Summary
declining to grant summary judgment where the "issue of whether people in wheelchairs are truly deprived of a viewing experience comparable to that of ambulatory stadium-goers remains a disputed issue of fact"
Summary of this case from Landis v. Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium Pub. Facilities Dist.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-10694-RWZ
May 30, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
In Lowell, Massachusetts, the boys of summer are called the Spinners, and they play baseball on a former junkyard and ash dump that has been transformed into a redbrick stadium overlooking the Merrimack River. Lowell's team is the Class A affiliate of the Boston Red Sox, and it competes in the estimable New York-Pennsylvania League against such foes as the Aberdeen Ironbirds, the Mahoning Valley Scrappers, and the Batavia Muckdogs. The Spinners' home, Edward A. LeLacheur Park, is owned by the City of Lowell ("City") and was designed and constructed between 1996 and 1998. The stadium has about 4,700 seats divided into 20 sections, and the Spinners have established three ticket classes: premium box (closest to the field), box, and reserved. Disabled fans can watch the Spinners play from one of 48 spaces large enough to accommodate a wheelchair, with a companion seat adjacent. All of these wheelchair spaces can be found in the last row of the ballpark. Although only six stadium sections are in the outfield, 58 percent of the wheelchair spaces are located there. The premium box area and the sections behind home plate have no handicapped accessible seating. On April 25, 2001, plaintiffs Scott Swanson and the Northeast Independent Living Program, Inc., filed suit against the City and the stadium architect, Hellmuth, Obata Kassabaum, Inc. ("HOK"), alleging that the wheelchair seating at LeLacheur Park violates the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. 12181 et seq. Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment on two issues: (1) whether the seating configuration of the stadium discriminates against disabled people, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), and (2) whether the City and HOK can be held liable for ADA violations.
The stadium is named for a state representative who helped secure funds for the project.
Mr. Swanson died in December, 2001, and on March 13, 2002, Frank Berry was substituted as a plaintiff.
First, plaintiffs contend that defendants have violated the ADA by designing and constructing a stadium in which all wheelchair spaces are located in the last row, with a disproportionate number in the outfield and none behind home plate and in the premium box section. The ADA Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG"), promulgated by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b), have set the standard for ADA-compliant seating configurations at stadiums as follows: "Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public." 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. A., § 4.33.3. The exception to the general rule is that "[a]ccessible viewing positions may be clustered for bleachers, balconies, and other areas having sight lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent. Equivalent accessible viewing positions may be located on levels having accessible egress." Id. The Department of Justice has further elucidated the standard in a technical assistance bulletin: "Accessible seating must be an integral part of the seating plan so that people using wheelchairs are not isolated from other spectators or their friends or family." Department of Justice, Accessible Stadiums 1 (1996). Additionally, "[w]heelchair seating locations must be provided in all areas including sky boxes and specialty areas. . . . [and] must be dispersed throughout all seating areas and provide a choice of admission prices and views comparable to those for the general public."Id. A comparable line of sight "allows a person using a wheelchair to see the playing surface between the heads and over the shoulders of the persons standing in the row immediately in front and over the heads of the persons standing two rows in front." Id. at 2.
The case law interpreting and applying the ADAAG provides a measure of support for plaintiffs. In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Ellerbe Becket Architects Engineers, P.C., 950 F. Supp. 393 (D.D.C. 1996), the builders of a basketball and hockey arena failed to comply with the ADA by "ghettoiz[ing]" many of the wheelchair spaces in the "end zone" areas. "Dispersal requires a choice of various seating areas, good and bad, expensive and inexpensive, which generally matches those of ambulatory spectators." Id. at 404. The District of Oregon required horizontal and vertical dispersal of wheelchair seats at a large indoor arena because otherwise "an arena operator could simply designate a few token wheelchair seats in the better seating areas, and cluster the majority of wheelchair seats in the last row or in other undesirable locations. That is contrary to the Congressional intent in enacting Title III of the ADA." Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 709 (D. Or. 1997). In holding that the wheelchair seats could not be clustered in the arena's "end zone" sections, the court noted that the Department of Justice had consistently interpreted Standard 4.33.3 "to require vertical and horizontal dispersal." Id. at 708. In one letter, the Department advised:
In order to fulfill the requirement that comparable lines of sight and admission prices be provided in new construction, wheelchair seating locations . . . must be provided in a number equal to approximately one percent of the seats in each price range, level of amenities, and viewing angle. Thus, if there are 400 box seats located between first and third base, there should be approximately 4 wheelchair seating locations provided within the boxed seating areas located between first and third base.Id. at 708-09 n. 9 (quoting a November 21, 1994, letter from DOJ regarding YakimaCounty Stadium).
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the dispersal requirement has been met because wheelchair spaces have been placed "in intermittent locations all the way around the Stadium." They point to the exception to Standard 4.33.3 that allows the clustering of handicapped seating "for areas having sight lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent." They further note that the original stadium designs had only two ticket categories and that the Lowell Spinners designated certain seats as "premium box" only after the design and construction process was complete.
Defendants also argue that various state and local agencies did not express any reservations about the stadium design, and they present an expert affidavit opining that the Stadium does, in fact, comply with the ADA. Such arguments are not dispositive.
None of these arguments, however, defeats plaintiffs' contentions. The disproportionate number of seats in the outfield raises troubling issues regarding the ADA's dispersal requirements. The deposition testimony by a senior project manager for defendant HOK that the stadium could still be modified to give wheelchairs "accessible egress" to the front-row premium areas suggests that the 4.33.3 exception does not save defendants. Finally, regardless of who created the premium box section and when, the fact that these seats have been designated as especially desirable presents the strong possibility that disabled fans are being forced to watch their beloved Spinners from suboptimal locations.
Nevertheless, the flaws in defendants' arguments do not compel a ruling in plaintiffs' favor. At root, the key determination is whether plaintiffs are being "discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of" LeLacheur Park. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Compared to the arenas in the cases cited by plaintiffs, the Spinners' stadium is tiny. While any right-thinking Portland Trailblazer or Washington Wizard fan would prefer to watch from center court as opposed to the "end zone" seats at their respective arenas, it is unclear whether the view varies much from section to section at a relatively intimate 5,000-seat stadium. The issue of whether people in wheelchairs are truly deprived of a viewing experience comparable to that of ambulatory stadium-goers remains a disputed issue of fact. Summary judgment, therefore, is inappropriate.
Conversely, HOK's citation of Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that it was acceptable to cluster wheelchair seating in the last row of a stadium-style movie theater), is misplaced because the last row of a cinema may afford a viewing experience substantially different from the back of a much larger baseball stadium.
In a letter to the court dated April 18, 2003, defendant HOK invited the Court to visit LeLacheur Park. This invitation may well prove useful to the eventual finder of fact.
Regarding the second ground for summary judgment, if the wheelchair seating at LeLacheur Park in fact violates the ADA, defendant City, as owner of the facility, would undoubtedly be liable under the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The City cannot avoid liability by arguing that defendant HOK was ultimately responsible for the stadium's design and construction. With respect to defendant HOK, the parties continue to dispute the degree of control the architect had over the design and construction process, creating genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
Such an argument would be more appropriate for a breach of contract claim or action for contribution that might arise in the event that plaintiffs obtain a favorable verdict.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied.