Opinion
Case No. 3:18-cv-01765-HZ
12-05-2018
TRAVIS LEROY BEAN, Petitioner, v. DOLLY MATTEUCCI, Respondent.
Oliver W. Loewy, II Assistant Federal Public Defender 101 S.W. Main Street, Suite 1700 Portland, Oregon 97204 Gordon Mallon PO Box 2383 Lake Oswego, Oregon 97035 Elizabeth JC Baker 1574 Coburg Road, #259 Eugene, Oregon 97401 Attorneys for Petitioner Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General Kristen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General Department of Justice 1162 Court Street NE Salem, Oregon 97310 Attorneys for Respondent
OPINION AND ORDER Oliver W. Loewy, II
Assistant Federal Public Defender
101 S.W. Main Street, Suite 1700
Portland, Oregon 97204 Gordon Mallon
PO Box 2383
Lake Oswego, Oregon 97035 Elizabeth JC Baker
1574 Coburg Road, #259
Eugene, Oregon 97401
Attorneys for Petitioner Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General
Kristen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, Oregon 97310
Attorneys for Respondent HERNANDEZ, District Judge.
Petitioner brings this habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging a state-court order allowing his involuntary medication at the Oregon State Hospital ("OSH") so as to restore his competency to stand trial. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2016, Petitioner was charged by Information with two counts of Murder in Douglas County. On December 14, 2016, his attorneys alerted the Circuit Court to Petitioner's inability to proceed by reason of incapacity where Dr. Michelle Guyton found Petitioner to be suffering from a psychotic illness, most likely delusional disorder. On December 29, 2016, the Circuit Court found Petitioner unfit to proceed and committed him to the OSH for further evaluation and treatment.
On March 9, 2017, Dr. Benjamin Goldstein of the OSH notified the Circuit Court that Petitioner was still unable to aid and assist in his own defense due to a delusional disorder. He was of the opinion that, with treatment including anti-psychotic medication, Petitioner might be competent within three to six months. Petitioner was unwilling to voluntarily take the prescribed medication, and Dr. Goldberg noted that because Petitioner did not demonstrate a danger to himself or others, he did not meet the OSH's criteria for involuntary medication.
On March 23, 2017, Petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Tanaka, administratively applied for permission to forcibly medicate Petitioner, but an Administrative Law Judge determined that Petitioner did not meet the criteria for involuntary medications. As a result, on June 15, 2017, Dr. Goldberg submitted a second evaluation to the Douglas County Circuit Court in which he stated that there was no substantial probability that Petitioner would be restored to trial competence in the near future because: (1) delusional disorders do not improve on their own; and (2) the OSH lacked authority to forcibly administer the anti-psychotic medication that would alleviate Petitioner's symptoms where Petitioner did not pose a danger to himself or others.
On August 15, 2017, the Douglas County District Attorney asked the Circuit Court to issue an order allowing Petitioner's forcible medication so as to restore his competency to stand trial. As a result, on April 19, 2018, the state court held a hearing where it evaluated the State's Motion pursuant to Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In Sell, the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution allows the Government to forcibly administer anti-psychotic drugs to a pretrial inmate, but only "if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests." Id at 179.
One month after conducting the Sell hearing, the Circuit Court concluded that Petitioner's case satisfied Sell's factors. Consequently, on July 16, 2018, the Circuit Court entered an order allowing the State to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to Petitioner so as to restore his competency to stand trial. The Sell order was not directly appealable, and Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus in the Oregon Supreme Court directing the Circuit Court to strike its Sell order, but the Oregon Supreme Court did not provide any relief. As a result, Petitioner filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus proceeding wherein he asks this Court to intervene and nullify the Circuit Court's Sell order.
DISCUSSION
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that in the context of a pending state criminal prosecution, federal courts should abstain from enjoining those proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Id at 53. "Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism." San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted).
