Opinion
No. 99 Civ. 12345 (LTS)(AJP)
December 8, 2003
Marshall B. Bellovin, Esq., Rachel S. Rothschild, Esq., BALLON STOLL BADER NADLER, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff
Michael A. Cardozo, Esq., Arthur A. Munisteri, Esq., CORPORATION COUNSEL FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, New York, NY, for Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants in this employment discrimination case move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's three remaining claims in this action. By Opinion and Order dated March 29, 2002, this Court dismissed several related claims against Defendants but denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") ( 42 U.S.C. § 12112), Section 296 of the New York State Executive Law ("New York State Human Rights Law"), and Section 8-107 of the New York City Administrative Code ("New York City Human Rights Law").
The Court has considered thoroughly all submissions in connection with the instant motion. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's ADA claim relating to her shoulder injury, and her national origin claim under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law, are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants' motion is granted on the merits as to the ADA claim relating to Plaintiff's gastric disorder and stress disorder.
Background
The following facts are undisputed unless characterized as claims or allegations. Plaintiff Sislyn Benjamin ("Benjamin"), was hired by the New York City Department of Health ("DOH") as a Supervising Public Health Nurse on or about March 21, 1994. (Defs.' Local Rule-56.1 Statement ("DR56.1") ¶¶ l, 2.) During the course of her employment, she worked in offices in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Staten Island, at various times under the supervision of Bertha Howard ("Howard"), Joan Rondon ("Rondon"), and Linda Fiore ("Fiore"). (Id ¶¶ 3, 7; Benjamin Aff. ¶¶ 11, 18, 25, 28.) Plaintiff is an African-American female of Jamaican origin. (DR66.1 ¶¶ 1.) Howard and Rondon are also African-American, but not of Jamaican origin; Fiore is Caucasian. (DR56.1 ¶¶ 4, 8; Fiore Dep. at 24:24-25.) Twice during her employment at DOH, Plaintiff was granted medical leave, first from October 19, 1994 to April 3, 1995, and then from February 11, 1997 to October 28, 1998. (DR56.1 ¶¶ 5-6; Benjamin Aff. ¶¶ 31.) Plaintiff was also subjected to several disciplinary charges, which she disputed and claimed were falsely brought against her as a result of discrimination. (Benjamin Aff. ¶¶ 42-45.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants repeatedly transferred her to offices that required a lengthy commute despite being on notice that she had a shoulder injury that she feared would be exacerbated by extra travel, and despite Plaintiff's requests on that basis for assignments to offices closer to her home. (Id ¶¶ 16, 18, 25-26.) Plaintiff further alleges that her supervisors harassed her by making derogatory references to her Jamaican heritage, by falsifying disciplinary charges against her, and by ridiculing her in front of other employees to sabotage her professional reputation. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 21, 33-51, 53 and Exhs. 14-18; see also Munisteri Decl. Ex. G.) This harassment allegedly gave Plaintiff gastric problems and a stress disorder that ultimately necessitated medical leave. (Benjamin Aff. ¶¶ 13, 15, 21-22, 27, 31, 37-38, 52.) Plaintiff was allegedly terminated on October 22, 1998. (Id. ¶ 55.)
Plaintiff filed a verified complaint with the New York City Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") (and simultaneously the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) ("EEOC") on May 19, 1997, charging Defendants with discrimination based on color and disability with regard to her gastric disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. (DR 56.1 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff received a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on September 2, 1999, and filed the instant action on November 1, 1999.
Plaintiff claimed only discrimination based on color in her CHR complaint. The CHR Determination and Order After Investigation indicates, however, that Plaintiff's "stress disorder, a peptic ulcer and gastric disorder" were also addressed during the course of the investigation. (Munisteri Decl., Ex. B.)
Discussion
Summary judgment is to be granted in favor of a moving party where the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A fact is considered material to summary judgment "if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and an issue of fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Holtz v. Rockefeller Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). The Second Circuit has explained, however, that the "party against whom summary judgment is sought . . . `must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . The nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotingMatshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
Plaintiff's ADA Claim — Shoulder Injury
In order for a district court to have jurisdiction to hear an ADA claim, the plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a timely complaint with the EEOC. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2003); Jurman v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2003 WL 21767506, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003) (applying Title VII exhaustion of remedies principle to ADA claim). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discrimination claim relating to her shoulder injury was never properly presented to an administrative agency and that this Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to that claim. Plaintiff's complaint to the CHR, which was also filed with the EEOC, only mentioned discrimination on the basis of color. It appears, however, that Plaintiff also asserted claims relating to her gastric disorder and stress issues during the course of the investigation. (Munisteri Decl., Ex. A, B (". . . although the instant complaint does not reflect complainant's disability (stress disorder, a peptic ulcer and gastric disorder) claim, it has been addressed during the course of the investigation.").) The Determination and Order After Investigation provides no indication of any assertion of a claim of discrimination relating to Plaintiff's shoulder injury.
