Opinion
Case No. 98-75330.
June 28, 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Introduction —
This is a disability discrimination case under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA). Plaintiff, Robert Beaudoin (Beaudoin) is suing his former employer, defendant Customized Transpertation Incorporated (CTI), for failure to accommodate his disability. Presently before the Court is CTI's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Beaudoin does not qualify as a disabled individual, and even is he does, he did not suffer adverse employment action because he voluntarily resigned and was not constructively discharged. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
II. Background
CTI provides value-added services, such as managing customer's supply chains and providing warehousing, among other services, primarily for the automotive manufacturing industry (Bellinger Dep. Tr., p. 7). At all relevant times, Beaudoin worked for CTI, first as a warehouse supervisor, aid then as a dispatch supervisor. The series of events from which this case arose began in 1995, when Beaudoin suffered a heart attack.
A.
In November 1995, CTI hired Beaudoin as a warehouse supervisor (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., p. 12). Beaudoin suffered a heart attack in December 1995. He returned to work on January 29, 1996 after producing a return to work authorization from his doctor. (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., pp. 10 and 48-49). In November 1997, Beaudoin was transferred by CTI from warehouse supervisor to third shift dispatch supervisor after his warehouse supervisor position ended as a result of contract termination by a CTI customer. (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., pp. 22 and 33-34). As dispatch supervisor, Beaudoin received several written warnings from his superior regarding performance deficiencies. (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., pp. 51-52). Beaudoin later received a performance improvement plan on March 12, 1998. (Bellinger Dep. Tr. Exhibit 7, p. 61).
On March 15, 1998, Beaudoin called in sick. He requested, and was granted, a 2-week medical leave of absence during which he was to undergo testing on his heart. He also requested a job reassignment, "due to stress," on March 17, 1998. (Bellinger Dep. Tr., pp. 51-52). Beaudoin, however, admits that he is unaware of, and cannot specifically identify a less stressful position within CTI. (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., pp. 83-84)
CTI granted an extension of Beaudoin's leave of absence and then granted him a 90-day disability leave, under the Family and Medical Leave Act, during which time Beaudoin received 75% of his weekly salary. (Bellinger Dep. Tr., p. 33). At the conclusion of this leave of absence, on July 7, 1998, Beaudoin tendered his written resignation. (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., pp. 57-59 and Bellinger's Dep. Tr., p. 34). Beaudoin never tendered a return to work authorization because his physician refused to issue the authorization "without proof that he had been transferred to a less stressful position" (Affidavit of Dr. Papasifakis, Plaintiff's Exhibit K, Response to S.J, Plaintiff's Dep. Pp. 59-60 and 76).
B.
In August 1998 and November 1998, Beaudoin completed applications to various companies for jobs similar to his dispatch supervisor position. On his applications, he did not identify any medical restrictions and stated that he was still employed by CTI. Beaudoin verbally informed interviewers of the respective employers of his heart condition. (Plaintiff's Dep. Tr., p. 46). Beaudoin accepted employment with Ryan Transportation (Ryan) in September 1998 but resigned after one month when his probationary period was extended. (Defendant's Exhibit 17, Motion for S.J., Plaintiff's Exhibit P, Response to Motion for S.J.). Beaudoin then accepted a job with Cassens Transportation (Cassens) in December 1998.
At both Ryan and Cassens, Beaudoin's preemployment physicals demonstrated no medical restrictions for any job duties (Defendant's Exhibits 16 and 18, Motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's Exhibits N and O, Response to Motion for S.J.). Beaudoin performed job duties similar to those that he performed at CTI since November 1998, without any medical restrictions or accommodations. Beaudoin, however, claims that his current duties at Cassens are "modified and less stressful." (Plaintiff's Deposition Transcript, pp. 42-43, 75, 84-85.) Beaudoin filed a claim with the EEOC against CTI and was issued a right to sue letter in October 1998.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue of material fact when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court must decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." In re Dollar Corp., 25 F.3d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). In so doing, the Court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1995).
IV. Analysis A.
Under the ADA, no employer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he:
1. is disabled;
2. is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation;
3. suffered an adverse employment decision; and
4. the employer knew or had reason to know of her disability.Monette v. Electronic Data Systems, 99 f.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996).
CTI contends that Beaudoin is not disabled under the ADA, and as such was under no duty to make accommodations. Alternatively, CTI contends that Beaudoin cannot establish that he was otherwise qualified, with or without an accommodation, because he never tendered a work authorization form from his physician. In addition, CTI argues that Beaudoin did not suffer an adverse employment action and was not constructively discharged.
