Opinion
01 Civ. 1270 (SWK)
September 9, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
This diversity action arose from injuries allegedly caused by an automobile collision at an intersection in New York, New York. Defendants Bolla Taxi, Inc., ("Bolla") and Youssef Abdou ("Abdou") move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56(c). Plaintiff Molly Beattie ("Beattie") cross-moves for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) on the issue of liability against defendants Marc Mertulien ("Mertulien") and Mike Dorval ("Dorval"). For the reasons stated below, the motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
On or about October 7, 2000, Dorval, the operator of a medallion taxi sedan registered to Mertulien (the "Dorval taxi") collided with another medallion taxi sedan operated by Abdou and registered to Bolla (the "Abdou taxi"), at the intersection of Seventh Avenue and West Thirty-Eighth Street in New York, New York. See Certification of Marjorie E. Bornes, Esq., ("Bornes Cert.") at ¶ 3; Affirmation of Robin S. Herman, Esq., ("Herman Aff.") at ¶ 3. Beattie was a passenger in the backseat of the Dorval taxi. See Deposition of Molly Beattie, dated June 6, 2001 at 20. The Abdou taxi then struck a third vehicle. See Herman Aff. at ¶ 4. Prior to the collision, the Dorval taxi was traveling east on West Thirty-Eighth Street, while the Abdou taxi was traveling south on Seventh Avenue. See Herman Aff., Exh. 1, Police Accident Report.
Beattie commenced the instant action for personal injuries on February 20, 2001. On January 11, 2002, Bolla and Abdou filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 23, 2002, Beattie cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability against Mertulien and Dorval.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Law
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must initially satisfy the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which can be done merely by pointing to an absence of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54 (1986). The nonmoving party must then come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), by "a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322.
The Court "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party defending against the motion." Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609 (1970). The Court is to inquire whether "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986), and the Court shall grant summary judgment where the nonmovant's evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, speculative or not significantly probative. See id. at 249-50; Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987).
To determine whether the nonmoving party has met this burden, the Court must focus on both the materiality and the genuineness of the factual issues raised by the nonmovant. As to materiality, "it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude summary judgment, id., but the presence of unresolved factual issues that are material to the outcome of the litigation mandates a denial of the summary judgment motion. See Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1987). In sum, if the Court determines that "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Az. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593 (1969)).
II. Bolla and Abdou's Motion
Bolla and Abdou argue that they are not liable for the collision because they were not negligent. Specifically, Bolla and Abdou allege that the Abdou taxi, which was traveling south on Seventh Avenue, "had a green light and [was] in the intersection" of Seventh Avenue and West Thirty-Eighth Street when it "was struck by the [Dorval taxi], which had gone through [a] red light." Bornes Cert. at ¶ 3. However, whether the Abdou taxi had a green light is a disputed fact. According to a report Dorval filed with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Dorval alleges that he had a green light and that the Abdou taxi "went through [a] red light," causing him "to unavoidably hit" the Abdou taxi. Opposition Affirmation of Michael I. Josephs, Esq., Ex. 2, Report of Motor Vehicle Accident Report ("Josephs Aff."). Therefore, the Court is unable to determine who ran a red light at the intersection of Seventh Avenue and West Thirty-Eighth Street.
In their opposition, defendants Mertulien and Dorval also assert that even if Abdou had a green light at the intersection, Bolla and Abdou were also negligent. Specifically, Mertulien and Dorval allege that Abdou's deposition testimony establishes a triable issue regarding whether their actions were the only proximate cause of the collision. See Josephs Aff. at ¶ 4. During his deposition, Abdou acknowledged that he did not see the Dorval taxi prior to the collision as he drove through the intersection. See Deposition of Youssef Abdou, dated July 24, 2001 at 22. Mertulien and Dorval claim that Abdou's deposition testimony indicates that "he was proceeding blindly" along Seventh Avenue. Josephs Aff. at ¶ 6.
It is well established under New York law that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. See Doctor v. Juliana, 277 A.D.2d 1013, 1014 (N.Y.App.Div. 2000). Here, Mertulien and Dorval present sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact concerning the alleged negligence of Bolla and Abdou, i.e., whether Abdou failed to use reasonable care when proceeding into the intersection. See Salas v. United States, No. 94 Civ. 0062H, 1996 WL 6222691, *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1996); see also Walker v. Dartmouth Plan Leasing Corp., 180 A.D.2d 952, 953-54 (N.Y. A.D. 1992) (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff's inattentiveness contributed to collision, despite defendant's negligence in proceeding against traffic signal). Mertulien and Dorval have therefore presented evidence of Bolla and Abdou's negligence sufficient to preclude summary judgment in Bolla and Abdou's favor.
The Court finds that Bolla and Abdou have not sustained their burden of showing the absence of material issues of fact and are not entitled to summery judgment. Accordingly, Bolla and Abdou's motion is denied.
III. Beattie's Cross-Motion
Beattie moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability against Mertulien and Dorval. See Herman Aff. at ¶ 1. Because, as discussed above, disputed factual issues remain as to the liability of each defendant, this motion must be denied. Accordingly, Beattie's cross-motion for summary judgment against Mertulien and Dorval is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, (1) Bolla and Abdou's motion for summary judgment against Beattie is denied; and (2) Beattie's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against Mertulien and Dorval is denied. The parties are hereby ordered to appear for a pre-trial conference on October 23, 2002, at 10:30 a.m., in Room 906, 40 Centre Street, New York, New York.
SO ORDERED.