Summary
dismissing case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), where plaintiff alleged that two Senators were “involved in the irradiation of his brain and manipulation of his thought processes via devices surreptitiously implanted in his head”
Summary of this case from Custis v. CIAOpinion
Civil Action No. 03-1470 (RWR).
March 11, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Andrew Bestor, has filed suit against Senators Joseph I. Lieberman and Edward M. Kennedy alleging that they are involved in the irradiation of his brain and manipulation of his thought processes via devices surreptitiously implanted in his head. Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, arguing, inter alia, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Because plaintiff's claims are plainly fanciful, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint and defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted. Moreover, plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint will be denied as futile because the proposed amendments would not survive a motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that while working in Tokyo, Japan from 1992 to 1996, he was drugged and kidnapped from his apartment, and that a system of neuroprosthetics was implanted in his skull and brain. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that the implantation was "very likely [performed] by the Japanese consulting with the `CIA-affiliated' Peter Bourne," and that he suspects that the "microscopic wires in [his] skull" were manufactured by the University of Michigan. (Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 21.) The neuroprosthetics allegedly allow remote human operators the capability to, among other things, induce image and audio sequences in plaintiff's brain. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that Senators Kennedy and Lieberman have at various times been featured in these alleged images. (See id. at 4-7.)Plaintiff alleges that by appearing in the video images in his head, Senators Kennedy and Lieberman act in violation of the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and 18 U.S.C. § 1961. (Compl. at 4-7, 9, 11.) Although it is difficult to discern the precise relief that he seeks, it appears that plaintiff wants to obtain information that would help him understand in greater depth the operation he describes, in which he alleges defendants are complicit. (Id. at 10, 12, 15-16.)
Defendants have moved to dismiss the case, claiming, among other things, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), and that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
DISCUSSION
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the action may not be maintained. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous[.]" Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it is "`patently insubstantial,' presenting no federal question suitable for decision." Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n. 6 (1989). Claims are patently insubstantial if they are "essentially fictitious," that is, if, for example, they advance "bizarre conspiracy theories," or allege "fantastic government manipulations of [one's] will or mind." See Best, 39 F.3d at 330; see also Carone-Ferdinand v. CIA, 131 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234 (D.D.C. 2001); O'Connor v. United States, 159 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Md. 1994).
Plaintiff's allegations of government manipulation of his brain and mind are essentially fictitious and frivolous. In Best, the D.C. Circuit cited the following allegation in Wilson v. United States Federal Government, Civ. Action No. 92-2159 (D.D.C. 1992), as "frivolous":
Years ago a Secret Branch of the Federal Government Put me under. This Branch of the Government, took my Face off of my Head, went into my Scull Put a Computer Chip of some kind a Camera System which makes me Project Images or Pitchers, many Feet in Front of me. This was done to me without my Written Permission or any kind of Signature. This was and is an Atrocity. This Atrocity that was committed against me, has caused Massive Interrogation Cruel Unusual Punishment Against me. The Atrocity that was committed against me is in all actuality Cruel Unusual Punishment. I feel that the Government should be responsible for the Atrocity committed Against me.See Best, 39 F.3d at 331 n. 3. Plaintiff's claims that the neuroprosthetics allegedly implanted in his head allow human operators to monitor his thoughts and induce image and audio sequences in his brain, and that his irradiation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, are nearly identical to the claims in Wilson characterized by the D.C. Circuit as frivolous. As such, they are precisely the sort of claims that "present no federal question suitable for decision."Best, 39 F.3d at 330.
Moreover, in Carone-Ferdinand, the plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived in various ways of insurance policies, bank accounts, and other property through a conspiracy involving the Central Intelligence Agency, three former United States presidents, and organized crime families. Carone-Ferdinand, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33. Finding the plaintiffs' claims "essentially fictitious," the court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. at 235. The court explained that the plaintiffs' claims could not be viewed as plausible because they were supported only by "one patently forged document and selfserving declarations." Id. at 236. The court stated that "[o]n its face, the complaint appears to be the very type of `bizarre conspiracy theory' that the D.C. Circuit has said warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)." Id. at 235.
As in Carone-Ferdinand, plaintiff's conspiracy theory is bizarre and unsupported by evidence and warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). First, plaintiff does not bring forward any evidence to support his baseline allegations — that he was drugged and kidnapped from his apartment in Tokyo and that neuroprosthetics were implanted in his skull and brain. This failure to support the foundations of his complaint "cast[s] doubt on [plaintiff's] entire case." Id. at 235. Second, the evidence that plaintiff does submit is wholly unrelated to him personally. He cites, for example, a drawing and several studies and articles on neuroprosthetics systems, but none of these suggests that the government is using neuroprosthetics systems in the way that plaintiff claims, much less that plaintiff himself has been targeted. Because of the frivolous nature of plaintiff's claims and the lack of evidence presented in support of the complaint, plaintiff's essentially fictitious allegations present no claim over which the court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted. See Best, 39 F.3d at 330; Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536-37.
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed a motion to modify his complaint, seeking to strike certain portions of his original complaint and add new language in support of his claims. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) dictates that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," a district court may deny such a motion where the proposed amendment is futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Nat'l. Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2004). "Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss." James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996);see also Robinson v. Detroit News Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002) ("An amendment would be futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.") (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint does not appear to raise any new or different claims for relief and does not identify any additional grounds for subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Rather, it advances more of the same frivolous and essentially fictitious allegations that deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. (See, e.g., Mot. to Suppl. R. at 17 ("Subsequent interaction and external indicators such as use of Jimmy Carter himself in an induced image sequence . . . eventually led to abrupt realization Carter himself had been implanted.")) Because "nothing in [plaintiff's] proposed amended complaint would change the fact" that plaintiff cannot establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint, plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint will be denied as futile. See Robinson, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff's claims are frivolous and essentially fictitious, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted. Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint will be denied because allowing plaintiff's proposed amendments would be futile. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.