct out of the Wayne County Circuit Court or the decisions by the Michigan Parole Board to deny him parole release, a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would not be the appropriate remedy. Where a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his or her physical imprisonment and the relief that he or she seeks is a determination that he or she is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his or her sole federal remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Section 1983 cannot serve as a basis to challenge the fact of a plaintiff's criminal conviction; the proper instrument for bringing such a challenge would be either on direct appeal, a state post-conviction relief motion, or a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. See Messa v. Rubin, 897 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Likewise, a state prisoner's claim that he or she was improperly denied parole can only be pursued by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, prior to which the plaintiff would be required to exhaust his or her state court remedies, rather than by means of an action under § 1983. Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 216 (2nd Cir. 1998); Hinds v. State of Tennessee, 888 F. Supp. 854, 857 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
An action which is properly one for habeas relief does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 947 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D.N.J. 1996). When the effect of granting equitable relief under the civil rights statute would be to substitute § 1983 for a petition for writ of habeas corpus to attack a state court conviction, a prisoner fails to state a claim under § 1983. Palmer v. Nebraska Supreme Court, 927 F. Supp. 370, 371 (D. Neb. 1996) (quoting Eutzy v. Tesar, 880 F.2d 1010, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff therefore cannot seek declaratory or injunctive relief relating to his conviction in a § 1983 action. St. Germain v. Isenhower, 98 F. Supp.2d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
To the extent that plaintiff is seeking to challenge his criminal conviction or the decisions by the Michigan Parole Board to deny him parole, his action should have been filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and not a civil rights suit under § 1983. This Court will not, however, convert the matter to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. When a suit that should have been brought under the habeas corpus statute is prosecuted instead as a civil rights suit, it should not be "converted" into a habeas corpus suit and decided on the merits. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). Instead, the matter should be dismissed, leaving it to the prisoner to decide whether to refile it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. When, as here, a civil rights complaint is defective and appears to assert claims for which the exclusive remedy is habeas corpus, a district court should state that the claims must be addressed in a habeas petition and should dismiss the civil rights claims without prejudice. Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
Secondly, to the extent that plaintiff is seeking monetary damages arising from his criminal conviction, he would be unable to obtain such damages absent a showing that his criminal conviction had been overturned. To recover monetary damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A § 1983 suit in which a plaintiff seeks damages in connection with proceedings leading to his allegedly wrongful state court conviction is not cognizable where the plaintiff's conviction has never been reversed or otherwise invalidated. See Patrick v. Laskaris, 25 F. Supp.2d 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Because plaintiff does not allege that his conviction has been overturned, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus, his allegations relating to any criminal prosecution, conviction, and incarceration against the defendants fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted and must, therefore, be dismissed. Weiss v. Sawyer, 28 F. Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
The Heck doctrine has also been applied to bar § 1983 actions which challenge state parole decisions in the absence of a previous decision by a state or federal tribunal which would declare the parole decision to be invalid. Bell v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 23 Fed. Appx. 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2001); See also Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 10240-1025 (9th Cir. 1997)( Heck bars a claim by a prisoner that the defendants violated his due process rights by considering false information in his prison file to find him ineligible for parole). Therefore, until plaintiff succeeds in getting the denial of parole overturned by either a state of federal court, a suit for monetary damages would be premature.
Because this Court is dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 complaint under Heck, the dismissal will be without prejudice. Diehl v. Nelson, 198 F.3d 244, 1999 WL 1045076 (6th Cir. November 12, 1999) (citing to Fottler v. United States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir. 1996)); Bell v. Raby, 2000 WL 356354, *8, fn. 14 (E.D. Mich. February 28, 2000).
V. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.