1.
Under the ADA, "disability" means, with respect to an individual —
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A physical or mental impairment means "[a]ny physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more of the following body systems . . . cardiovascular" 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(i). Beaudoin relies on this EEOC definition of a physical or mental impairment to establish the existence of a disability and argues that his major life activity of working is substantially limited.
Working is a "major life activity" under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "Substantially limits" means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
In determining whether plaintiff is substantially limited the Court must take into account the nature and severity of the impairment. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i). Beaudoin argues that because he suffers from a cardiovascular impairment, namely a myocardial infarction, his major life activity of working is substantially limited.
2.
In order to be considered substantially limited in his life activity of work, Beaudoin must be:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see also, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
Beaudoin contends that he is substantially limited in every range and class of jobs. Plaintiff's brief in Response to S.J. at 14. InMcKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. USA., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997), the plaintiff was afflicted with carpal tunnel syndrome. Despite expert testimony that the plaintiff could not perform medium or heavy work, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, found that she was not disabled. Id. at 373. The Sixth Circuit held:
the physical restrictions caused by plaintiff's disability do not significantly restrict her ability to perform the class of jobs at issue, manufacturing jobs; at best, her evidence supports conclusion that her impairment disqualifies her form only the narrow range of assembly line manufacturing jobs that require repetitive motion or frequent lifting of more than ten pounds. It follows that her limited impairment would not significantly restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes.Id. Thus, under this analysis, a class of jobs here would be all supervisory jobs, not simply a third shift dispatcher supervisor position at CTI.
In Muthler v. Ann Arbor Machine, Inc., 18 F. Supp.2d 722, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1998), plaintiff had a heart condition that restricted his ability to work long hours. Plaintiff's physicians had restricted him to working no more than 32 hours, and while one of the main bases of the court's holding is that the inability to work overtime does not constitute a "substantial limitation on a major life activity," the court also held that the inability to perform either a particular job for a particular employer or a narrow range of jobs is not a disability. Id. at 727. Moreover, the court held that the inability to perform a high stress job with long hours also does not render an individual "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class or broad range of jobs in various classes, the criteria for being substantially limited in the major life activity of working.Id. at 728.
3.
Beaudoin has not shown that he is precluded from performing a broad range of jobs in various classes. Rather, as CTI correctly contends, Beaudoin's ability to locate and work at two warehouse/dispatch jobs, with duties similar to those he performed for CTI, within several months of his resignation, demonstrates that he is not disqualified from a broad range of jobs. Defendant's Motion for S.J. at 12-13. Additionally, Beaudoin fails to proffer any evidence to demonstrate the precise limitations of his impairment, nor does he indicate specifically what causes his symptoms. Merely offering conclusory arguments are insufficient. See Matuska v. Hinckley Township, 56 F. Supp.2d 906, 913 (N.D. Ohio 1999). Thus, because Beaudoin cannot show a substantial limitation in his life activity of working, he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that he is disabled.
B.
Even assuming that Beaudoin's condition qualifies as a disability, he must still prove that with or without accommodations he is capable of performing the essential functions of his job, and that his condition was not reasonably accommodated by CTI. Beaudoin contends that he was qualified to perform the essential functions. However, he never produced a return to work authorization from his physician indicating as such. Beaudoin also argues that CTI ignored his request for a reassignment or job transfer and, as such, he was constructively terminated.
Beaudoin cites Gilday v. Mecosta County et al., 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997) as support that he was able to perform the duties of his job with an accommodation. However, reliance on Gilday is misplaced because the facts are distinguishable. In Gilday, the plaintiff suffered from diabetes and stress and when he requested an accommodation, was denied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment holding that there was a material fact question regarding whether Gilday was a qualified individual with a disability. The court reasoned that "the ability to get along with coworkers and customers is necessary for all but the most solitary of occupations, and to the extent that his fluctuating blood-sugar levels impair this, Gilday's diabetes may substantially limit his ability to work." Id at 765. In other words, because Gilday's disability would substantially affect either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, summary judgment was inappropriate.
Here, however, Beaudoin is contending that his heart condition is aggravated by the stress from his particular job as third shift dispatch supervisor and requested an accommodation in the form of a reassignment. Although the court in Gilday held that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether Gilday was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with an accommodation, it did so because Gilday had shown that had he been transferred, he could have followed a health regimen and special schedule that would control his blood sugar fluctuations. In this case, Beaudoin failed to produce an authorization from his physician stating that he was able to return to work, a procedure that is mandatory according to CTI policy. Although Beaudoin insists that he could not produce the work release form without first being accommodated, even assuming that he could be accommodated in some way, he did not provide any evidence regarding his blood pressure, or specifics about his "disability" in which CTI could assess that "had he been transferred" it would have lowered his blood pressure or stress and controlled his heart condition. As such, Beaudoin cannot prove that he is able to perform the essential functions of his job at CTI, especially in light of the fact that his doctor refused to submit a letter without proof that he had been transferred.
