Opinion
C/A No.: 4:19-1673-RBH-KDW
06-04-2020
Jarreit Bellamy, Plaintiff, v. Ofc Dewitt; Ofc Sgt. Grate; John Doe; Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This matter is before the court on Defendant Ofc Dewitt ("Defendant Dewitt") and Defendant Ofc. Sgt. Grate's ("Defendant Grate") (together, "Defendants"), Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 10, 2020. ECF No. 74. Plaintiff responded to Defendants' motion on April 23, 2020. ECF No. 90. Defendants filed a reply on April 30, 2020, ECF No. 92, making this motion ripe for consideration. This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. Because Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is dispositive, a Report and Recommendation ("Report") is entered for the court's review.
I. Background
A. Procedural Background
On June 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this court alleging his civil rights were violated during and after an arrest on March 7, 2019. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's original Complaint named Officer Dewitt, the Horry County Police Department ("HCPD"), the Horry County SWAT Division, and two John Doe officer defendants. Id. at 2-4. On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint to replace a John Doe defendant with Defendant Grate, and the court granted that motion. ECF Nos. 15, 20. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against HCPD, the Horry County SWAT Division, and official capacity claims against Defendants Dewitt and Grate. ECF No. 38. The court granted that motion and the case proceeded against Defendants Dewitt, Grate, and Ofc. John Doe in their individual capacities. ECF No. 65.
B. Factual Background
On March 7, 2019, HCPD was notified of a potential kidnapping and domestic assault incident in Longs, South Carolina. ECF No. 74-1 at 2. Due to staffing shortages only one officer arrived at the scene of the alleged kidnapping and assault, and Officer Grate went to the home of the alleged victim's mother where the victim was present. Id. at 5. Once further police assistance for the victim was available, Defendant Grate was to provide assistance at the incident scene. Id.
According to an HCPD Report of Investigation, the female victim claimed that Plaintiff had struck her in the face and, along with another suspect, kidnapped her, held her at gunpoint, forced her to undress, duct taped her to a chair, and plotted to kill her. ECF No. 74-1 at 6. She also claimed that Plaintiff had consumed alcohol and cocaine. Id.
Defendant Grate attests that he met Corporal Granger at the alleged crime scene. Grate Aff., Ex. D, ECF No. 74-4 at 3. A bodycam video, worn by Corporate Granger, a Caucasian male, shows him walking the perimeter of a mobile home, knocking on doors, and announcing HCPD presence. Granger Bodycam Video, Ex. B, ECF No. 74-2. At the start of the video, another officer briefly appears on camera. Id. at 20:15-59. Near the end of the video, Defendant Grate, an African-American male, is seen at an exterior door of the mobile home. Id. at 20:18:52. Two light colored SUVs, marked "Horry County Police" are seen clearly in the video. Id.
Defendant Grate contends that upon receiving no response to their knocks, the officers reported back to HCPD and were informed that a SWAT team would be coming to the scene. Grate Aff., Ex. D, ECF No. 74-4 at 3. He states in his affidavit that once the SWAT team arrived at the scene, he left the premises in an HCPD Tahoe and relocated to a command rally point at a nearby school. Id. According to Defendant Grate, he was not advised that Plaintiff had surrendered until he arrived at the command rally point. Id.
The SWAT team bodycam video shows several officers on the scene dressed in camouflage with assault-style weapons. SWAT Sweep Video, Ex. C, ECF No. 74-3. In the initial seconds of the video Plaintiff can be seen kneeling on the ground with his hands behind his back being handcuffed by a member of the SWAT team. Id. at 22:51:01. Several members of the SWAT team surround and enter the mobile home and perform a room-by-room sweep of the interior of the home. Id. at 22:51:39 - 22:53:06.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff describes a "john doe officer then, under the influence of rage, adrenaline, testosterone, or out of spite [putting] handcuffs on [his] wrists too tightly as an act of retaliation or neglect [and] bias because he was part of the S.W.A.T. team." ECF No. 1 at 6. He states that "[b]efore the SWAT Team was set up, I surrendered without further incident." Id.
Plaintiff was arrested on charges of criminal conspiracy, domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature, kidnapping, possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person convicted of a violent felony, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. ECF No. 74 at 3. Plaintiff later pled guilty to a lesser charge of Domestic Violence First Degree and to one of the weapons possession charges; the other charges were dismissed. Id. at n.2.