Plaintiff argues that her shoulder injury claim is nonetheless related to her other disability claims and therefore should be considered in this action. There is an exception to the exhaustion requirement where a claim is treasonably related" to the EEOC charge. See Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Housing Preservation Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Service Care, 163 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). "`A claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was made.'"Deravin, 335 F.3d at 200-01 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359-60 (2d Cir. 2001)). Here, however; there is no such reasonable relationship. Plaintiff's shoulder-related disability claim arises from Defendants' failure to accommodate the alleged shoulder disability by assigning her to locations near her home so as to minimize any necessary commuting. Her complaints of gastric and stress disorder-related disability, like her claim of national origin discrimination, focus on alleged workplace harassment and allegedly ill-founded disciplinary charges. There is thus no basis for any expectation that attention to her shoulder-related issues could reasonably have been expected to flow from the charges that were asserted at the administrative level. See Jurman, 2003 WL at *3 (substance abuse-related claim would not have put defendant on notice of back injury-related claim); Chandler v. AMR American Eagle Airline, 251 F. Supp.2d 1173, 1178 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (prostate condition not reasonably related to back and leg injuries because requested accommodations differed).
Plaintiff's "gastric disorder" is also referred to throughout the parties' papers and exhibits as "irritable bowel syndrome." The two terms are used interchangeably, which does not affect the ADA analysis. There is also intermittent mention of Plaintiff's "peptic ulcer." For purposes of this decision, the Court considered all of these illnesses as part of Plaintiff's general "gastric disorder."
Plaintiff thus has not met the ADA's exhaustion of remedies requirement as to her shoulder injury claim. This Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claim. See Butts, 990 F.2d at 1401. Plaintiff's claim as to the shoulder injury will be dismissed.
Plaintiff's ADA Claim — Gastric and Stress Disorders
The burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court inMcDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs the substantive analysis of Plaintiff s claim. See also Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that discrimination claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws are evaluated in the same manner as those under Title VII and applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis);Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm, for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program. Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (applyingMcDonnell Douglas to ADA analysis).
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id., 198 F.3d at 72. In order to make out a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Cameron v. Community Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, Defendants argue that, in light of the factual assertions Plaintiff has proffered, she cannot meet the prima facie case standard and that they are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law to the extent her ADA claim relates to her alleged post-traumatic stress and gastric disorders. For the following reasons, the Court agrees.
Plaintiff, who has not worked since February 10, 1997, asserts that, as a result of the defendants' allegedly hostile and discriminatory conduct, she developed post-traumatic stress syndrome and gastric problems that eventually forced her to take two medical leaves, as she could no longer "cope" with the work situation. Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendants violated the ADA in refusing to accommodate the stress/gastric disability (which, she asserts, rendered her substantially limited in the major life activity of working and thus "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA) by eliminating the allegedly hostile atmosphere. As to her current status, she alleges variously that she could return to work if the alleged hostile atmosphere were eliminated (Benjamin Dep. at 70; Benjamin Aff. ¶ 30) and that she has not worked since leaving the DOH because her condition renders her unable to work (Benjamin Dep. at 71.).
To sustain her burden of proving a prima facie case and defeat this motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must show that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, namely that she suffers from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits her in one or more major life activities, that she has a record of such an impairment, or that she is being regarded as one who has such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 1995); Heyman, 198 F.3d at 72. She must also demonstrate that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position in question, with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1995); Cameron, 335 F.3d at 63.
Plaintiff contends that she is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The EEOC regulations for the ADA, which are to be given `great deference,' explain that, to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must be
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630G)(3)(i) (2003); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 140 F.3d 144, 150 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1998)).
If, as Plaintiff contends in her affidavit, she "would have been able to adequately perform [her] job responsibilities without suffering mental or physical disabilities" she cannot as a matter of law be deemed substantially limited in the major life activity of working because, by Plaintiff's own admission, her stress and gastric disorders do not restrict her ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.
