Opinion
Argued March 12, 1984
May 25, 1984.
Workmen's compensation — Course of employment — To and from work — Personal convenience — Executive position.
1. An employe injured in his own driveway after completing the days work and driving home is properly found not to have sustained an injury in the course of his employment, and neither the fact that he occupied an executive position nor that he carried property of his employer home alters such determination when the property was carried home only for the personal convenience of the employe. [543-4]
Judge BARBIERI filed a dissenting opinion which was substantially as follows:
1. The course of employment of a working corporate executive is necessarily broad, and a finding of a referee in a workmen's compensation case that such employe was in the course of employment when injured while taking work home should not be disturbed by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board when such finding turns upon credibility which must be judged by the referee. [545]
Argued March 12, 1984, before Judges ROGERS, PALLADINO and BARBIERI, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1515 C.D. 1982, from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of William Beahan v. Pittsburgh Software Consultants, Inc., No. A-81113.
Petition to the Department of Labor and Industry for workmen's compensation benefits. Benefits awarded. Employer appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. Benefits denied. Claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Denial affirmed.
Joseph S. Hornack, Abes Begler, P.C., for petitioner.
Francis E. Pipak, Jr., Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek Eck, for respondent, Pittsburgh Software Consultants, Inc.
William Beahan (Claimant) appeals from an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) reversing a decision of the referee and denying benefits. We affirm.
Claimant was a systems analyst for Pittsburgh Software Consultants, Inc. (Employer). He was also president of the company. On March 15, 1980, Claimant was working for a customer at another company's office, off the Employer's premises. When Claimant finished his work, he loaded his car with four of the Employer's computer discs and drove to his home. On the way home, Claimant drove directly past the building where the Employer's office was located. Claimant did not stop to drop off the discs because it was late and because he had been having trouble using his key to get into the building.
Although Claimant did not intend to do any further work with the discs, he took them home with him. While carrying the discs into his home, Claimant slipped and fell on ice in his driveway, sustaining a broken right leg and a dislocated right ankle.
The referee granted benefits and the Board reversed, concluding as a matter of law that Claimant was not within the course of his employment as a systems analyst when he fell. Claimant in his appeal challenges this conclusion of the Board.
Our scope of review in a workmen's compensation case where the party with the burden of proof did not prevail below is limited to a determination of whether an error of law was committed or whether competent evidence was capriciously disregarded. Nucci v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 70 Pa. Commw. 178, 452 A.2d 905 (1982).
Section 301(a) of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (Act) provides that an employer "shall be liable for compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of each employe, by an injury in the course of his employment."
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P. S. § 431.
Section 301(c)(1) of the Act defines injury to mean "an injury to an employe, regardless of previous physical condition, arising in the course of his employment and related thereto."
77 P. S. § 411(1).
In Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 497 Pa. 115, 439 A.2d 627 (1981), the Supreme Court held that Section 301(c)(1) contains only two requirements for compensability — (1) that the injury arose in the course of employment and (2) that the injury was related to that employment.
Krawchuk, 497 Pa. at 120, 439 A.2d at 630.
In the instant case we cannot say that the Board erred as a matter of law in concluding that Claimant was not within the course of his employment when he was injured. The Board found that Claimant chose to take the discs home for personal reasons, and did so for his own convenience rather than that of the Employer. The evidence supports this finding. Claimant in his testimony stated that he had finished his work for the day and did not intend to do any work for the Employer at home. Claimant also stated that although he had been having trouble with his key, he had been able to use it to get into the building on other occasions. These facts support the Board's finding that Claimant took the discs home for his own convenience.
Claimant argues that because he is the president of the company we should expand the course of his employment to include his decision to take the discs home. We do not agree. The fact that Claimant's actions were based on personal convenience removes the injury from the course of his employment, regardless of Claimant's executive position.
We find that the Board correctly concluded that Claimant was not in the course of his employment when he was injured. Accordingly, the order of the Board reversing the referee and denying benefits is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, May 25, 1984, the order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned case is hereby affirmed.
Most respectfully, I must dissent. The referee's finding that Claimant's injury was suffered "in the course of, and was related to, his employment" is supported by evidence which the referee as the trier of fact could rightfully accept. In accepting the Board's reversal based upon its contrary findings, the majority states: "[t]he Board found that the Claimant chose to take the discs home for personal reasons, and did so for his own convenience rather than that of the Employer."
Since, in my view, whether Claimant's acts were for personal reasons or for his own convenience rather than that of his Employer are questions of fact turning upon credibility, it was clear error for the Board, without taking additional evidence, to substitute its fact determinations for those of the referee. Artrip v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Mace, Inc.), 54 Pa. Commw. 502, 421 A.2d 1254 (1980); Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Commw. 176, 305 A.2d 757 (1973). For this reason, I cannot agree with the majority's view that the Board's findings should be approved if they can be supported by evidence in the case.
Also, while it may not be necessary to reach the corporate executive employe question, since the injured worker in this case was president of the corporate employer and as such was an "executive officer" of the corporate employer, entitled to employee status under the terms of Section 104 of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P. S. § 22, the "working corporate executive" has been accorded a broader scope of employment for workmen's compensation purposes than might otherwise exist. Forschner v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 60 Pa. Commw. 258, 431 A.2d 374 (1981); Artrip. Since we must view the evidence in the light most supportive of the referee's finding, we note that there is no discernable reason why the referee could not properly believe that the injured worker, in the corporate executive role of his dual employe relationship, was acting in what he considered, as corporate president, to be in the best interest of the company, the employer. The referee found that "some of his employer's work" was done in Claimant's house and that "he went to the office only 3 or 4 days per week."
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and reinstate the decision and award of the referee.