Plaintiff brought this action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under the (1) Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment, (2) Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, and (3) Fourth Amendment Abuse of Authority/Power and Excessive Use of Force. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that he "soiled [him]self twice, was not allowed to clean and was humiliated by John Doe Officer." Id. at 10. He further alleges that "Ofc Dewitt used excessive force applying tight cuffs & forcing me in a painful position in the car making me sit in urine. All was done maliciously to punish me. I was in excessive tight cuffs and due to the positioning of my body caused more pressure to cuffs over 40 minutes causing permanent damage." Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, nominal damages alleging nerve damage, emotional stress and mental anguish, and loss of liberty. Id.
II. Standard of Review
The court shall grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;" or "showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
The Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), established the standard that the court is to follow in determining whether a defendant is protected by qualified immunity. That decision held that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id . at 818. When evaluating a qualified immunity defense, the court must determine (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 232. The two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis may be addressed in whatever order is appropriate given the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 236. In determining whether the right violated was clearly established, the court defines the right "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004). "If the right was not clearly established in the specific context of the case—that is, if it was not clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted—then the law affords immunity from suit." Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted). Defendants Grate and Dewitt argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 74 at 10-11.
A. Defendant Grate
In his Complaint, Plaintiff provides the following description of a "John Doe officer" and his actions:
John Doe officer then, under the influence of rage, adrenaline, testosterone, or out of spite put handcuffs on my wrists too tightly, as an action of retaliation or neglect [and] bias because he was part of the S.W.A.T. team that was called in because I never answered the door for Horry County police and felt that resources were wasted as well as man power and time.ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff continued,
Once in the car, I told John Doe officer my cuffs were too tight and that I had to use the restroom. I was told I was unable to use the restroom at that time. My cuffs were not loosened. He came back 10-15 minutes later. I was then asked if I still needed to use the restroom, I said "no," and showed him the pool underneath me,
where I had soiled myself again, I asked if my cuffs could be loosened [and] if I could be removed from the urine. He closed the door making jokes [and] humiliated me to other officers it was very embarrassing, especially when I was so emotionally distraught I soiled myself. He also asked if I needed to go to the hospital. I declined due to the embarrassment.Id. at 7. In his motion seeking to amend his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that "Sgt. Grate is the officer who car I was led to once I was placed in cuffs. After receiving and reviewing my discovery I was able to locate his name which I had no knowledge of prior to receiving my discovery." ECF No. 15.
Defendant Grate disputes Plaintiff's claim that he is the John Doe officer and asserts that Plaintiff was never placed in his vehicle and at no time did he have any contact with Plaintiff. Grate Aff., Ex. D, ECF No. 74-4 at 4. Defendant Grate argues that he is entitled to immunity because Plaintiff cannot establish that he had any personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's Constitutional rights. ECF No. 74 at 10. He contends that "there is no evidence that Grate had any interaction with Plaintiff." Id. at 11.
Plaintiff responds that a video of the incident offers proof of Defendant Grate's personal involvement. ECF No. 90. Citing to Defendant Dewitt's bodycam video, Plaintiff contends that it "shows Sgt Grate standing by car I'm sitting in. He said he never had any contact with me but can be clearly seen talking to me at 23:26 in video." ECF No. 90 at 1. In the video, an African-American male officer is seen standing next to the Ford sedan where Plaintiff was sitting initially. Dewitt Bodycam Video 1, Ex. F, ECF No. 74-6 at 23:25:52, 23:26:05. Defendant Grate argues that he was present at the scene "well before the events which are the subject of Plaintiff's Complaint . . . ." ECF No. 74 at 11. Defendant Grate also notes that the video evidence "indisputably shows" that he was operating a Tahoe vehicle, and not the unmarked Ford Taurus. Id.
The undersigned has reviewed four videos capturing the events of the incident occurring on March 7, 2019. ECF Nos. 74-2, 74-3, 74-6, 74-8. Corporal Granger's bodycam video shows Corporal Granger and Defendant Grate walking around a mobile home, knocking on windows and doors at the residence, and announcing their presence as HCPD. Granger Bodycam Video, Ex. B, ECF No. 74-2. In this video, Defendant Grate's face and body can be clearly seen at time stamp 20:18:55. Id. Two light colored SUVs marked Horry County Police are also seen at various points throughout the video. Id. In his affidavit, Defendant Grate attests that he was driving a Chevrolet Tahoe police vehicle at this time. Grate Aff., ECF No. 74-4.
