Opinion
No. CV08-4035501
October 3, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is an action to enforce a foreign judgment by the plaintiff, Beam Team, Inc. against the defendant, Stevenson Group Corporation. On May 22, 2007, a Georgia superior court rendered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff because the defendant's challenge to the plaintiff's complaint was not filed by a licensed attorney. The Georgia court awarded the plaintiff $62,527.50 on its breach of contract action. The plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the ground that the Georgia court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and therefore this court must enforce the default judgment pursuant to the full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States, article four, § 1.
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on similar grounds on March 5, 2008. On April 24, 2008, the court, Bentivegna, J., denied the motion due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The court, nevertheless, granted the plaintiff permission to move for summary judgment following additional discovery.
The following facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff is a Georgia corporation, and the defendant is a Connecticut corporation. Representatives of the plaintiff and the defendant met at a trade show in Phoenix, Arizona, where the parties initially discussed a proposed contract. The parties ultimately agreed to a contract whereby the plaintiff would provide interior construction services for the defendant in West Point, New York. The defendant mailed checks and sent wire payments to the plaintiff in Georgia.
There is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether the defendant conducted contract negotiations via telephone from Connecticut with the plaintiff in Georgia. According to the affidavit of the plaintiff's president, Richard Hall, he and Donna Stevenson, the defendant's president, exchanged phone calls between Connecticut and Georgia "multiple times" to discuss the proposed contract. (Hall Aff. ¶ 21-22.) The affidavit of Donna Stevenson, though, claims that the defendant negotiated the contract by telephone only with the plaintiff's representative located in Texas. (Stevenson Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.) There is no evidence submitted that the defendant traveled to Georgia in connection with the Beam Team contract or otherwise conducts business in Georgia.
Based upon the undisputed facts, the issue before the court is whether a Georgia court had personal jurisdiction over a Connecticut company who contracted with a Georgia company to perform services in New York on the basis of an initial meeting in Arizona and who sent payments to Georgia.
"The validity of the [foreign] judgment in Connecticut implicates the full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States, article four, § 1 . . . As a general principle, the full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution permits a creditor who has obtained a judgment in one state to enforce that judgment in this state. This principle is inapplicable, however, if the foreign judgment is a default judgment rendered by a court that did not have personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Corda Construction, Inc. v. Zaleski Corp., 98 Conn.App. 518, 522-23, 911 A.2d 309 (2006).
"The United States Supreme Court has consistently held . . . that the judgment of another state must be presumed valid, and the burden of proving a lack of jurisdiction rests heavily upon the assailant . . . Furthermore, the party attacking the judgment bears the burden of proof regardless of whether the judgment at issue was rendered after a full trial on the merits or after an ex parte proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 523.
"To determine whether a foreign court lacked jurisdiction, we look to the law of the foreign state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 524. "Georgia's Long Arm Statute states that [Georgia courts] may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident as if he were a resident of the State, if in person or through an agent he: `1) Transacts any business within this State . . .' This has been interpreted to mean that `purposeful acts' must have been performed by the defendant to tie it to the State . . . Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there . . . the defendant (must have) `purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation (must result) from alleged injuries that `arise out of or relate to' those activities . . . (T)he constitutional touchstone (is) whether the defendant purposefully established `minimum contacts' in the forum State . . . (that is, whether) the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there . . . [M]ere telephone or mail contact with an out-of state defendant . . . is insufficient to establish the purposeful activity with Georgia required by the Long Arm statute . . . Also, [a]n individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone (cannot) automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts . . . (P)rior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing . . . must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White House, Inc. v. Winkler, 202 Ga.App. 603, 604-05, 415 S.E.2d 185 (1992).
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-10-91(1) (2008).
The plaintiff argues that the Georgia court had personal jurisdiction because the defendant telephoned the plaintiff in Georgia to negotiate the contract and because the defendant sent payments via check and wire transfer to Georgia. The court cannot consider the telephone calls to Georgia because the defendants have raised a genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to their existence. The checks and wire transfers are the only undisputed evidence that the defendants have directed activities to Georgia.
"The Eleventh Circuit . . . places little weight on the mailing of payments to the forum state." Allegiant Physicians Services, Inc. v. Sturdy Memorial Hospital, 926 F.Sup. 1106, 1116 (N.D.Ga. 1996) (discounting the defendant's payments to Georgia in determining whether Georgia courts had personal jurisdiction), citing General Electric Credit Corp. v. Scott's Furniture Warehouse Showroom, Inc., 699 F.Sup. 907, 913 (N.D.Ga. 1988) ("the agreement to mail payment checks into a forum state does not weigh heavily in the calculus of contacts"); see also Signet Bank/Virginia v. Tiflis, 196 Ga.App. 433, 435-36, 396 S.E.2d 54 (1990) (holding that a Virginia court lacked personal jurisdiction over a Georgia defendant who, inter alia, sent payments to the plaintiff in Virginia).
The motion is therefore denied.