Opinion
Case No. 20020409-CA.
Filed June 19, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.
Thomas E. Lowe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Steven Lee Payton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mrs. Beesley (Wife) argues that the "trial court abused its discretion in determining that a portion of Mr. Beesley's [partnership] interest in Vintage Square [was] a gift." We "accord the trial court considerable discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced parties" and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). "In particular the `[d]etermination of the value of the assets is a matter for the trial court which will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.'" Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984) (quotingTurner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982) (alteration in original)).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mr. Beesley (Husband) received a portion of the partnership interest as a gift. On appeal, Wife merely reargues the weight of the evidence, claiming that Husband did not meet his burden for proving that part of the partnership was a gift. However, after Husband offered evidence and testimony about the value of the partnership, Wife "had the burden of offering . . . evidence on alternative methods of valuation." Argyle, 688 P.2d at 470-71. "Having failed to produce such evidence, [Wife] may not claim that the trial court erred in considering the information" before it. Id. at 471.
Wife also argues that the "trial court abused its discretion in determining that presumed costs of sale should be deducted in valuing the partnership capital of Vintage Square." We disagree. Husband offered the testimony of two financial experts who are accountants. They testified that all financial documents were prepared according to "standard, accepted accounting practice." Wife did not offer any expert testimony or evidence contrary to the accounting procedures used by Husband's experts. See Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ¶ 42 ("If [Wife] wishes to discredit the testimony . . . [s]he is, of course, welcome to invite an expert witness of [her] own to contradict [it]."). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking into account presumed costs of sale for the partnership. See id.; Argyle, 688 P.2d at 471. Finally, Wife's contention that Husband's experts relied on documents that were inadmissible is unavailing. See GAW v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1137 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) ("Utah Rule of Evidence 703 . . . allows an expert to base an opinion on admissible evidence and inadmissible evidence of the kind that experts in the field use.").
Without specifying a basis, Husband requests "an award of attorney fees and costs necessitated by this appeal." The trial court ordered the parties to bear their own attorney fees below. We do likewise on appeal. However, Husband is entitled to his costs on appeal, pursuant to rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R.App.P. 34(a).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, and Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.