Defendant Grate does not appear in a second bodycam video, taken by a member of the SWAT Team. SWAT Sweep Video, Ex. C, ECF No. 74-3. In this video, Plaintiff is shown kneeling on the ground with his hands behind his back. Id. at 22:50:49. A Caucasian member of the SWAT team, wearing tactical gear, can be seen handcuffing Plaintiff. Id. at 22:51:02. Defendant Grate is African-American and clearly not the person who handcuffed Plaintiff at the scene. Plaintiff also has no evidence that Defendant Grate was part of the SWAT team of which he alleges the John Doe officer was a member.
Defendant Dewitt's bodycam video shows Plaintiff sitting inside an unmarked Ford sedan. Dewitt Bodycam Video 1, Ex. F, ECF No. 74-6. As Plaintiff suggests, there is an officer standing near the rear car door. Id. at 23:25:52. The video shows this officer's face and it is not Defendant Grate and he is not identified in the video. Id. Additionally, as shown in screen shots from the Granger and Dewitt bodycam videos, the individual identified as Defendant Grate is not the same individual seen beside the Ford sedan. Ex. A, ECF No. 92-1. In the Dewitt video, Plaintiff asks the officer wearing the body-cam, "Who are you sir?" ECF No. 74-6 at 23:27:02. The officer that interacts with Plaintiff on video identifies himself as "Corporal Dewitt." Id. at 23:27:04. In his Response to Summary Judgment Plaintiff stated that he "thought it was [Defendant Grate's] car [he] was sitting in because he was the only one who came to talk to [him] while [he] was sitting in car." ECF No. 90 at 1. Plaintiff contends that the video depicts him "showing Officer Dewitt and Sgt. Grate [he] urinated in the car after being denied use of restroom." Id.
Based on the analysis of the facts presented Plaintiff appears to have misidentified the John Doe defendant as Defendant Grate. Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that Defendant Grate was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's Constitutional rights as required by §1983. "Plaintiff's failure to sue to the proper parties is not a minute technical failure that the Court is at liberty to overlook. Personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government official in his or her individual capacity." Herrera v. Finan, 176 F. Supp. 3d 549, 569 (D.S.C. 2016), aff'd 709 F. App'x 741 (4th Cir. 2017). See Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) ("While a plaintiff is not charged with pleading facts sufficient to prove [his] case, as an evidentiary matter, in [his] complaint, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that support a claim for relief."); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (stating that a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that a defendant's own, individual actions violated the Constitution). There is no indication that Defendant Grate was involved in the use of alleged excessive force in handcuffing Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged facts against Defendant Grate to support a claim for relief and summary judgment should be granted in his favor.
B. Defendant Dewitt
Defendant Dewitt also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity and, thus, summary judgment. He contends that even when the facts alleged are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot show that his conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. ECF No. 74 at 11. Defendant Dewitt maintains that his use of handcuffs did not constitute excessive force. Id. at 12. He additionally argues that his denial of Plaintiff's request to pull over and allow Plaintiff to use the restroom did not violate Plaintiff's Constitutional rights. Id. at 14. In response, Plaintiff directs the court to specific actions captured on video as evidence to show that material facts exist as to whether Defendant Dewitt violated his rights.
