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Best v. State

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Apr 10, 2014
116 A.D.3d 1198 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)

Opinion

2014-04-10

Timothy BEST, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Timothy Best, Greenville, North Carolina, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), for respondent.



Timothy Best, Greenville, North Carolina, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., STEIN, McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ.

STEIN, J.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Hard, J.), entered November 27, 2012, which, among other things, granted defendant's cross motion to dismiss the claim.

Claimant commenced this action alleging that Supreme Court Justice James Gilpatric had engaged in “Intentional Professional and Malicious Misconduct” in the manner in which he presided over an action that claimant had brought in Supreme Court. In its answer to the claim in the instant action, defendant asserted, among other things, the defense of judicial immunity. Claimant moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of action or, alternatively, for summary judgment dismissing the claim. The Court of Claims found, among other things, that judicial immunity barred the claim, denied claimant's motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross motion to dismiss. Claimant now appeals, and we affirm.

Claimant asserted, among other things, that Gilpatric improperly advised a defendant in the Supreme Court action to file a summary judgment motion and then granted it.

It is well settled that a “[j]udge is immune from civil liability for acts done in the exercise of his [or her] judicial function” ( Salzano v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 300 A.D.2d 716, 717, 751 N.Y.S.2d 130 [2002] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Mosher–Simons v. County of Allegany, 99 N.Y.2d 214, 219, 753 N.Y.S.2d 444, 783 N.E.2d 509 [2002];Davey v. State of New York, 31 A.D.3d 600, 600, 817 N.Y.S.2d 918 [2006];Slavin v. State of New York, 206 A.D.2d 651, 652, 614 N.Y.S.2d 938 [1994],appeal dismissed84 N.Y.2d 863, 618 N.Y.S.2d 8, 642 N.E.2d 327 [1994],cert. denied513 U.S. 1194, 115 S.Ct. 1261, 131 L.Ed.2d 141 [1995] ). “Absolute immunity is ... necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation” ( Lombardoni v. Boccaccio, 121 A.D.2d 828, 829, 504 N.Y.S.2d 260 [1986] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ) and “discourages inappropriate collateral attacks on court rulings and fosters judicial independence by protecting courts and judges from vexatious litigation” ( Mosher–Simons v. County of Allegany, 99 N.Y.2d at 219, 753 N.Y.S.2d 444, 783 N.E.2d 509). There are only two recognized exceptions to the broad cloak of judicial immunity, namely “when a [j]udge does not act as a [j]udge, or when a [j]udge, though acting under color of judicial authority, lacks any jurisdiction supporting judicial authority for the action taken” ( Alvarez v. Snyder, 264 A.D.2d 27, 34, 702 N.Y.S.2d 5 [2000];see Harley v. State of New York, 186 A.D.2d 324, 325, 587 N.Y.S.2d 805 [1992],appeal dismissed81 N.Y.2d 781, 594 N.Y.S.2d 713, 610 N.E.2d 386 [1993] ). As to the latter exception, there is a clear “ ‘distinction between acts performed in excess of jurisdiction[, which fall within the scope of immunity,] and acts performed in the clear absence of any jurisdiction over the subject matter,’ ” which do not ( Moulton v. State of New York, 114 A.D.3d 115, 123, 977 N.Y.S.2d 797 [2013], quoting Sassower v. Finnerty, 96 A.D.2d 585, 586, 465 N.Y.S.2d 543 [1983],appeal dismissed61 N.Y.2d 756, 472 N.Y.S.2d 923, 460 N.E.2d 1358 [1984],lv. denied61 N.Y.2d 985, 475 N.Y.S.2d 283, 463 N.E.2d 624 [1984] ).

The allegations made by claimant here clearly challenge the manner in which Gilpatric acted in a matter pending before him. None of the acts of which claimant complains were taken by Gilpatric outside his judicial capacity or were beyond the scope of his jurisdiction ( see Colin v. County of Suffolk, 181 A.D.2d 653, 654, 580 N.Y.S.2d 460 [1992],lv. denied80 N.Y.2d 756, 588 N.Y.S.2d 824, 602 N.E.2d 232 [1992] ). As a result, the Court of Claims properly determined that Gilpatric was protected by judicial immunity and dismissed the instant claim ( see Salzano v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 300 A.D.2d at 717, 751 N.Y.S.2d 130;see also Colin v. County of Suffolk, 181 A.D.2d at 654, 580 N.Y.S.2d 460;Sassower v. Finnerty, 96 A.D.2d at 586, 465 N.Y.S.2d 543).

Claimant's remaining contention has been rendered academic as a result of this decision.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ., concur.




Summaries of

Best v. State

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Apr 10, 2014
116 A.D.3d 1198 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
Case details for

Best v. State

Case Details

Full title:Timothy BEST, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Date published: Apr 10, 2014

Citations

116 A.D.3d 1198 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
116 A.D.3d 1198
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 2484

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