Opinion
A03-119 CV (JWS), [Re: Motion at Docket 80].
December 3, 2004
ORDER FROM CHAMBERS
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 80, third-party plaintiff R.J. Kenney Associates, Inc. ("RJK") moves to withdraw deemed admissions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. The Seward Association for the Advancement of Marine Sciences ("SAAMS") opposes the motion. Oral argument was not requested and would not assist the court.
II. BACKGROUND
This order adopts and incorporates by reference the background facts and statement of jurisdiction as presented in this court's order at docket 77.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) directs, in pertinent part, that "any matter admitted under [Rule 36(a)] is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." However, the rule also provides that admissions may be withdrawn:
[T]he court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.
IV. DISCUSSION
On January 23, 2004, SAAMS served RJK with a series of discovery requests, including eleven requests for admission. Because RJK failed to respond to the requests for admission within the time provided by Rule 36(a), the requests were deemed admitted. On or about August 18, 2004, RJK submitted its response to the requests for admission, claiming that the approximately six-month delay was "due to an oversight on counsel's part." Presently, RJK seeks to withdraw the deemed admissions pursuant to Rule 36(b), which directs that withdrawal is appropriate if (1) presentation of the merits is subserved; and (2) SAAMS is not prejudiced by the withdrawal.The first prong of the test for withdrawing deemed admissions "essentially asks if allowing withdrawal will aid in the resolution of the case." In its opposition to the motion to withdraw, SAAMS asserts that RJK's belated responses are "defective under Rule 36(a)" and concludes that RJK's request for withdrawal should therefore be denied. For example, SAAMS asserts that RJK's response to Request for Admission No. 1, which asks RJK to admit that RJK does not believe Belfor is entitled to additional compensation, is improper and should be stricken. Rule 36(a) directs that the answer to a request for admission "shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter." RJK's response to Request No. 1 specifically denies the matter, and thus is proper under Rule 36(a). Consequently, there is no support for SAAMS contention that the answer must be stricken. Moreover, the issue to be resolved by the present motion is not whether the new responses to the requests for admissions are proper, but whether withdrawal of the deemed admissions would aid in the resolution of the case. If SAAMS believes the answers produced by RJK are defective, it may move the court to determine the sufficiency of the answers pursuant to Rule 36(a) in a separate motion. The relevant inquiry here, however, is whether withdrawal of the deemed admissions would help resolve the case. Because the deemed admissions do not accurately represent RJK's position in the dispute, withdrawal of those deemed admissions would serve to clarify the position of RJK in relation to the other parties involved in this dispute. Clarity would assist resolution of the case. Consequently, the first requirement for withdrawal is satisfied.
Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2002).
In fact, all of RJK's responses specifically deny or admit the matter asserted, and therefore comport with the requirements of Rule 36(a).
The Ninth Circuit has indicated that "the prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) . . . relates to the difficulty a party may face in proving its case," including "the sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to the questions previously deemed admitted," as well as problems "caused by the unavailability of key witnesses." While acknowledging that "ample time remains before trial to conduct the discovery needed," SAAMS nevertheless asserts that withdrawal of the deemed admissions would be prejudicial because SAAMS "wasted six months of time and legal fees . . . assuming that RJK was going to vigorously contest Belfor's claims." While it is likely that SAAMS's strategy and preparation would have been different had RJK complied with the requirements of Rule 36(a) in a timely fashion, the expenditure of time and money is not the type of prejudice which can provide a basis to deny withdrawal.
Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348.
Doc. 82 at 7.
Withdrawal of the deemed admissions would assist in presentation of the merits of the case. There is not cognizable prejudice to SAAMS. For these reasons, the motion to withdraw the deemed admissions will be granted.
Having contemplated the outcome, SAAMS "requests that RJK be ordered to pay all costs and legal fees incurred by SAAMS for its participation in the mediation session of June 25, 2004." SAAMS cites Hadley v. United States for the proposition that in cases where the prejudice resulting from withdrawal of deemed admissions is not severe enough to warrant denial, the court may nevertheless order the party seeking withdrawal to pay a "substantial monetary fine and/or [the requesting party's] increased costs and expenses." In response, RJK contends that costs and expenses are inappropriate because (1) RJK's failure to respond was inadvertent; (2) SAAMS suffered no real prejudice in presenting its case; and (3) "the record is noticeably devoid of facts or circumstances that would warrant the imposition of costs and fees in this case."
Id. at 8.
Id., citing Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1350.
Doc. 85 at 8.
For the following reasons, the court is not persuaded by RJK's argument. First, the inadvertence of RJK's failure to timely comply with Rule 36(a) does not minimize the expenses incurred by SAAMS in preparation for the mediation. Moreover, those expenses were incurred because of RJK's failure to comply with the rules. Fairness requires the party responsible for the error to bear the costs of the mistake. Similarly, the fact that SAAMS suffered no prejudice in presenting its case ignores the expenses incurred by SAAMS in preparing for and attending the mediation session of June 25, 2004, expenses which would not have been necessary had RJK complied with Rule 36(a) in a timely fashion. Finally, RJK's argument that "the record is noticeably devoid of facts or circumstances that would warrant the imposition of costs and fees" is untenable given the approximately six-month delay of RJK's response to the requests for admission and the outcome taken by SAAMS in reliance on the deemed admissions.
For the reasons stated above, the court determines that an award of costs and fees is appropriate. The amount of that award, however, has yet to be determined. Therefore, SAAMS is ordered to submit, on or before Monday, December 20, 2004, a motion for an award of fees, properly supported, specifying and itemizing the sum sought. RJK may submit a response contesting the amount of the award (but not entitlement to an award) on or before Friday, January 14, 2005. If RJK opposes the motion, SAAMS may file a reply by January 21, 2005.