Officer Dewitt attests that he was instructed to transport Plaintiff, and when he arrived at the scene Plaintiff was seated in an "unmarked HCPD Ford Taurus." Dewitt Aff., Ex. E. ECF No. 74-5. Defendant Dewitt's bodycam begins with Defendant Dewitt, an African-American male, approaching a brown, unmarked Ford Sedan. Dewitt Bodycam Video 1, Ex. F, ECF No. 74-6 at 23:25:48. The video pans around and shows six officers standing nearby and one officer standing next to the car door closest to where Plaintiff is seated in the car. Id. at 23:25:44. Officer Dewitt approaches the backdoor of the sedan and Plaintiff is seen seated inside the backseat of the car with his hands cuffed behind his back with plastic flex cuffs. Id. at 23:26:17. Plaintiff complains about the cuffs being too tight. Id. at 23:26:26. In response to Plaintiff's question, Officer Dewitt identifies himself as "Corporal Dewitt." Id. at 23:27:04. Plaintiff is removed from the Ford sedan, walked over to Defendant Dewitt's vehicle, a Chevrolet Impala police cruiser, and placed in the backseat. Id. at 23:27:19 - 23:27:42. Plaintiff has difficulty fitting his legs in the car and can be heard to complain that "it's tight, man." Id. at 23:27:48. Another officer can be heard offering Plaintiff help with seating and Defendant Dewitt can be heard telling Plaintiff he is going to help with the cuffs. Id. at 23:27:54 - 23:27:59. After securing Plaintiff with the seatbelt and adjusting his legs, Id. at 23:28:31 - 23:28:46, Defendant Dewitt checks the plastic flex cuffs and cuts them off with a knife and replaces them with metal handcuffs, Id. at 23:28:53 - 23:31:42.
Defendant Dewitt's second bodycam video begins approximately one minute after his first bodycam video ends. Dewitt Bodycam Video 2, Ex. H, ECF No. 74-8. Defendant Dewitt walks to the drivers' side of the patrol car and enters the vehicle. Id. at 23:33:21. The camera's view out of the front windshield shows the sun beginning to set and the time of 6:35 can be seen on the car's interior clock. Id. at 23:33:40. Plaintiff's voice is heard but his words are indistinguishable. Id. at 23:34:04. Defendant Dewitt responds that he cannot pull over but states, "We're going to stroke it on out to J. Reuben quickly." Id. at 23:34:12. While Defendant is driving Plaintiff asks him about his charges, and Defendant Dewitt tells him that a hold has been placed on him for domestic violence and kidnapping. Id. at 23:36:50 - 23:37:12. Plaintiff continues to ask Defendant Dewitt about the charges. Id. at 23:37:37 - 23:37:50. Later in the transport Plaintiff's voice can be heard but his words are indistinguishable. However, Defendant Dewitt can be heard responding that per policy when putting cuffs on there must be at least one finger of space. Id. at 23:50:33 - 23:52:30.
Defendant Dewitt attests that pursuant to HCPD policy he briefly deactivated his body-worn camera and reactivated to generate a new video of Plaintiff's transport because the police cruiser was not equipped with an in-car camera. Dewitt Aff., Ex. E, ECF No. 74-5 at 4-5.
In his affidavit, Defendant Dewitt attests that "Plaintiff asked whether we could stop so he could use the restroom." Dewitt Aff., Ex. E, ECF No. 74-5 at 5. Dewitt also avers that Plaintiff had not asked to use the restroom prior to their departure from the scene. Id.
Defendant Dewitt states that for the first time, when they were approximately three minutes away from the detention center, Plaintiff complained about his metal handcuffs being too tight. Dewitt Aff., Ex. E, ECF No. 74-5 at 5. --------
When Defendant Dewitt and Plaintiff arrive at the detention center gate, the clock inside the vehicle reads 6:55. Dewitt Bodycam Video 2, Ex. H, ECF No. 74-8 at 23:54:06. As they are driving into the facility Officer Dewitt can be heard telling Plaintiff: "You don't need to be embarrassed man, nobody gonna judge you. Ain't no judgment." Id. at 23:54:23. Once parked, Officer Dewitt exits the vehicle, unbuckles Plaintiff's seatbelt from the driver's side, walks around to the passenger's side and instructs Plaintiff on how to exit the vehicle easier. Id. at 23:55:14 - 23:56:16. After Plaintiff exits the vehicle, Defendant Dewitt walks behind him and leads him into the facility; although cuffed, Plaintiff is able to move his arms. Id. at 23:56:17- 23:56:39. Once inside they are met by another officer who pats Plaintiff down, removes money from Plaintiff's pocket, and then removes his handcuffs. Id. at 23:56:57 - 23:58:30. After the handcuffs are removed Plaintiff can be seen flexing his fingers and rubbing his wrist. Id. at 23:58:21. While the detention center officer removes Plaintiff's leg shackles, Plaintiff points to and shows Defendant Dewitt his left wrist. Id. at 23:59:02. The video ends with Defendant Dewitt completing paperwork and releasing custody of Plaintiff to the detention center officer. Dewitt Bodycam Video 2, Ex. H, ECF No. 74-8 at 23:59:58.
