Opinion
2011-12-30
In the Matter of Leydy S. BELLO, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMPORARY AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, Respondent.
Leydy S. Bello, Petitioner pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of Counsel), for Respondent.
Leydy S. Bello, Petitioner pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination following a fair hearing that required her to repay the emergency assistance funds paid to her electric and gas services providers. “[T]he role of a court reviewing an administrative determination is limited to ensuring that the determination arrived at following an adversarial hearing is supported by substantial evidence” ( Matter of Jason B. v. Novello, 12 N.Y.3d 107, 114, 876 N.Y.S.2d 682, 904 N.E.2d 818; see CPLR 7803[4]; Faber v. Merrifield, 11 A.D.3d 1009, 782 N.Y.S.2d 495). “Substantial evidence means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” ( Matter of Johnson v. Town of Amherst, 74 A.D.3d 1896, 1897, 902 N.Y.S.2d 874, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 712, 2010 WL 4181994 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183).
Here, respondent concluded that petitioner was required to repay the emergency assistance funds in question inasmuch as her gross monthly income exceeded the applicable public assistance standard of need (see 18 NYCRR 352.5[e]; see generally New York State Off. of Temporary & Disability Assistance Administrative Directive 2002 ADM–02). Petitioner contends that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence because respondent erroneously characterized an “interest-free loan” as income in calculating her gross monthly income. We reject that contention. Respondent was faced with conflicting evidence whether certain funds received by petitioner were loans rather than income. “ ‘[I]t is for the administrative tribunal, not the courts, to weigh conflicting evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and determine which [evidence] to accept and which to reject’ ... This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of respondent” in rejecting petitioner's position that the funds at issue constitute loans rather than income ( Faber, 11 A.D.3d at 1010, 782 N.Y.S.2d 495; see Matter of Padulo v. Reed, 63 A.D.3d 1687, 1688, 881 N.Y.S.2d 581, lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 716, 2010 WL 118231).
Contrary to petitioner's further contention, pursuant to respondent's “Energy Manual,” it is not required to pay miscellaneous charges, including reconnect fees ( see 18 NYCRR 352.5[e] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.