Additionally,
A disabled employee who claims that he or she is otherwise qualified with a reasonable accommodation bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that the accommodation is objectively reasonable. An employer then has the burden of persuasion to show that an accommodation would impose undue hardship. Under the ADA, an employer need only reassign the employee to a vacant position. However, a reassignment will not require creating a new job, moving another employee, promoting the disabled employee, or violating another employee's rights under a collective bargaining agreement.Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Company, 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, CTI asserts that it advised Beaudoin that it was reviewing different locations but that it did not have any positions with "a less stressful environment." (Bellinger Dep.Tr., p. 32-33). It further contends that Beaudoin failed to propose any accommodation nor obtain a medical note defining the restriction more completely, and that Beaudoin offered no suggested alternative job that he was qualified to perform. The Court agrees. Beaudoin's main suggestion to CTI is that it bring in another supervisor or additional personnel. Under the ADA, however, "a reassignment will not require creating a new job." Essentially, Beaudoin was requesting that CTI create a new supervisor job and more positions to compensate for his inability to perform the functions of his job. CTI tried to find positions that were available, but Beaudoin failed to identify a job he was qualified to perform, and as such, CTI was unsuccessful in finding a vacant position with the little information it was given. Although Beaudoin requested to be reassigned to a less stressful position, no openings or other contracts were available that were "less stressful," and as indicated, an employer need only reassign the employee to a vacant position, none of which existed. Thus, Beaudoin has not established a genuine issue regarding reasonable accommodation.
C.
Finally, Beaudoin claims that he was constructively discharged from CTI. "A finding of constructive discharge requires the determination that . . . working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1984). In Easter, plaintiff proved that she was constructively discharged because:
on numerous occasions, other employees informed her (Easter) that they would not submit to her authority because she was a woman, that women had no business telling men what to do, that women were useful only as sex objects . . . They also made threats against Easter's family should she persist in working at Jeep.
In another case, Held v. Gulf Oil Company, 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982), the court held that plaintiff's working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant as to warrant resignation. In Held, plaintiff was subjected to various forms of treatment including constant lectures about her sex life and her use by management as an errand girl, and the overall continuous course of discriminatory conduct consistent with management belief that women and marketing shouldn't mix. Id.
The facts here illustrate that Beaudoin does not have a convincing constructive discharge claim. Beaudoin's evidence, looked at in its most favorable light, supports only the conclusion that he did not like the shift for which he was scheduled, and as such resigned. Beaudoin can point to no "aggravating circumstances" that compare with those relied upon by the appellate courts in Held and Easter.See Davis v. Pioneer Screw Nut Co., 706 F. Supp. 547, 549 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Moreover, the record does not indicate that the conditions at CTI were difficult or intolerable, nor that Beaudoin had no other choice but to resign. In fact, having taken a parallel position just two months later, demonstrates that the conditions at CTI i.e. his job responsibilities, were not so difficult that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.
When an employee voluntarily resigns, he cannot claim that he has suffered an adverse employment decision under the ADA." Hammon v. DHL Airways. Inc., 165 f.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 1999). In Hammon, plaintiff claimed that he suffered an adverse employment decision under the ADA. Id. at 447. Hammon was a pilot at DHL Airlines. He contracted pneumonia and took a leave of absence. Upon returning to work, he was screamed at by a flight instructor due to a mistake he had made and later became anxious and disheartened because of the incident. Id. at 446. He then told his supervisor and a chief pilot of his intention to resign, and was advised that his intention to resign would not be submitted for 24 hours and to call before noon the next day or else the resignation paperwork would begin to be processed. Hammon did not call for four days. The court held that Hammon failed to establish that he suffered an adverse employment decision because he voluntarily resigned. Id. at 450.
Similarly here, after Beaudoin advised CTI of his intent to resign, he also submitted a formal letter of resignation. He was not forced to do so, either actually or constructively. Therefore, Beaudoin resigned voluntarily and as such, did not suffer an adverse employment action.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED.
While the Court customarily has oral argument on motions, as can be seen from the Court's analysis, oral argument is not necessary in this case. See Local Rule 7.1(e).