1. Use of Handcuffs
In his response to the Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff argues that even after Dewitt replaced the flex cuffs with metal handcuffs, he complained that they were "still tight." ECF No. 90 at 2. Plaintiff notes that at the detention center he "showed Officer Dewitt the welps [sic] on [his] wrist (Ex 2) which can clearly be seen in video." Id. Plaintiff claims that by the time he was seen by medical personnel "the welps [sic] were gone and I didn't know it would lead to nerve damage." Id. Plaintiff also argues that in the transport car he was "forced into an uncomfortable position which caused pressure on [his] wrist which is cruel and unusual punishment." Id. Plaintiff argues that "Qualified Immunity should be denied because officer violated [his] constitutional right to be free from excessive force, [his] right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, 14th Amendment due process." Id. at 3.
"[A]nalysis of an excessive force claim brought under § 1983 begins with 'identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.'" Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). As stated by the Fourth Circuit in Orem, "[t]he point at which Fourth Amendment protections end and Fourteenth Amendment protections begin is often murky." Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d at 446. Like the plaintiff in Orem, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Dewitt arise during his transport to the detention center after he was arrested. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment applies. Id. (holding that the district court erred in applying the Fourth Amendment because the plaintiff's status as an arrestee required application of the Fourteenth Amendment).
To succeed on an excessive force claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [plaintiff] must show that [the defendant] inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering. In determining whether [this] constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d at 446 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff's allegations of excessive force stem from the use of handcuffs which he claims were too tight. According to the HCPD Report of Investigation, police officers were called to the scene because of an alleged violent kidnapping incident. ECF No. 74-1 at 5. The alleged victim informed HCPD officers that Plaintiff had stated "[w]hen the police come, it's going to be a war" and the victim believed Plaintiff "to be a danger to himself, as well as law enforcement." Id. at 6. According to the investigation report, this information "was passed along to proper command." Id. Bodycam video from the scene of the incident prior to Plaintiff's arrest show that two HCPD officers knocked on the doors of the mobile home and did not receive a response. Granger Bodycam Video, Ex. B, ECF No. 74-2. A SWAT team was called to the scene and Plaintiff was taken into custody. ECF No. 74-1 at 6; SWAT Sweep Video, Ex. C, ECF No. 74-3. The Report of Investigation notes that Plaintiff was "extremely inebriated" and had admitted to having recently used narcotics. ECF No. 74-1 at 6. Defendant Dewitt did not apply Plaintiff's handcuffs when he was initially taken into custody, but once he encountered Plaintiff and heard his complaints, he immediately offered to adjust the flex cuffs and attempted to loosen them. Dewitt Bodycam Video 1, Ex. F, ECF No. 74-6 at 23:29:14. When Plaintiff complained that the flex cuffs were still too tight, Defendant Dewitt cut them off and replaced them with metal handcuffs. Id. at 23:30:45. Plaintiff did not complain about the handcuffs again until they were en route to the detention center and less than five minutes away from their arrival. Dewitt Bodycam Video 2, Ex. H, ECF No. 74-8 at 23:50:33. As argued by Defendant, "it was objectively reasonable" to continue to their destination rather than having a lone officer pull over to adjust Plaintiff's cuffs by the side of the road in the dark. ECF No. 74 at 13 (citing Fettes v. Hendershot, 375 F. App'x 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2010)).
In his response to summary judgment Plaintiff contends that by the time he was seen by medical personnel the "welps" on his wrist were gone. ECF No. 90 at 2. The "Booking Medical/Mental Health Screening" dated March 7, 2019, indicates that Plaintiff responded "no" to the question asking if he needed medical attention. ECF No. 90-1 at 6. On May 15, 2019 Plaintiff was seen by medical staff at the detention center complaining of numbness and pain in his left hand. ECF No. 90-1 at 9. However, Plaintiff denied knowing when the issue started, denied any history of recent or old trauma, and medical personnel indicated that there was no swelling, deformity, tenderness or discoloration. Id. Plaintiff was not seen again until November 2019 for complaints related to left arm nerve damage. Id. at 10. Plaintiff complained of vague nerve pain in his left arm in December 2019 but indicated that the pain "comes and goes" and is "positional and sometimes onset is leaning or trying to sleep on that side." Id. at 11. Plaintiff indicated that he had been placed on medication and noted some improvement. Id. On inspection, Plaintiff's wrist had normal range of motion. Id.
Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could infer that the need for and application of the handcuffs were applied in good faith and there is no evidence that Defendant Dewitt's actions were done in a malicious or sadistic manner for the purpose of causing harm. The medical records on the date of Plaintiff's arrest do not indicate Plaintiff suffered an injury as Plaintiff denied the need for medical attention. ECF No. 90-1 at 6. See Jack v. Chapman, No. 3:16CV316, 2018 WL 1785480, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff failed to provide factual allegations to support his claims that the defendant subjected him to unnecessary use of force resulting in a back injury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). The undersigned finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendant Dewitt's actions or inactions constituted excessive force. Because Plaintiff has not established that Defendant Dewitt violated his constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding handcuffing.
2. Denial of Bathroom Access
Defendant Dewitt also argues the denial of Plaintiff's request to use the bathroom did not violate any Constitutional rights and he is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 74 at 14.
In his Complaint concerning allegations against Defendant Dewitt Plaintiff states: "I again, had to use the restroom & again I was made to soil myself. I was not allowed to be clean, made to sit in it until I arrived at J.R.L. [J. Reuben Long Detention Center]." ECF No. 1 at 8. Plaintiff argues "the constitution forbids the punishment of pretrial detainees, due process rights have been violated under Graham standards, excessive force purpose of punishment." Id. In his response in opposition to summary judgment Plaintiff argues that the video evidence shows that when he "was getting out the car at the detention center [he] told [Defendant Dewitt] [he] peed in the car and that this was embarrassing." ECF No. 90 at 2.
"The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). The Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). However, "'the Fourth Amendment . . . applies to the initial decision to detain an accused, not to the conditions of confinement after that decision has been made.' Once the single act of detaining an individual has been accomplished, the [Fourth] Amendment ceases to apply." Robles v. Prince George's Cty., Maryland, 302 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2002)(quoting Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1163 (4th Cir. 1997)(en banc)). Here, Plaintiff encountered Defendant Dewitt after he was handcuffed and arrested; the denial of bathroom access occurred on the way to the detention center. Dewitt Aff., Ex. E, ECF No. 74-5 at 5. The undersigned therefore recommends a finding that there are no material questions of fact regarding Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges an Eighth Amendment violation of cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 90 at 3. However, the "Eighth Amendment standard applies 'only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 398-99 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671, n. 40 (1977). Plaintiff's case had not been formally adjudicated at the time of the events at issue. Accordingly, the undersigned will consider Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Dewitt's denial of bathroom access violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. ECF No. 1 at 5, ECF No. 90 at 3.
"Broadly speaking, the substantive due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against egregious, arbitrary governmental conduct. Only governmental conduct that 'shocks the conscience' is actionable as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Young v. City of Mt. Rainer, 238 F.3d 567, 574 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). In Davis v. Wright, an arrestee plaintiff was denied use of the bathroom after informing the officer of a medical condition related to urination, making approximately six requests to her detaining officer and, subsequently, urinating on herself. Davis v. Wright, No. 3:14CV161, 2014 WL 5361335, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2014). Davis alleged a violation of her due process rights. Id. The court analyzed whether the plaintiff had alleged a violation of a constitutional right. Id. at *3.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a jail official does not act with 'deliberate indifference' towards an inmate's needs 'unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'"Id. (emphasis in original). The Davis court held that "[w]hile Plaintiff no doubt experienced discomfort and embarrassment upon urinating in her clothing, that does not equate with a violation of her substantive due process rights under the Farmer v. Brennan standard." Id. at *3 (noting there was nothing in plaintiff's complaint to suggest the officer "drew the inference" that plaintiff would suffer "serious harm" if denied restroom access pending her transport to the county jail).
After examining the evidence in this case, the undersigned recommends that Defendant Dewitt's denying Plaintiff access to a restroom was not egregious, arbitrary governmental conduct that shocks the conscience. Defendant Dewitt is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Dewitt violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant Dewitt violated any of his constitutional rights. Even if Plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right, Defendant Dewitt should be shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants Grate and Dewitt's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 74, be granted and Plaintiff's claims against them dismissed.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. June 4, 2020
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge