Opinion
2014-04298
03-11-2015
Gregory A. BEROZA, respondent, v. SALLAH LAW FIRM, P.C., et al., appellants.
Sallah Law Firm, P.C., Holtsville, N.Y. (Dean J. Sallah, pro se, of counsel), pro se, and for remaining appellants. Amy S. Nord, Valley Stream, N.Y., for respondent.
Sallah Law Firm, P.C., Holtsville, N.Y. (Dean J. Sallah, pro se, of counsel), pro se, and for remaining appellants. Amy S. Nord, Valley Stream, N.Y., for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.
Opinion In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, Jr., J.), dated April 2, 2014, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss a complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the moving defendant must establish, prima facie, that the time in which to commence the action has expired” (Kitty Jie Yuan v. 2368 W. 12th St., LLC, 119 A.D.3d 674, 674, 988 N.Y.S.2d 898 ; see Beizer v. Hirsch, 116 A.D.3d 725, 725, 983 N.Y.S.2d 615 ; Zaborowski v. Local 74, Serv. Empls. Intl. Union, AFL–CIO, 91 A.D.3d 768, 768–769, 936 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations is tolled or is otherwise inapplicable (see Kitty Jie Yuan v. 2368 W. 12th St., LLC, 119 A.D.3d at 674, 988 N.Y.S.2d 898 ; Beizer v. Hirsch, 116 A.D.3d at 725, 983 N.Y.S.2d 615 ; Zaborowski v. Local 74, Serv. Empls. Intl. Union, AFL–CIO, 91 A.D.3d at 769, 936 N.Y.S.2d 575 ).
The three-year limitations period applicable to causes of action to recover damages for legal malpractice “may be tolled by the continuous representation doctrine where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim” (Aseel v. Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 A.D.3d 1037, 1038, 966 N.Y.S.2d 202 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Zorn v. Gilbert, 8 N.Y.3d 933, 934, 834 N.Y.S.2d 702, 866 N.E.2d 1030 ; McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 306, 755 N.Y.S.2d 693, 785 N.E.2d 714 ; Singh v. Edelstein, 103 A.D.3d 873, 874, 962 N.Y.S.2d 225 ). “For the doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney” (Aseel v. Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 A.D.3d at 1038, 966 N.Y.S.2d 202 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Piliero v. Adler & Stavros, 282 A.D.2d 511, 512, 723 N.Y.S.2d 91 ). “ ‘One of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties' ” (Aseel v. Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 A.D.3d at 1038, 966 N.Y.S.2d 202, quoting Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 507, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787 ; see Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 463 N.E.2d 371 ; Piliero v. Adler & Stavros, 282 A.D.2d at 512, 723 N.Y.S.2d 91 ).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the complaint based on the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214[6] ). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Kitty Jie Yuan v. 2368 W. 12th St., LLC, 119 A.D.3d at 674–675, 988 N.Y.S.2d 898 ; Bill Kolb, Jr., Subaru, Inc. v. LJ Rabinowitz, CPA, 117 A.D.3d 978, 980, 986 N.Y.S.2d 523 ; Macaluso v. Del Col, 95 A.D.3d 959, 960–961, 944 N.Y.S.2d 589 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.