Nos. 05-07-00855-CR, 05-07-00856-CR
Opinion Filed June 17, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. 001-82325-07 and 001-82327-07.
Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
Opinion By Justice LANG.
Appellant Melody Gaye Beale appeals from convictions for burglary of a motor vehicle and failure to identify herself to a police officer. After a pre-trial motion to suppress was denied, appellant pleaded guilty to both charges and, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, was sentenced to ninety days in the Collin County jail for each charge with credit for time served. In her sole point on appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2007, between 7:30 and 8:30 a.m., the Frisco police department received a 911 hang-up call. The police called the number back and the caller reported a "suspicious" vehicle parked in his driveway. The caller described the vehicle as a maroon Land Rover and gave the police the complete license plate number. The phone call originated from a residence in Frisco. Frisco Police Officer Rowdy Vest was dispatched to the residence and arrived within a minute of the call. Officer Vest saw a maroon Land Rover with the reported license plate number parked in the alley near the residence. He observed appellant walk from one side of the alley to where the Land Rover was located, get in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and drive away. Officer Vest did not personally observe any criminal activity or see appellant violate any traffic laws. Officer Vest stopped the Land Rover and asked appellant for her driver's license, but she was unable to produce it. The officer noticed three purses in the Land Rover, which was "packed with various objects," giving Officer Vest reason to suspect appellant was engaged in theft or burglary. Appellant gave Officer Vest verbal consent to search the Land Rover. According to Officer Vest, inside the Land Rover he found three purses, one of which contained "a money market card, a cashier's check, . . . a Social Security card, [and] some other type of automotive card[.]" The items found in the purse bore three different names, including a male's name. Appellant was arrested and charged with burglary of a motor vehicle and failure to identify herself to a police officer. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. She argued the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. Officer Vest testified at the suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion and the motion for reconsideration. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to both charges in a plea bargain, while preserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The trial court entered findings of fact that Officer Vest was a credible witness and his testimony at the suppression hearing was believable. The trial court also made a conclusion of law that the officer "had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." This appeal followed. II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In her sole issue on appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. The State responds that there was a reasonable suspicion to stop appellant because the police officer "possessed specific, articulable facts concerning appellant's suspicious behavior." A. Standard of Review
Whether a specific search or seizure was reasonable is a mixed question of law and fact. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (citing Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)). A bifurcated standard of review is applied to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). This standard of review gives "almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts[,] especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (en banc)); see also St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725. Similarly, we afford the same deference to the "application of law to facts," also known as "mixed questions of law and fact," if resolving those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We apply a de novo review to "mixed questions of law and fact" not turning on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We do not conduct our own factual review as the trial court is the sole trier of fact, the judge of witness credibility, and the determiner of the weight given to witness testimony. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. B. Applicable Law
When a police officer stops a defendant without a warrant, the State has the burden at a suppression hearing of proving the reasonableness of the stop. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if the officer lacks probable cause. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (en banc) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. The appellate court must consider both the facts articulated by the officer and the "rational inferences" from those facts. See Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The reasonableness of a temporary detention is examined in terms of the "totality of the circumstances." Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. The court of criminal appeals has recognized "there may be instances when a person's conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, give rise to reasonable suspicion." Id. The factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information from another person. In re J.D.B., 209 S.W.3d 708, 711-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2006, no pet.) (citing Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1150 (2006)) (holding officer had reasonable suspicion based on a resident's report of "suspicious activity" involving a strange vehicle parked in a neighbor's driveway and individuals who did not live in the neighborhood); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The reliability of a citizen-informant is generally shown by the very nature of the circumstances under which the incriminating information became known to him or her. Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258. A stop based on facts supplied by a citizen-eyewitness, which are adequately corroborated by the arresting officer, does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 259. "To require officers who are apprised of detailed facts from citizen-eyewitnesses to observe suspects and wait until additional suspicious acts are committed, would be foolish and contrary to the balance of interests struck in Terry and its progeny." Id.C. Application of Law to Facts
At the time Officer Vest responded to the call, he had knowledge of a "suspicious" activity report from a residence. The caller reported an unfamiliar vehicle parked in the driveway of the caller's residence, which is accessed by an alley. Further, contrary to appellant's assertions, the caller was not anonymous because the police had the telephone number and address of the residence. Therefore, when Officer Vest responded to the call, he knew that a stranger had parked a vehicle in a resident's secluded alley-accessed driveway under circumstances reported as "suspicious" by the resident, and the circumstances were suspicious enough to prompt the resident to call 9-1-1. See In re J.D.B., 209 S.W.3d at 711-12; Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258. Officer Vest arrived at the scene within one minute of the call and observed the reported vehicle parked in the alley, in a different place, farther down the alley from the location reported by the caller. Officer Vest saw appellant returning to the vehicle from the other side of the alley and driving away. The caller had given specific details about the vehicle and those details were corroborated by Officer Vest's observations. See Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 258. During the minute it took for the officer to arrive on the scene, it was rational to infer appellant had driven a short distance down the alley and stopped, exited the vehicle to walk across the alley, and returned to the vehicle again to drive away. This behavior, when combined with the other circumstances, reasonably raised Officer Vest's suspicions of criminal activity. See Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. From the circumstances, a "rational inference" can be made that appellant was driving down the alleyway from house to house in order to access the driveways, with a low risk of encountering other vehicles, in a manner that facilitated criminal activity. See Curtis, 238 S.W.3d at 381. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the State established Officer Vest had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts and rational inferences, that appellant had been engaged in or was about to engage in a crime when he stopped and detained her for investigative purposes. See Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d at 741; Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 35. Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's sole issue is decided against her. III. CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress. The judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.