Opinion
February 20, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see, Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87).
Here, the entire complaint is predicated on a mere banking dispute arising out of a computer entry. The defendant bank declined to accept a third-party check tendered by the plaintiff for deposit because the check had been drawn upon insufficient funds. This resulted in further conflicts between the plaintiff and the defendant Bank. As such, the acts complained of fall far short of the level of "extreme and outrageous" conduct required of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress ( see, Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 82 N.Y.2d 690). Further, the complaint is devoid of any allegations of a deliberate or malicious campaign of harassment or threat, or conduct which is so outrageous or atrocious in nature as to transcend the bounds of decency ( see, Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135; Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560). Although the plaintiff may well have been aggravated by the incidents pertaining to her bank accounts, and even assuming that bank personnel were rude or abrupt with the plaintiff, the law does not compensate an individual for "threats, annoyances or petty oppressions or other trivial incidents which must necessarily be expected and are incidental to modern life no matter how upsetting" ( Ruggiero v. Contemporary Shells, 160 A.D.2d 986, 987, quoting Lincoln First Bank v. Barstro Assocs. Contr., 49 A.D.2d 1025; Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 182).
Further, the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to indicate that the sole motivation for the defendants' actions was "disinterested malevolence", thus warranting dismissal of her claim of prima facie tort ( see, Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 117; Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Linder, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 333).
Lastly, the causes of action sounding in libel and slander were properly dismissed, as the plaintiff failed to identify exactly who overheard or read the alleged publication. It is well established that the identity of third persons to whom the allegedly defamatory statements were made or read must be pleaded with specificity ( see, Williams v. Varig Brazilian Airlines, 169 A.D.2d 434, 436-437).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.P., Thompson, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.