Opinion
CV 03-1698-BR
April 14, 2004
CRAIG A. CRISPIN, ELON HASSON, CRISPIN EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS, Portland, OR, Attorneys for Plaintiff
MONTGOMERY W. COBB, ERIC M. BOSSE, COBB AND BOSSE LLP, Portland, OR, Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for a More Definite Statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) (#3) of Defendants Cascade Precision, Inc., and Michael Hall.
Plaintiff, an employee of Cascade Precision, alleges race discrimination based on his Italian ancestry under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, race and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030, and common law battery.
For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS Standards
Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "for failure to state a claim is proper `only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). A court must limit its review to the contents of the complaint, take all allegations of material fact as true, and view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998). A court should not dismiss a complaint, thus depriving the plaintiff of an opportunity to establish his or her claims at trial, "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Discussion
In his first, third and fifth claims, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights under Title VII, Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 respectively by discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of race. Plaintiff predicates his race-based claim on his alleged Italian ancestry. Defendants, however, assert race discrimination cannot be predicated on Italian ancestry as a matter of law.
Although Title VII and its Oregon counterpart, Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030, prohibit employment discrimination based on several classifications, including race and national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is limited to discrimination based on race. White v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 692 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982). The few courts, therefore, that have addressed the issue of what constitutes a "race" for purposes of anti-discrimination statutes have done so in the context of § 1981 claims.
In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of § 1981 and found:
Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory.481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). The Supreme Court rejected the idea that race discrimination in the historical context of the 1870 enactment of § 1981 should be defined by the twentieth century concept that mankind is divided into the "Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro races." Id. at 611. The Court recognized nineteenth century encyclopedias described numerous ethnic groups as comprising separate races, including "Germans, Greeks, Finns, Italians, Spanish, Mongolians and the like." Id. (internal citations omitted).
In Bisciglia v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, the court noted under the standards recognized by the Supreme Court in Al-Khazrajic, "`Italians' may have been considered an identifiable race." 45 F.3d 223, 230 (7th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the court held the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to allege a race discrimination claim under § 1981 based on his Italian ancestry because "it is not clear that Bisciglia can state no set of facts upon which relief can be granted under Section 1981." Id.
Similarly, in Commodari v. Long Island University, the court held § 1981 applied to discrimination based on Italian ancestry. 89 F. Supp. 353, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). See also Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1989) ("targets of race discrimination for purposes of section 1981 includes groups that today are considered merely different ethnic and national groups, such as Arabs, Jews, Germans and Italians.").
Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiff has stated a claim for race discrimination under § 1981 based on his Italian ancestry and, therefore, denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
The Court notes neither Defendants nor Plaintiff have addressed whether the Supreme Court's historical rationale for concluding the definition of "race" in the context of § 1981 includes ethnicity based on national characteristics would extend to the definition of "race" under Title VII or Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030, both of which are legislative creations dating from the latter part of the twentieth century. Accordingly, on this Motion, the Court does not differentiate between Plaintiff's § 1981 claim and his claims under Title VII and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Defendants seek more definite statements regarding (1) the specific amount of damages Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendants' alleged discriminatory conduct and (2) the conduct Plaintiff ascribes to each Defendant.The Court finds Plaintiff's Complaint, although not a model of clarity in identifying the relationship between Defendants Hall and Cascade Precision, Inc., provides Defendants with sufficient notice of the conduct Plaintiff complains of and the nature of the injuries he allegedly suffered to allow Defendants "to frame a responsive pleading." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Defendants also may obtain further information through discovery.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Make Definite and Certain.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for a More Definite Statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) (#3) of Defendants Cascade Precision, Inc. and Michael Hall.
IT IS SO ORDERED.