Summary
observing that New York courts have "held that provisions of the City Human Rights Law must be construed broadly in favor of plaintiffs alleging discrimination and assessed under more liberal standards, going beyond the counterpart state or federal civil rights laws"
Summary of this case from Jablonski v. Special Counsel, Inc.Opinion
04-26-2016
Fletcher BENNETT, et al., Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. TIME WARNER CABLE, INC., Defendant–Appellant.
Kauff McGuire & Margolis LLP, New York (Marjorie B. Kulak of counsel), for appellant. Archer, Byington, Glennon & Levine LLP, Melville (Robert T. McGovern of counsel), for respondents.
Kauff McGuire & Margolis LLP, New York (Marjorie B. Kulak of counsel), for appellant.
Archer, Byington, Glennon & Levine LLP, Melville (Robert T. McGovern of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Donna M. Mills, J.), entered November 26, 2014, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws for age-based discrimination based on a theory of disparate impact, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that they were general foremen in their 50's and 60's, and that defendant's decision to eliminate the general foreman position disproportionately affected them in comparison to younger workers. Crediting their allegations for purposes of this motion to dismiss (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 N.Y.2d 144, 151–152, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131, 773 N.E.2d 496 [2002] ; Askin v. Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 A.D.3d 621, 622, 973 N.Y.S.2d 629 [1st Dept.2013] ), plaintiffs have adequately pleaded claims for age discrimination based on a disparate impact theory under the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 296 ; Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107; see Mete v. New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 21 A.D.3d 288, 296–297, 800 N.Y.S.2d 161 [1st Dept.2005] ; see also Teasdale v. City of New York, 2013 WL 5300699, *8, *12, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133764, *21–22, *34–35 [E.D.N.Y., Sept. 18, 2013, No. 08–CV–1684 (KAM) ], affd. sub nom. Teasdale v. New York City Fire Dept., 574 Fed.Appx. 50 [2d Cir.2014] ).
Defendant incorrectly argues that the Supreme Court was bound by the decision in Bohlke v. General Elec. Co., 293 A.D.2d 198, 742 N.Y.S.2d 131 (3d Dept.2002), lv. dismissed 98 N.Y.2d 693, 747 N.Y.S.2d 410, 775 N.E.2d 1289 (2002). This Court has previously recognized that disparate impact claims alleging age discrimination are cognizable under the State Human Rights Law (see Mete, at 296–297, 800 N.Y.S.2d 161 ), and we choose to follow our own precedent. Furthermore, this Court has held that provisions of the City Human Rights Law must be construed broadly in favor of plaintiffs alleging discrimination and assessed under more liberal standards, going beyond the counterpart state or federal civil rights laws (see e.g. Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept.2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 702, 2009 WL 2622097 [2009] ). We note the decision in Bohlke did not involve a claim under the City Human Rights Law, and therefore would not be dispositive of plaintiffs' city law claim.
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
RENWICK, J.P., ANDRIAS, SAXE, RICHTER, JJ., concur.