Opinion
No. 2:15-cv-01722-MCE-KJN
12-15-2015
MICHAEL S. BERMAN and DARRELL B. STAPP, Plaintiffs, v. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Governor of California, in his official capacity, and JEFFREY A. BEARD, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, in their official capacities, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Michael S. Berman and Darrell B. Stapp ("Plaintiffs") initiated this action against Defendants Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, and Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"), in their official capacities (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff claims Defendants' exclusion of men from California's Alternative Custody Program ("ACP"), as authorized by California Penal Code section 1170.05, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On September 1, 2015, the Court ordered that this case is related to Sassman v. Brown, 2:14-cv-1679-MCE-KJN ("Sassman"), a case in which Plaintiff William Sassman pursued identical challenges to those raised here. Subsequently, on September 9, 2015, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Sassman and directed Defendants to permit male inmates to apply to the ACP. Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31) and Defendants' Motion to Stay (ECF No. 33). For the following reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the Motion to Stay is DENIED as moot.
Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).
ANALYSIS
The facts pertaining to the ACP and the State's exclusion of men from that program are set forth in detail in the Court's memorandum and order granting William Sassman's motion for summary judgment. See Sassman v. Brown, 2:14-cv-01679-MCE-KJN, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015). That decision is incorporated here in its entirety. --------
Plaintiffs seek an order of summary judgment because this Court has already ruled in Sassman that the ACP's exclusion of male inmates does not pass constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues here. Defendants disagree, arguing that Plaintiffs should not be permitted to offensively invoke the collateral estoppel doctrine when they could easily have joined Mr. Sassman's action. They also contend that this Court's decision in Sassman is not sufficiently firm because Defendants have noticed an appeal in that case. Plaintiffs have the better arguments.
Reliance on collateral estoppel as a bar to further litigation "is appropriate only if (1) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue was decided in a final judgment; and (4) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action." Syverson v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). "[T]rial courts have broad discretion to determine when [offensive collateral estoppel] should be applied." Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). "The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel." Id.
Collateral estoppel bars Defendants from defending against Plaintiffs' action. Defendants were parties to the Sassman action, where they litigated issues identical to those raised here, and a final judgment was issued against them. Moreover, despite Defendants' arguments to the contrary, it is not clear to the Court that the Plaintiffs in this action could easily have joined the Sassman proceedings. By the time Plaintiffs contacted counsel to initiate this action, the Court was preparing to rule on the Sassman motions for summary judgment. Regardless, the Court fails to see how Plaintiffs in this case would have gained much tactical advantage by taking a "wait and see" approach with regard to the Sassman proceedings. Had the Court ruled against Mr. Sassman on what were essentially purely legal issues, Plaintiffs' claims would have fallen as well. It is thus implausible Plaintiffs could have maneuvered themselves into a position to take another bite at the apple simply by waiting for a ruling in the related case. Furthermore, Defendants identify no prejudice they will suffer by entry of judgment in this case, when the Court has already ruled that all eligible male inmates must be considered for the ACP. Finally, Defendants' argument that this Court's decision is not "sufficiently firm" is rejected. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a pending appeal renders a judgment less final. To the contrary, appeals do not affect the firmness of district court decisions. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 327 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment, and Defendants' request for a stay is moot. /// /// /// ///
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31) is GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Stay (ECF No. 33) is DENIED. This Court's orders in Sassman are incorporated herein and any future orders with regard to Defendant's compliance with the Court's orders in that case shall be incorporated herein as well.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 15, 2015
/s/_________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT