Opinion
21-35732
10-17-2022
PAUL BELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 7, 2022 [**] Seattle, Washington
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington S. Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01225-SKV
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and W. FLETCHER and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Claimant Paul Bell appeals the magistrate judge's order affirming the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his applications for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. Bell argues that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in assessing his medical impairments and certain medical opinions, and in discounting lay-witness statements. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms the denial of benefits.
The parties consented to proceeding before the magistrate judge.
This court reviews the district court's order de novo and reverses only if the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was based on legal error. Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means-and means only-such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (cleaned up). Even if the ALJ errs, this court must affirm if the error is harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a).
1. Bell argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical evidence. An ALJ considers all relevant medical evidence and must resolve any conflicts. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). "[A]n ALJ's decision, including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence." Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022).
The ALJ determined that the "record does not support that [Bell's] psychogenic movement disorder was as seriously restricting as alleged," despite Bell's "diagnosis with a functional (psychogenic) movement disorder . . . causing occasional speech stuttering and stammering and tremors." As support, the ALJ cited the records of Bell's primary-care provider, Dr. Ali Samii, dating back to September 2016. The ALJ found that Dr. Samii's treatment notes "do not support [Bell's] allegation of extremely limiting symptoms arising from his movement disorder." Bell has not shown that this conclusion is error or that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Samii's 2018 opinion-which found that Bell's complex motor tic disorder prevented him from being able to perform even simple sedentary or light job duties-inconsistent with the medical record. The ALJ considered all relevant medical evidence and gave sufficient reasons to explain why Bell's movement disorder was not as seriously restricting as alleged. Woods, 32 F.4th at 792; see also Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. The ALJ's finding was supported by substantial evidence.
In July 2018, Bell's psychiatrist, Dr. Frank Hoffman, noted that Bell's mental functioning presented extreme functional limitations on some days. The ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with Bell's longitudinal record-including other, undisputed medical evaluations-which showed that Bell's mental functioning was "at most, only moderately limited." Bell has not shown that the ALJ erred because an ALJ can reject an opinion presenting inconsistencies between the opinion and the medical record. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, Bell has not shown that the ALJ "selectively analyzed" the record because the ALJ cited evidence of Bell's normal concentration and attention, which contradicts Dr. Hoffman's opinion. The ALJ therefore properly compared Dr. Hoffman's findings with the entire medical record and provided "specific and legitimate" reasons for discounting Dr. Hoffman's conclusion. The ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ found that the medical record did not show that Bell's psychogenic tic and mental impairments (including brain fog, memory issues, and limited social functioning) were as restricting as Bell alleged. The ALJ found that Bell's mental functioning was "consistently within normal limits." In coming to that conclusion, the ALJ did not err in discounting examining psychologist Dr. David Mashburn's, 2018 psychological evaluation, which found marked limitations, because it was inconsistent with Dr. Mashburn's 2017 opinion that found Bell's cognitive functioning was within normal limits, and Dr. Mashburn's 2018 conclusion was not supported by Bell's 2018 mental-status examination, which found that Bell's mental functioning was overall unremarkable. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician . . . if that opinion is . . . inadequately supported by clinical findings."). Bell also contends that Dr. Mashburn's 2018 opinion was supported by Bell's subjective self-reporting. Given that the ALJ discounted Bell's self-reporting, a conclusion Bell does not challenge, Bell cannot bolster Dr. Mashburn's opinion with his own subjective reports. Accordingly, the ALJ considered all relevant medical evidence and provided "specific and legitimate" reasons to explain why Bell's psychiatric impairments were not so severe that they would wholly affect his ability to work. The ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ also did not err when it found that consultative mental-health counselor Suzanna Eller's opinion describing Bell's mental symptoms and limitations unpersuasive because it "did not set forth any specific explanation for the statements that [counselor] Eller made other than that the claimant's 'pain, mood, movement disorder impair sustained functioning.'" See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[A]n ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."). Further, the ALJ explained that counselor Eller's opinion was unsupported by the record because her conclusions were inconsistent with her treatment notes. The ALJ's decision therefore was supported by substantial evidence.
2. Bell argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the lay statements written by his father and his roommate. Both reported that Bell's impairments significantly affected his day-to-day activities and would undoubtedly affect his ability to work. The ALJ found these statements unpersuasive because they were "not supported by the objective medical evidence in the record." An ALJ may discount lay statements for germane reasons, see Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993), such as contradiction by medical evidence, see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on contrary medical evidence as a reason to discount the lay statements, and the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
3. Bell argues that the ALJ's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") assessment did not include all of Bell's limitations and that the ALJ did not adequately question the vocational expert concerning Bell's limitations. First, Bell's challenge to the RFC assessment is based on his prior arguments regarding medical opinions as to his limitations, which the ALJ properly discounted based on all the relevant medical evidence. Second, "the ALJ is not required to discuss evidence that is neither significant nor probative ...." Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Third, Bell cannot show how any of the allegedly omitted conditions would have changed his RFC or affected the outcome of his disability analysis. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless."). Substantial evidence therefore supports the ALJ's RFC assessments. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony in response to a hypothetical was proper when the ALJ's hypothetical "contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence").
The ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).