A federal court must abstain under Younger if all of the following four requirements are met: "(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves." Id at 1092. If these factors are satisfied, a litigant can only circumvent Younger if he is able to make a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982).
As an initial matter, Petitioner claims that he does not seek to enjoin his criminal prosecution, only the Circuit Court's allegedly erroneous Sell order. However, the Sell order is an integral part of the prosecution the absence of which prevents Petitioner's prosecution. In this way, Petitioner's challenge to the Sell order is tantamount to a challenge to his prosecution.
It is evident that Petitioner has an ongoing criminal prosecution in Douglas County, and that the State has an important interest in prosecuting a murder case. Accordingly, Younger's first and second parts are easily met.
Younger's fourth factor is also satisfied without the need for extended discussion where Petitioner's requested intervention by this Court would effectively enjoin his criminal case from proceeding. As Dr. Goldberg opined, Petitioner's delusional psychotic disorder renders him unfit to proceed and will not improve over time absent the administration of medication. Thus, if this Court were to enjoin the administration of the medication needed to help Petitioner recover from his illness, he might never stand trial.
The central Younger issue in this case involves Younger's third factor--whether Plaintiff is barred from litigating the involuntary medication issue in Oregon's state courts. It is difficult to conclude that Petitioner is barred from litigating the involuntary medication issue in state court where he: (1) already received a lengthy hearing spanning two days where the parties presented evidence pertaining to Sell's factors, and the Circuit issued a "Sell order" in the wake of that hearing; and (2) presented the Sell issue to the Oregon Supreme Court in his mandamus action. While Petitioner is not entitled to directly appeal that Circuit Court's decision on the Sell issue until judgment is entered in his criminal case, and while his mandamus action was subject to discretionary review in the Oregon Supreme Court, this Court cannot conclude that Petitioner was barred from litigating the issue. See Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Al., 67 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1995) (discretionary review is not tantamount to bar); Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 746-49 (6th Cir. 1996) (abstaining under Younger where litigant could raise issues in administrative proceeding and by filing a petition for discretionary review in the state supreme court).
Petitioner argues that the State did not meet its burden under Sell, and that the Ninth Circuit has determined that involuntary medication orders are appealable prior to the entry of a criminal judgment under the "collateral order doctrine." He directs the Court to United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012) to support his claim.
Typically, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a federal appeals court may only review the final decision of a district court. Under the collateral order doctrine, an appellate court may review a district court's preliminary decision where that decision "(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Sell, 539 U.S. at 176. In Loughner, the Ninth Circuit determined that a district court's order permitting involuntary psychotropic medication was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. It found the issue "effectively unreviewable because '[b]y the time of trial [Loughner] will have undergone forced medication—the very harm that he seeks to avoid.'" Loughner, 672 F.3d at 743 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77).
Loughner is inapposite because it involves the application of the collateral order doctrine in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, thereby focusing on the direct appealability of preliminary or interim orders made by a federal court. As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, "[t]here is no doubt that interference with state proceedings is at the core of the comity concern that animates Younger." Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (bold added). Nowhere does Loughner discuss Younger, or the substantial interests of comity and federalism upon which Younger firmly rests.
Petitioner disagrees with the Douglas County Circuit Court's decision regarding the issue of involuntary medication, but neither that difference of opinion nor an inability to file any state-court appeal aside from his mandamus action amounts to a bar to his ability to litigate the Sell issue in Oregon's state court. If Petitioner regains his competency to stand trial as a result of the involuntary medication ordered by the Douglas County Circuit Court, and is convicted following a trial, he may raise that issue in the state courts on appeal following his judgment. He can also raise the issue in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in this Court should he find no relief in the state courts. He cannot, however, ask this Court to interrupt an ongoing state criminal prosecution where the state courts allowed him an opportunity to present his arguments in opposition to the involuntary medication order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons identified above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#1) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this fifth day of December, 2018.
/s/ Marco A. Hernandez
Marco A. Hernandez
United States District Judge