Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Alan S. Rosenfield, Judge. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MC 016336
Girardi & Keese, Thomas V. Girardi and Vincent J. Carter for Plaintiff and Appellant.
David Edward Ambill for Defendant and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Genie Beauchamp sued her stepmother, Donna Martin, alleging causes of action for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, partnership accounting, declaratory relief, breach of joint venture, quiet title, and specific performance. After a one-day bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Martin on all causes of action. Beauchamp contends that substantial evidence does not support the judgment. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 1999, Beauchamp decided to move out of a house she rented in Lancaster. Beauchamp and Martin talked about the possibility of Beauchamp renting a home closer to her place of work in the San Fernando Valley. Because Beauchamp could not afford to purchase a home on her own, they agreed that Beauchamp would look for an affordable home in the Palmdale area, Martin would purchase it, and Beauchamp would pay Martin monthly to live in the home. Martin was living in Visalia at the time, so Beauchamp took on the responsibility of finding an appropriate home. Martin supplied the down payment, obtained the necessary financing, and took title in her own name; Beauchamp’s name does not appear on any documentation concerning the ownership of the property, taxes, or insurance. Beauchamp’s monthly payments to Martin, several of which she either failed to pay or paid in partial sums, were based on, but less than, the amount of the mortgage payments, insurance, and taxes on the property. Initially the amount Beauchamp paid Martin was $675, but by the time Beauchamp filed suit it had risen to $716, an amount that reflected an increase in the mortgage payment.
The parties did not enter into a written lease or any other written agreement concerning ownership of the property, but they discussed the issues of payments and repairs. In return for the right to live in the house, and in addition to the monthly payments Beauchamp made to Martin, Beauchamp agreed to be responsible for normal maintenance and minor repairs. Upon moving into the house, Beauchamp made initial repairs, and, as compensation, Martin excused her from making payments for the first two and one-half months that Beauchamp lived in the house.
In 2001, because she needed extra funds to pay off her credit card debt, Beauchamp suggested refinancing the mortgage on the property, and Martin agreed. The refinancing generated approximately $13,000, of which Beauchamp received $10,000 and Martin received approximately $3,000.
In 2004, Beauchamp lost her job and had trouble making the monthly payments to Martin. At first she paid Martin partially for each month, but later she missed entire monthly payments. Simultaneously, Martin was experiencing her own financial difficulties, which made full monthly payments by Beauchamp imperative. Because Beauchamp was unable to make the monthly payments, Martin decided to sell the house. In response, Beauchamp filed suit on March 24, 2005.
Beauchamp’s complaint stated seven causes of action: (1) breach of partnership agreement, (2) breach of fiduciary duty (based on breach of the alleged agreement between the parties), (3) partnership accounting, (4) declaratory relief, (5) breach of joint venture, (6) quiet title, and (7) specific performance. Beauchamp alleged that she and Martin had entered into a partnership agreement, according to which Martin would purchase the property and Beauchamp would “pay all mortgage, taxes and utilities on the house, as well as be[] responsible for any repairs . . . .” Beauchamp also alleged that, according to their agreement, only Beauchamp had the right to decide when to sell the house, and Beauchamp and Martin agreed to split the proceeds from the sale. Beauchamp contended that by unilaterally deciding to sell the house and to keep the proceeds from the sale, Martin breach the partnership agreement.
At trial Martin testified that she purchased the property as an investment for herself and as means of providing Beauchamp with an affordable home in which to live. Martin also explained that the funds Beauchamp received from the refinancing were a gift from Martin, not a distribution of equity. She further testified that she never told Beauchamp that they would share the sale proceeds, and that she never intended to do so, as she had always regarded the property as her own investment.
The trial court found for Martin on all causes of action, concluding that there was no partnership or joint venture agreement between the parties, or any other agreement on the basis of which to award specific performance. The court ordered title to be quieted in favor of Martin. The court also found that Beauchamp is not entitled to reimbursement for the improvements she made on the property. The court entered judgment against Beauchamp, and Beauchamp timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.)
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Finding that There Was No Agreement Between the Parties Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
In finding for Martin on all causes of action, the trial court found that there was no meeting of the minds on the terms of any alleged agreement. The court thus found that there was no partnership or joint venture agreement or any other agreement between Beauchamp and Martin that could support any of Beauchamp’s claims.
On appeal, Beauchamp argues that she introduced “overwhelming” evidence of the parties’ intent to share ownership, against which Martin presented “mere gainsay.” However, Martin testified at trial that she had purchased the property as an investment for herself and as an affordable rental unit for Beauchamp to occupy. Martin also testified that the division of the proceeds from the refinancing was a gift to Beauchamp, and that she did not consider the $3,000 she received to be a partial reimbursement for her $10,000 down payment on the property. As stated in In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614, “the testimony of a witness, even the party himself, may be sufficient” to constitute substantial evidence.
Martin’s testimony that she never entered into an agreement with Beauchamp concerning the ownership of the property, and that she always regarded it as an investment belonging to herself alone, supports the reasonable inference that there was no meeting of the minds and thus no partnership or other agreement. We therefore affirm the trial court’s rejection of all claims that were based on the alleged agreement.
II. The Trial Court’s Finding that Plaintiff’s Improvements on the Property Are Not a Sufficient Basis for Unjust Enrichment Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
The trial court found that there was no basis for unjust enrichment and that Beauchamp was not entitled to reimbursement for the improvements she made on the property. Beauchamp argues on appeal that the “monetary and sweat equity” she poured into the property by landscaping and improving house fixtures increased the value of the property to Martin’s benefit and at Beauchamp’s expense, and that the retention of these benefits by Martin would be unjust because it was Beauchamp’s belief, upon making the improvements, that she was “investing in her future.”
At trial Martin testified that she excused Beauchamp from paying the first two and one-half months’ rent as compensation for the repairs that Beauchamp made. Martin also testified that, as further compensation for the repairs, she was charging Beauchamp less than the fair rental value of the property. Martin’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence that Beauchamp’s repairs and maintenance on the property were compensated for by the reduced rent described by Martin. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Martin was not unjustly enriched by Beauchamp.
For the following reasons, our analysis of the unjust enrichment issue also resolves the issue of constructive trust, which Beauchamp raises for the first time on appeal. Beauchamp does not identify the property, real or personal, on which she wishes to have a constructive trust imposed. Insofar as she seeks a constructive trust imposed on the value of any uncompensated improvements she made on the home, her claim fails because the trial court has determined, on the basis of substantial evidence, that Beauchamp was not entitled to further compensation for the improvements she made.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J., VOGEL, J.