Benjamin Aff. ¶ 30. (emphasis added)
If, however, the Court accepts as true Plaintiff's assertion that her conditions are so severe that she is unable to work at all, it is clear that she cannot meet the "qualified individual with a disability" prong of the prima facie test because she cannot show that she is able to perform the essential functions of the job even with reasonable accommodation. See Cameron, 335 F.3d at 63; see, e.g. Potter v. Xerox Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d 109, 112-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (inability to work under particular supervisor not a disability). Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the ADA claims regarding Plaintiff's gastric disorder and stress disorder will therefore be granted on the merits.
Plaintiff's New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law National Origin Discrimination Claims
In dismissing all but three of Plaintiff's claims in its Opinion and Order dated March 29, 2002, this Court ruled that, because Plaintiff had not explicitly raised her claim of national origin discrimination in the CHR complaint, Plaintiff was not barred from seeking a judicial remedy as to the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights' Law claims.
Defendants now assert that Plaintiff's state and municipal law claims for national origin discrimination should nonetheless be dismissed because the claims arose from the same transaction as Plaintiff's CHR complaint based on color, thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction over any employment discrimination claim arising out of the facts alleged in the CHR complaint. Defendants cite to Craig-Oriol v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 607 N.Y.S.2d 391 (2d Dept. 1994), which held that, where a plaintiff had filed a claim with the State Division of Human Rights based on age discrimination, the plaintiff was barred from bringing a subsequent action based on race discrimination arising out of the same facts and relating to the same period of time. Id at 391; see also Chudnovsky v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 2000 WL 1576876, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2000) (". . . the relevant inquiry [for subject matter jurisdiction] is whether the facts alleged in the administrative charge are the same as those alleged in the federal court lawsuit.").
The election of remedies provision of the New York State Human Rights Law provides, in relevant part, that:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of appropriate jurisdiction for damages . . . and such other remedies as may be appropriate, including any civil fines and penalties provided in subdivision four of this section, unless such person had filed a complaint hereunder or with any local commission on human rights, or with the superintendent pursuant to the provisions of section two hundred ninety-six-a of this chapter . . .
N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9) (McKinney 2003).
Similarly, the New York City Human Rights Law provides, in relevant part, that:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice as defined in chapter one of this title . . . shall have a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages, including punitive damages, and for injunctive relief and such other remedies as may be appropriate, unless such person has filed a complaint with the city commission on human rights or with the state division of human rights with respect to such alleged unlawful discriminatory practice or act of discriminatory harassment or violence.
N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-502(a) (Supp. 2002).
While Plaintiff's CHR complaint was based on color, and she now asserts state and municipal claims based on national origin, both claims arise out of the same set of factual allegations regarding events and conduct in the workplace. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted in the CHR complaint that she was subjected to harassment by her supervisor, Joan Rondon, and that such harassment included transferring her, writing her up, filing false charges regarding her performance, and threatening termination. (Munisteri Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff makes the same allegations before this Court, albeit in support of a claim of discrimination based on national origin rather than color. (Benjamin Aff. ¶¶ 21-23, 39, 42-50.) Moreover, even though Plaintiff alleges facts here that were not presented in the CHR complaint, including allegations of comments regarding her Jamaican heritage and additional facts about harassment by supervisors other than Rondon, the national origin claim nonetheless arises out of the same alleged conduct (i.e. harassment by supervisors while employed by the DOH). See Lyman v. City of New York, 1997 WL 473976, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1997).
In light of the holding in Craig-Oriol, the Court is now persuaded that Plaintiff's national origin claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As the Second Circuit has explained, "a state law depriving its courts of jurisdiction over a state law claim also operates to divest a federal court of jurisdiction to decide the claim." Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 58 F.3d 879, 884 (2d Cir. 1995). Defects in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the proceedings and must be addressed by the Court accordingly. Id at 882; Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Because Plaintiff elected to pursue her employment discrimination claim by filing a complaint with the City Human Rights Commission, she is barred from seeking a judicial remedy on her state and local claims that national origin bias was at the root of the discrimination she allegedly suffered in the workplace.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's ADA claim as to her shoulder injury, and her national origin claim pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Right Law, are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's ADA claim for her gastric disorder and stress disorder. There being no claims remaining for trial, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in Defendants' favor and close this case.
SO ORDERED.